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ABSTRACT 
 
RICHARDS PLAVNIEKS: Nazi Collaborators on Trial during the Cold War: 
The Cases against Viktors Arājs and the Latvian Auxiliary Security Police 
(Under the direction of Christopher Browning) 
 
 
The Latvian Auxiliary Security Police, informally known as the Arajs Kommando 
after its founder and commander, Viktors Arājs, was a unique unit among the perpetrators of 
the Holocaust. Composed of a total of about 1,200 volunteers, it participated in all 
quintessential aspects of the “Holocaust by Bullets” in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union 
including raiding and looting homes; clearing ghettos; engaging in mass-shootings, anti-
partisan operations, and reprisal actions; and the rest. The direct deaths of at least 26,000 
Jews in Latvia may be laid at its boots, although this number does not reflect the unknown 
but considerable death toll the Kommando inflicted in the course of occupation duty in Nazi-
controlled Belarus nor the assistance it rendered in other Actions such as providing the screen 
at Rumbula – the second largest mass shooting at the time behind Babi Yar. 
 The defeat of Nazi Germany scattered the men of the Kommando who were not 
among the many who fell in combat during the Reich’s desperate death throes. The 
subsequent decades would see a variety of polities attempt to deliver justice to these 
criminals and discover the truth about their complicity in the Holocaust as a whole. All told, 
nearly a third of the unit’s personnel faced some type of formal judgment and were subject to 
various penalties. The Soviet Union handled by far the largest number of cases, while both 
East and West Germany and the United States took up the rest. 
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Each of these judicial systems – both Communist and liberal-democratic – involved 
in the prosecutions was unique, undertook the task at different times, and treated the 
defendants differently. This study seeks to view these legal systems through the prism of this 
one specific perpetrator unit with special awareness that the processes took place at different 
times and in the context of the ongoing Cold War. The explicitly comparative assessment of 
their relative merits and demerits is based not only upon the justice meted out to the criminals 
and how vigorously they were pursued, also but the volume of reliable historical data 
bequeathed to posterity by the investigations and the adequacy of the attempts to educate the 
public on the findings.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: 
THE LATVIAN AUXILIARY SECURITY POLICE AND COLD WAR JUSTICE 
The Crimes of the Latvian Auxiliary Security Police 
In early July 1941, immediately following the arrival in Rīga, Latvia, of the first units 
of the Wehrmacht and Einsatzgruppe (EG) A, a small group of Latvians under the leadership 
of a former police lieuteant and law student named Viktors Arājs volunteered for service with 
the German security forces. Officially, it was designated the “Latvian Auxiliary Security 
Police,” but unofficially it was dubbed the “Arajs Kommando,” after its leader whose name 
meant “plowman.” After a rampage in the first days following the Germans’ entry that killed 
several hundred Jews on the streets of Rīga, the capital of Latvia, and burned down its 
synagogues, the Arajs Kommando was deemed worthy of new tasks by its Nazi masters. 
These included the arbitrary invasion of the city’s Jewish homes and the terrorization, 
robbery, and arrest of the residents; the routine shooting of Jews and Communists in the 
Biėernieki forest outside of the city in early-morning mass-executions; and mobile 
operations, traversing the Latvian hinterland and acting as the triggermen in the organized 
“liquidation” of the Jews of Latvia’s small towns and countryside.  
Over these first few months of the German occupation, the Latvian Auxiliary Security 
Police became better organized, its initial core of about 300 rowdy volunteers expanded 
while becoming ever more experienced and disciplined, and its uniforms and equipment 
became standardized. On 30 November and 8 December 1941, the Arajs Kommando was 
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instrumental in providing the cordon for the notorious Rumbula Action that took place in the 
Rumbula forest outside of Rīga. This was the second largest mass shooting of the Holocaust 
up to that point, the 25,000-plus victims of which were exceeded in number only by the 
victims at the massacre at Babi Yar outside Kiev the previous September. German, Austrian, 
and Czech Jews deported to Latvia then became the Kommando’s next targets, the Jews of 
Latvia having already been killed except for a small remnant reserved for slave labor. After 
selected members of the Kommando had been sent to formal Security Service (SD) training 
in Germany and returned, rotating sections of the newly professionalized unit were deployed 
to German-occupied Belarus. There, the Latvian Auxiliary Security Police – now a 
permanent, militarized, mobile, hardened, battalion-strength appendage of Nazi power – 
participated in ghetto-clearings, anti-partisan operations, and reprisal actions against the local 
population. By 1944, the war having turned against the Third Reich, the unit was effectively 
disbanded. They could then better serve Hitler as soldiers than police paramilitaries, so the 
Arajs Kommando’s personnel were absorbed into front-line combat units of the Latvian 
Legion along the rapidly approaching Eastern Front.  
At war’s end, Viktors Arājs’s Kommando had itself directly killed no fewer than 
26,000 people in Latvia, while its very substantial death tally in Belarus is simply impossible 
to estimate. Considering its participation in the Rumbula cordon and other shootings, the unit 
also abetted the killings of tens of thousands more. The members of this Latvian police unit, 
operating under the command of Einsatzkommando (EK) 2 and later the Kommandeur der 
Sicherheitspolizei (KdS) Lettland, participated as volunteers in practically every signature 
aspect of Nazi oppression in occupied Eastern Europe, including mass-shootings, ghetto-
clearings, guarding concentration camps, and anti-partisan operations. They were 
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quintessential actors in what is now recognized as “the Holocaust by bullets” – old-fashioned 
killers who shot their targets one at a time, creating their death count without need of the 
techno-industrial horror of the gas chambers. 
 All of this, however, was only the first part of the story of the men of the Arajs 
Kommando. Much of the actual historical record of their crimes was not established by 
historians through normal analysis of period records in archival repositories. The Nazis often 
avoided committing anything incriminating to paper and they deliberately destroyed all they 
could of the documentary evidence that did exist before they were defeated. Thus much of 
what we know about the Kommando is the result of decades of painstaking work by 
prosecutors around the globe who, to make their cases against that unit’s killers, augmented 
the scarce wartime material at hand with witnesses of all stripes: survivors, bystanders, and 
the perpetrators themselves. 
 It is upon these sources that the present study based.  
To answer the deceptively simple questions of whether, how, by whom, and with 
what results these men were investigated, tried, and punished requires deeper examination. 
Hundreds of cases were tried in multiple jurisdictions on both sides of the Iron Curtain 
during the entire span of the vast contest of the Cold War. The legal aftermath of the crimes 
against humanity committed by the Arajs Kommando can therefore be used as a prism 
through which to view a spectrum of very different justice systems at work at different times, 
and how they attempted to match atrocity with justice amid a radically new postwar order. In 
this regard, this study assesses the efforts of the Soviet Union, both West and East Germany, 
and the United States. Using these hideous crimes as a backdrop, the following chapters 
examine both Communist and liberal-democratic legal systems, and their intermittent 
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dialogue with one another, from the 1940s through the 1980s, as they dealt with Nazi crimes 
while operating in the context of the global superpower struggle. 
 
The Historiography of the Holocaust in Latvia 
This study connects two of the currently expanding major subfields of the subject of 
the Holocaust: Eastern Europeans’ participation in it and the Holocaust’s aftermath. More 
specifically, it examines the legal ramifications of Latvian Holocaust complicity, the social 
and political effects of the functioning of the legal apparatus in each national case-study, and 
their interaction in an international context.  
Particularly since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rediscovery of national 
histories in the erstwhile formally monolithic Eastern Bloc, historical scholarship has 
concerned itself increasingly with the investigation of Eastern European Nazi auxiliaries and 
Holocaust co-perpetrators. That many participated is not in doubt. What is less well 
understood is the degree to which Eastern Europeans actively sought to participate and what 
motivated their fateful volunteerism. All told, as many as 300,000 Eastern European police 
auxiliaries had been recruited to the German side by the end of 1943. Not all of them 
colluded with the Nazis to carry out the Holocaust – indeed relatively few to the degree that 
the men of the Arajs Kommando did – but all of them tied themselves to the fortunes of 
Hitler and the Third Reich. As Jürgen Matthäus has written: “German policy is key to the 
understanding of non-German involvement,” but “this astonishing degree of involvement in 
murder was not merely the result of German instigation; there were other, indigenous factors 
at work.”1 The major debate on the Holocaust in Latvia is precisely upon this point: to what 
                                                           
1
 Christopher R. Browning and Jürgen Matthäus. The Origins of the Final Solutions: The Evolution of Nazi 
Jewish Policy, September 1939-March 1942. Lincoln, Nebraska, and Jerusalem: The University of Nebraska 
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degree were Latvians complicit, why, and how should their complicity be regarded vis-à-vis 
German policy? Like other examples in the wider field, assessments in this case also vary 
fairly widely from sweeping accusatory generalizations to polemical apologetics, and 
disagreements have been attended by considerable acrimony.2 Because the subject has 
become something of a lightning rod, this study cannot avoid addressing it as one of four 
overarching points. 
The Latvian-American scholar Andrew Ezergailis’s sweeping yet admirably detailed 
overview, The Holocaust in Latvia, 1941-1944: The Missing Center, provided the starting 
point for an objective, detached, and apolitical assessment of Latvian involvement in the 
Holocaust in 1996 and it remains to date the definitive work on the subject.3 Although 
recently retired from his professorship of history at Ithaca College, Ezergailis continues to be 
an active participant in debates surrounding these issues, and is highly esteemed on both 
sides of the Atlantic. The “missing center” referred to in his title – and which he tries to fill 
with his book – is what he correctly identifies as a general problem of perception: between 
exaggeration of Latvian complicity (in its most extreme form: a “Germanless” Holocaust 
where events were dictated by eager Latvian killers) on one hand, and the elision – not to say 
denial – of Latvian participation on the other. In a case of strange bedfellows, variants of the 
former line have been put forward by some Jewish scholars, Soviet publications, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Press and Yad Vashem, 2004, pp. 268-69. 
 
2
 The debate overall has seen some extraordinary controversy, the most famous of which was the publication of 
Jan Gross’s Neighbors. Jan Gross. Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland. 
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001. For an example of the other side of the argument, see: 
Richard Lukas. The Forgotten Holocaust: The Poles under German Occupation, 1939-1944. New York: 
Hippocrene, 1997. 
 
3
 Andrew Ezergailis. The Holocaust in Latvia, 1941-1944: The Missing Center. Rīga: The Historical Institute of 
Latvia, 1996. 
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Holocaust-deniers alike.4 The second was adopted as a strategy by some postwar Latvian 
exiles living in the West and has since also been advanced by post-1991 Latvian hyper-
nationalists.5 Ezergailis is right to insist that the reality fell somewhere in between these 
extremes. 
Another overview of the Holocaust in Latvia has been published more recently in 
German and in English translation. Andrej Angrick and Peter Klein have produced a 
remarkable work about Jewish life and death in Rīga during the German occupation, from 
ghettoization to the mass shootings.6 It is a fairly comprehensive study of the Holocaust in 
Latvia, although its focus is on Rīga and German policies as seen through their effects there, 
rather than in Latvia’s provinces. However, as in the work of  Ezergailis as well as others, the 
Arajs Kommando is only peripherally mentioned.  
Several historians have focused more on Latvian participation but have somewhat 
undervalued German decision-making and overall orchestration or over-stressed Latvian 
anti-Semitism as a motive factor for collaboration. These historians as well, however, have 
relegated the Arajs Kommando to incidental mentions or small sections within larger works. 
Latvian, German, and Jewish historians such as Modris Eksteins, Katrin Reichelt, and 
                                                           
4
 For the most important examples of raising the importance of Latvian perpetrators over the German ones, see: 
Max Kaufmann. Churbn Lettland: Die Vernichtung der Juden Lettlands. Munich: 1947, and Bernhard Press. 
The Murder of the Jews in Latvia: 1941-1945. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2000. For the 
1960s Soviet version of events, see: “Destroy as Much as Possible...”: Latvian Collaborationist Formations on 
the Territory of Belarus, 1942-1944. Document Compendium. Johan Beckman, ed. Irina Zhila, trans. Helsinki: 
Johan Beckmnn Institute, 2010. For a typical example of this type of “revisionism” see: Ted O’Keefe. “Quiet 
Neighbors: Prosecuting Nazi War Criminals in America. Book Review,” in The Journal for Historical Review. 
Volume 6, Number 2. Summer 1986, p. 231. 
 
5
 Witness the absence of discussion about the Holocaust among Latvians living in the West and the active 
repudiation of the idea of the Holocaust by the rightwing Pērkonkrusts [“Thundercross”] organization in 
present-day Latvia. See: http://www.perkonkrusts.lv/. 
 
6
 Andrej Angrick und Peter Klein. Die “Endlösung” in Riga: Ausbeutung und Vernichtung, 1941-1945. 
Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2006. 
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Menachem Barkahan have to varying degrees overvalued Latvian autonomy while 
underplaying the role the Nazis who were in command.7 This tradition is generally still being 
followed in the most recent scholarship from Germany.8 
 Much serious Latvian-language scholarship has also been done since 1991, most 
importantly by the blue-ribbon Symposium of the Commission of the Historians of Latvia 
which produces periodic volumes. The present study draws upon the findings of several of 
the participants in this perennial symposium, most significantly Rūdite Vīksne, who almost 
alone has dedicated herself to the study of the Arajs Kommando specifically.9  
 
The Historiography of the Holocaust’s Legal Aftermath 
‘Aftermath studies’ is a very broad and somewhat nebulous field. It can encompass 
studies of memoirs, memory, museums, and memorialization; postwar Jewish diaspora and 
migration to Israel; the Holocaust in art and cinema; trauma and survivor psychology; 
survivor literature and Jewish generational difference; the postwar Jewish relationship with, 
say, Poles or that between the Soviet government and the ‘refuseniks;’ reparations; and every 
aspect of German Vergangenheitsbewältigung [“managing the past”].  
                                                           
7
 Modris Eksteins. Walking Since Daybreak: A Story of Eastern Europe, World War II, and the Heart of Our 
Century. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1999. Katrin Reichelt. Lettland unter deutscher 
Besatzung, 1941-1944: der lettische Anteil am Holocaust. Berlin: Metropol-Verlag, 2011. Menachem Barkahan. 
Extermination of the Jews in Latvia, 1941-1945: Series of Lectures. Emil Tubinshlak, trans. Rīga: Shamir, 
2008. 
 
8
 Robert Bohn. “Kollaboration und Genozid im Reichskommissariat Ostland. Die strafrechtliche Aufarbeitung 
in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland am Beispiel des Arajs-Verfahrens,” in Reichskommissariat Ostland: Tatort 
und Erinnerungsobjekt. Sebastian Lehmann, Robert Bohn, and Uwe Danker, eds. Paderborn, Munich, Vienna, 
and Zurich: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2012. For a significant counterpoint, see: Wolfgang Curilla. Schutzpolizei 
und Judenmord: Die Dienststelle des Kommandeurs der Schutzpolizei in Riga. Berlin: Edition Hentrich, 2005. 
 
9
 Rūdite Vīksne. “The Arājs Commando Member as Seen in the KGB Trial Files: Social Standing, Education, 
Motives for Joining It, and Sentences Received,” in Holokausta Izpētes Problēmas Latvijā: Latvijas 
Vēsturnieku Komisijas Raksti. 2. Sējums. Rīga: Latvijas vēstures institūta apgāds, 2001. 
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This study focuses on the legal aftermath. In fact, this is a rapidly growing area of 
research and is garnering considerable interest from top-level scholars and institutions, 
including Yad Vashem and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.10 One of the 
most important contributors to this arena of thought is Devin Pendas.11 He starkly 
emphasizes the importance of judicial investigations into Nazi crimes, while struggling to 
reconcile the disappointing and totally incommensurate penalties applied as a rule to 
convicted perpetrators with the great benefit to knowledge and truth even such flawed 
proceedings can yield. As a unit, an exceptionally high proportion of the men of the Latvian 
Auxiliary Security Police – between one-third and one-half – either did not survive the war 
or faced some form of justice thereafter. Yet, in view of the enormity of the crimes they 
committed, the results for ‘justice’ remain palpably unsatisfying while the cause of ‘truth’ 
was well-served. In this sense, the fate of the Latvian Auxiliary Security Police stands as 
compelling evidence in support of Pendas’s paradox. Because it is the area in which the law 
was most successful, underscoring the significance of the record established by legal 
investigators is the second goal of this work. 
Yet in this rapidly growing area of study, few works have been dedicated to the legal 
aftermath of Nazi crimes in the Baltics.12 On that score, the necessary starting point has again 
                                                           
10
 For recent monographs, see: Donald Bloxham. Genocide on Trial: War Crimes Trials and the Formation of 
Holocaust History and Memory. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Nazi Crimes and the 
Law. Nathan Stoltzfus and Henry Friedlander, eds. German Historical Institute and Cambridge University Press: 
Washington, DC and Cambridge, 2008. For essay collections, see: Holocaust and Justice: Representation and 
Historiography of the Holocaust in Post-War Trials. David Bankier and Dan Michman, eds. Jerusalem and New 
York: Yad Vashem and Berghahn Books, 2010. Also see: Atrocities on Trial: Historical Perspectives on the 
Politics of Prosecuting War Crimes. Patricia Heberer and Jürgen Matthäus, eds. Lincoln and London: 
University of Nebraska Press in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2008. 
 
11
 Devin Pendas. The Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial, 1963-1965: Genocide, History, and the Limits of Law. 
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been supplied by Ezergailis – specifically, his critique of perceived Soviet political 
interference in the workings of US justice in the 1970s and 1980s.13 Because this is a wide-
ranging comparative project, a third focal point of each national case study will be the laws, 
legal procedures, and legal culture specific to each polity that determined how the crimes of 
the Arajs Kommando could even be approached and how the search for ‘truth’ and ‘justice’ 
could be undertaken and accomplished or distorted and misdirected in these various contexts. 
What were the relative merits of the respective systems, and what shortcomings did they 
have relative to one another or did they perhaps share? How did the Cold War shape legal 
imperatives and influence their attitudes and actions toward each other? 
Finally, in connection with the strictly legal aftermath of the Holocaust there is a 
fourth focal point of the present study. Following Lawrence Douglas, the didactic value or 
effect of the investigations and trials – that is, their broader societal impact in each polity – 
must also be reckoned with in the final assessment of the discrepant processes.14 While this 
function of the legal proceedings is generally more significant in high profile cases like the 
International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem, and 
the Auschwitz trial in Frankfurt it also can be applied to more minor sets of cases such as 
those relating to the Arajs Kommando. Even if the various Arajs Kommando cases had 
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relatively less resonance for the wider public, they were at least indispensable for the 
edification of the Latvian exile communities during the Cold War – of which this author was 
a part – and for the education of Latvians in Latvia today – a cause to which the present work 
is also dedicated. 
This study hinges on the subject of law and the Holocaust, and is predicated upon the 
validity of the notion that the concepts of ‘truth’ and ‘justice’ are related but can be 
separable. While individual perpetrators were confronted with their crimes and given ‘due 
process’ and ‘justice’ of various stripes, another metric is available: what contribution did the 
dispensers of individual ‘justice’ make to the cause of ‘truth,’ first discovering and then 
exposing the reality of the Holocaust for all humanity? Theories that the law is to be applied 
primarily in order to rehabilitate the criminal, to deter future criminals, or to satisfy the 
victims seem inadequate in the face of such truly extraordinary crimes. Because of the 
magnitude of real atrocity, the assignment of proportionate penalties to the perpetrators 
seems a virtual impossibility. To evaluate the judicial system used by each polity – East or 
West – to reckon with the Kommando’s crimes, then, this study chooses ‘truth’ alongside 
‘justice’ as a comparative metric. At least as important as the number of perpetrators in the 
dock and the severity of their punishments and the cathartic value the process might offer the 
survivors – in the long term – is the quality and volume of reliable historical data generated 
for posterity over the course of the investigations and trials. Because historians, the public, 
and posterity are so dependent on the material generated in the course of these cases, this 
project evaluates the disparate legal systems involved according to the criterion of their 
contribution to our understanding of the historical reality. 
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The Organization of the Study 
Before any assessment of the legal attempts to visit justice upon the men of the Arajs 
Kommando and establish the truth of their crimes can take place, the wartime events 
themselves must be described. Chapter One reconstructs and analyzes the actions of the Arajs 
Kommando and the historical context both deep and immediate in which they occurred, the 
collective biography of the unit, and the various hypothetical motives of its members. It aims 
to help account for their volunteerism in the Nazis’ project to exterminate the Jews even 
though, as Latvians, they emerged from a culture hitherto almost uniquely not anti-Semitic 
among the others of Eastern Europe. Chief among a variety of posited factors is a militant 
and traumatized anti-Soviet sentiment gained through the first year of the USSR’s occupation 
of Latvia and misdirected by the Nazis against Jews.  
Chapter Two is the first of a series of four case-studies in the postwar judicial 
ramifications of the Arajs Kommando’s lethal participation in the Holocaust. The Soviet 
Union was the first to recognize and prosecute any man who had belonged to the 
Kommando. A tremendous amount of data was accumulated by the investigations, conducted 
by the Soviets between 1944 and 1967, of some 356 captured men of the Kommando – 
almost a third of the unit, remarkably. This hard data was largely concealed from domestic 
audiences, however. A related but partly falsified official history was substituted and 
periodically adjusted by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) for purposes of 
political utility according to the times. Thus, paradoxically, while responsible for punishing 
by far and away the greatest number of Arajs Kommando perpetrators, the USSR also did the 
most to distort the historical truth of the Holocaust and the Kommando’s role in it before the 
public. The political instrumentalization of justice by the Soviets manifested itself most 
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egregiously in a series of “show trials” in the 1960s. Here, a number of defendants – 
including Latvian exiles living in the West – were tried and sentenced to death in order to 
send a Cold War message abroad and to domestic audiences. Even here, however, justice for 
the criminals was deserved and no seemingly innocent persons had been convicted, but much 
of the truth was again hidden behind propaganda and the proceedings took place with no 
provision for due process. Nevertheless, Soviet cooperation with legal efforts against 
captured suspects from the Kommando abroad was unstinting, reality-based, and would 
prove to be indispensable.  
 In Chapter Three, the West German response is addressed. It was in that country that 
Viktors Arājs himself was captured and tried in the 1970s. His pursuit, prosecution, and 
punishment are laid out in detail. The postwar experience of Arājs was in some ways typical 
of that of the generic Nazi war criminal living quietly in the Federal Republic of Germany 
(FRG). Left unpunished by the Allied Commissions in the immediate wake of the war, he 
was left in peace throughout the 1950s and forgotten. The 1960s saw a rekindling of interest 
in the pursuit of justice and coming to terms with the Nazi past, and Arājs was asked after but 
not apprehended. Arājs’s story deviates from the norm, however, firstly in that he was 
captured at all. Secondly, although throughout the investigation and trial his rights were 
assiduously – even meticulously – respected and he and his legal defense team were given 
every possible opportunity to stall the proceedings, invoke technicalities, and make appeals, 
unlike most such defendants, he actually received the harshest legal punishment available in 
West Germany: life imprisonment. The trial was, of course, conducted in full view of the 
public and the authorities in this case seem to have been perfectly disinterested, politically. 
 Chapter Four covers the single case brought by East Germany against a suspected 
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former Arajs Kommando man. It is convenient from the standpoint of the historian who 
wishes to draw comparisons between East and West that the capture, investigation, and trial 
of this suspect in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) were virtually contemporaneous 
with those of Arājs in the FRG and both men received the same sentence. The East German 
trial was kept secret, however, first because it was presumably initiated as an ‘insurance 
policy,’ and second because it was bungled. This case was probably being prepared as part of 
East Germany’s obsessive competition with West Germany to prove itself the more 
progressive and anti-fascist of the two Germanys. But the effort ended up serving no political 
purpose because the West German investigation did not result in an obvious miscarriage of 
justice, unlike many other such trials in West Germany, thus depriving East Germany of the 
opportunity of using its own parallel Arajs Kommando trial to showcase its more 
uncompromisingly anti-Nazi stance. Moreover, the investigation itself was seriously and 
bizarrely flawed. This was an elaborately squandered opportunity in that the suspect was 
clearly guilty of crimes related to the Holocaust, but the process was so badly managed that 
almost all knowledge to potentially be gained from it was corrupted. In the end, the entire 
case remained secret. Lacking due process and based on some dubious conclusions, the 
investigation and trial neither served justice nor enhanced historical knowledge, despite being 
years in the making.  
 Lastly, the comparatively belated response of the United States is assessed. Only in 
the late 1970s did the necessary alignment of political and social factors emerge to trigger a 
re-visitation of Nazi crimes by US justice authorities: the de-valorization of the victims of 
Communism amid a population growing weary of the Cold War and the roughly 
simultaneous breakthrough of the Holocaust into public consciousness. In the event, a novel 
 14 
 
system was devised to denaturalize immigrants who were convicted of having perjured 
themselves on the requisite immigration and naturalization forms about their wartime past 
and who had indeed committed crimes of Nazi persecution. Once convicted, they faced 
banishment: deportation to any country as would take them. The American Latvian exile 
community, however, pushed back against this effort in the 1980s in concert with their native 
rightwing allies. The resulting melee turned out to be very illustrative of the relationship 
between the public and the judiciary in a free and pluralistic society – that is, between the 
court of public opinion and the courts of justice. 
The Conclusion of the present study underscores the thesis that the most lasting and 
salutary legacy of the investigations and trials undertaken against the killers of the Latvian 
Auxiliary Security Police lies in the knowledge they uncovered – that truth was better served 
than justice. The exception that proves the rule, the government-sanctioned extra-judicial 
killing of a notorious and high-ranking Kommando member in the 1960s, represents at once 
an act of perhaps understandable revenge but also an irrevocable and permanent denial of 
knowledge to posterity. The crimes at issue are beyond punishment, the perpetrators beyond 
rehabilitation, and the victims beyond any fitting compensation. In the long term, then, the 
best that could be hoped for is the discovery, preservation, and dissemination of knowledge 
about what happened. For the most part, that is what happened. 
Of the four Einsatzgruppen tasked with the mass-murder of Jews and Communists 
behind the advancing Wehrmacht, none was as dependent on the aid of local volunteers as 
the 170-man EG A.15 The approximately 1,200 men of the Latvian Auxiliary Security Police 
made a heavy contribution to the Nazi cause. The goal of Chapter One is to document the 
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crimes of Viktors Arājs and the “plowmen” of his Kommando and to propose a series of 
explanations for how they could have willingly so scarred the soil of Latvia with their evil 
tilling. The chapters that follow it will explore what justice and truth there were to be reaped.
  
CHAPTER 2 
 WARTIME LATVIA: 
VIKTORS ARĀJS, HELL’S PLOWMAN 
OVERVIEW 
 The intent of this chapter is to establish, contextualize, and analyze the wartime 
events in Latvia. It is divided into two parts. The first lays out the necessary historical 
background of the territory of twentieth century Latvia from the Middle Ages through the 
Second World War. It examines the commander of the Latvian Auxiliary Security Police, 
Viktors Arājs, the composition of his unit, and its specific contributions to the Nazi cause. 
The second focuses solely on analyzing the motives behind the men of the Arajs Kommando. 
It is an attempt to situate the Arajs Kommando and its crimes intelligibly within Latvian 
history. The examination of the investigations and trials that took place after the war pursuant 
to these crimes forms of the basis of this work’s subsequent chapters. First, it is necessary to 
know and understand what those crimes were. 
 
THE BACKGROUND 
For more than 700 years, the territories that would become Latvia were ruled by a 
military, religious, and merchant elite of Germans – conquering crusaders and their 
descendants. This minority German ruling class maintained its lordship over the Latvian 
peasantry under successive empires even after it could no longer maintain its own exclusive 
suzerainty over the territory. This class maintained its unassailable ascendancy until the 
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emancipation of the serfs in their lands by the Tsar in the early 19th century. That decree set 
in motion a series of developments that undermined and eventually unseated the Baltic 
Germans. 
Emancipation brought the advent of a Latvian middle class. With education, Latvian 
print culture developed along with national consciousness and aspirations for independence. 
The first armed rumblings were to be observed in the unsuccessful 1905 Revolution – jointly 
put down by the Russian autocracy and its local aristocratic German allies. But the 
cataclysms of the First World War and the Russian Civil War afforded the chance for a 
nationalist movement to militarily defeat all of its enemies – the detested Baltic Germans, the 
White Russian monarchists, and the newly birthed Red threat – one-by-one. Independence 
was declared on 18 November 1918, although the fighting persisted until the last opponent 
withdrew from the arena in 1920. 
 Latvia’s first experience with self-government took the form of a parliamentary 
democracy. It functioned well during the 1920s and minority rights were respected. 
However, political gridlock, international turmoil, and the Great Depression combined to see 
the parliamentary democracy fall to an indigenous dictatorship, in much the same way as 
these factors combined to produce democratic failure and authoritarian successor regimes 
across much of Europe. Kārlis Ulmanis, the Vadonis, or “Leader,” used the slogan “Latvia 
for the Latvians,” banned all political parties, and imposed strict censorship, fatefully 
blinding the population to the menacing and portentous events transpiring in Nazi Germany 
and the Soviet Union. 
 The pivotal year between the summer of 1940 and that of 1941 saw the imposition of 
a new Soviet regime on Latvia. During this brief period, known as the Baigais Gads, or 
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“Year of Horror,” tens of thousands were killed or deported to the Soviet interior. Soviet 
control also occasioned massive economic dislocation and the pauperization of the country. 
The commencement of Operation Barbarossa put Soviet power in Latvia quickly to flight. 
What followed is the chief concern of this chapter.16 
 
The Sword Brothers  
The land now called Latvia has ever occupied a strategic geographic position. 
Archeological evidence of Viking and proto-Russian and Ukrainian cultures shows that the 
land was traversed by traders and raiders since time immemorial. Its existence as a land that 
supplied amber, furs, and honey was vaguely known to the Mediterranean world during the 
flourishing of the Roman Empire. 
However, if history begins when people start to record events by the written word, 
then the pre-literate peoples of present-day Latvia entered history at the tip of German 
crusaders’ swords in the year 1201. The best records of the first conquest of the territory by 
the Teutonic and Livonian Orders, referred to by Latvians as ZobeĦu BrāĜi, or “Sword 
Brothers” – comes from the Chronicles of Henry of Livonia.17 He depicts an indigenous 
agricultural society composed of numerous fractious pagan tribes. These were gradually 
subdued by the foreign knights through the direct application of force aided by political 
maneuvering that sought to pit one tribe against another. Forced conversion to Christianity 
                                                           
16
 Several helpful synthetic general histories of Latvia form the basis for this summary, for instance: Andrejs 
Plakans. The Latvians: A Short History. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press and Stanford University, 1995. Some 
of these were offered as part of the exiles’ postwar public-relations offensive, but remain very useful sources. 
For example: Alfred Bilmanis. Dictionary of Events in Latvia. Washington, DC: The Latvian Legation, 1946. 
Also see: Crossroads Country Latvia. Edgars Andersons, ed. Waverly, Iowa: Latviju Gramata, 1953. Other 
histories created for native Latvian audiences are also instructive, for example: P. Dreimans. Latvju Tautas 
Vēsture. Copenhagen: Imanta, 1958. 
 
17
 Henricus Lettus. The Chronicle of Henry of Livonia. James A. Brundage, ed., trans. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2003. 
 19 
 
and serfdom awaited all those who were not wiped out.18 
What emerged was not quite the classic feudal system of the high Middle Ages 
elsewhere in Europe in that power remained radically decentralized. The military caste was 
autonomous and its barons preferred to rule themselves without a king. Where the sword 
went, the Cross followed. Like everywhere else in Europe, secular power – for the 
theoretically religious commission of the Livonian and Teutonic Orders did not prevent them 
from jealousy defending their corporate independence – was rivaled by the ecclesiastical. 
Rīga quickly became a fully-fledged Catholic archbishopric, while smaller centers in the 
territory became bishoprics. Next in power behind these two forces in the lands called 
Courland and Livonia was the Hanseatic League, the great north-German trade network of 
free cities. Beneath these three competing groups was the mass of the peasantry.  
Interestingly, in what Heinrich von Treitschke called “the classical land of peasant 
oppression,” one other dynamic set Courland and Livonia apart.19 Unlike elsewhere in 
Europe, the system of social stratification was fully congruent with linguistic, ethnic, and 
ultimately national difference. The most durable aspect of the society’s structure – 
unchallengeable German privilege and perpetual indigenous peonage – would persist under 
three separate empires: Poland-Lithuania, Sweden, and Russia. 
The unrelenting hegemonic status of the Germans in Courland and Livonia meant that 
both the nascent Latvian people and Jews, who began arriving in the territories in the 1600s, 
were similarly cast in the role of underlings. Both groups’ rights were curtailed by the 
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German barons, clerics, and merchants. For example, until perhaps the mid-1600s, both 
Latvians and Jews were effectively priced out of the chance to become householders in 
Rīga.20 Other historical circumstances also retarded the growth of a distinctly Latvian form of 
anti-Semitism. Firmly locked into their station as a permanent peasant underclass, the nascent 
Latvian people experienced no economic competition from Jewish storekeepers, peddlers, 
and craftsmen. Also, Christianity was very long in taking root in the hearts of the peoples 
indigenous to Courland and Livonia. Pagan symbols, folksongs, stories, and other cultural 
artifacts still enjoy currency in Latvia today, being sold to tourists in the very shadows of the 
Germans’ stone churches in Rīga’s medieval Old Town. The concepts undergirding Christian 
anti-Semitism were as foreign to the local peoples as the religion itself. The elaborate pagan 
belief system against which Christianity was pitted had no preconceptions about or historical 
baggage associated with Jews.  
 
The Russian Imperial Period 
Courland and Livonia came under Tsarist rule in the early 1700s – spoils of the Great 
Northern War with Sweden, which polity had, in turn, won the lands from the Kingdom of 
Poland-Lithuania the century before. They were considered “partly autonomous territories” 
of the Russian Empire. 21 This designation is not to be misunderstood as meaning that the 
local populations at large had any involvement in government or administration. It meant 
simply that the Baltic Germans who had dominated not only the political, but also the 
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religious and economic life of Livonia and Courland since the 1200s were “partly 
autonomous” from the Tsar’s court in Petersburg. Of all the territories of the western reaches 
of the Russian Empire – and quite distinct from the “pale of settlement,” as further Jewish 
immigration to the Baltic provinces was barred in 1805 – those of Courland and Livonia 
were almost alone in their absence of pogroms.22 
Between 1817 and 1819, fully forty years ahead of their counterparts elsewhere in the 
Russian Empire, Latvian serfs were emancipated.23 The peasant emancipation was the first 
among other profound developments that followed during the middle decades of the century 
and culminated in the emergence of a distinct Latvian national consciousness.24 Beginning in 
the 1840s, the natives began to explore their own history as a nation, though even as late as 
1860, some forty years after the reform, the majority of them still identified themselves not 
as a nationality, but rather as “people of the country.”25 Only with the rapid industrialization 
and commercialization that began in earnest in the 1860s, and which coincided with the first 
large-scale peasant purchases of land, did national sentiments begin to have an audience 
amongst a burgeoning educated social stratum of self-conscious “Latvians.”26 
It is no coincidence that at the same time, the first sizable classes of Latvian 
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university students were graduating. Prior to these growing yearly waves of graduates, 
upwardly mobile elements of the indigenous population were tempted to avoid alienation by 
assimilating as best they were able into the ranks of the Baltic Germans, commonly even 
adopting Latvianized German names.27 But by the 1860s, a critical mass of educated Latvian 
middle-class people had emerged. As described by Benedict Anderson, “The general growth 
in literacy, commerce, industry, communications and state machineries that marked the 
nineteenth century created powerful new impulses for vernacular linguistic unification within 
each dynastic realm.”28 The processes essential for “second-wave” European nationalism 
were all finally present in what was to become Latvia. 
 
The Revolution and National Independence 
At the outbreak of the First World War, the lands that were soon to become Latvia 
were still subject to the Tsar. Latvians, together with some Baltic Germans, fought loyally in 
the ranks of the army of the Russian Empire for years against the Kaiser’s forces. Much of 
this fighting took place in Courland and Livonia, where the Latvians zealously acquitted 
themselves as some of the Tsar’s best troops. However, 1917 brought the abdication of the 
Tsar, the collapse of the Russian war effort, and the descent of the Empire into civil war 
between “Whites” and “Reds.”   
                                                           
27
 Gershon Shafir.  Immigrants and Nationalists: Ethnic Conflict and Accommodation in Catalonia, the Basque 
Country, Latvia, and Estonia. New York: State University of New York Press, 1995, p. 132. This was actually 
judged a “Volkstumwechsel.” Racial ideas were apparently not part of the makeup of the Baltic German psyche 
at that time. Also see: Georg von Rauch. The Baltic States: The Years of Independence, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, 1917-1940, p. 7. In fact, one important study of the Baltic Germans during the second half of the 
nineteenth century found that their “belief that linguistic nationality was a subsidiary function of social class.” 
Anders Henriksson. The Tsar’s Loyal Germans: The Riga German Community: Social Change and the 
Nationality Question, 1855-1905. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983, p. 107. 
 
28
 Benedict Anderson. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Rev. Ed. 
London: Verso, 2003, pp. 77-78. 
 23 
 
 The fledgling Bolshevik government, anxious to cease hostilities with Germany to 
free it to attend to the consolidation of its own power in Russia, effectively ceded what would 
become Latvia to the German Reich by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March of 1918. The 
people in the territories of Courland and Livonia had their own vision of the postwar order 
that did not include the resumption of German dominance, however. A week after Germany 
signed an armistice and conceded defeat on the western front, the Latvian independence 
movement headquartered in Rīga and led by Kārlis Ulmanis, took the opportunity to declare 
a state. The date was 18 November 1918. At that time, a host of non-government forces vied 
for control of the territory besides those of the new government of pro-independence 
Latvians and their indispensable Estonian allies: monarchist “White” Russian forces, German 
Freikorps composed of a mixture of a local Baltic German Landeswehr and erstwhile 
German Army personnel calling themselves the “Iron Division,” and the new Red Army that 
included some pro-Communist Latvians with a rival Bolshevik Latvian government in train. 
A very hard fight – including the loss of Rīga to the Communists at one point and to the 
Germans at another, and involving the making and breaking of tactical alliances – was over 
by 1920. In international diplomacy and by virtue of the facts on the ground, the Republic 
was Latvia was confirmed and became a member of the League of Nations. 
Compared with the status quo ante bellum, with the most to lose, the Baltic Germans 
lost the most, while Jews, with the most to gain, also gained the most. Finally, 
comprehensive land reform was enacted. After decade upon decade of vehemently 
attempting to preserve an increasingly dysfunctional and inefficient estate system against 
reform, the old Baltic barons were virtually dispossessed by edicts of the Saeima, the 
popularly elected Latvian parliament that dominated both the new executive and judiciary 
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branches. The Baltic Germans’ active and violent attempts to thwart the very inception of the 
Latvian state and then to kill it in its cradle left them with very few friends or favors to call 
upon. A relatively more prosperous and productive Latvian peasantry resulted from the 
reforms. At the same time, in the democratic Latvian state, Jews were accorded, at least on 
paper, rights equal to those of every other citizen. This increased freedom meant a vast 
improvement over life as a Jewish subject of the Russian Empire and Latvian Jews were able 
to succeed culturally and economically in the newly created liberal environment. 
In the Republic of Latvia, minority rights were observed by the government with 
attention to international norms and treaties. Russians (10.59% of the total population of 
Latvia), Jews (4.79%), Germans (3.19%), Poles (2.51%), and smaller minorities were free to 
send their children to schools run by their own respective communities.29 The government 
did not tamper with religious observation of any stripe or sect. Minorities were also free, if 
they could muster the votes, to elect their own representatives to the national legislative body, 
the Saeima – and did so. Nor were they impeded from printing their own newspapers and 
journals or from participating at high levels in the economy. As a rule, religious, cultural, 
educational, and economic autonomy for minorities prevailed. The borders were never closed 
and personal and public communication and travel were never hindered in either direction. 
That is not to deny that institutional discrimination against minorities did occur. Some 
government policies certainly tended to favor Latvians or were outright exclusionary. Quota 
systems operated unofficially, for example, in certain university admissions.30 The military, 
especially, was a jealously guarded province, with the officer corps almost entirely of ethnic 
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Latvian background. Much evidence exists pointing to the routine bullying of Baltic German 
conscripts by Latvian drill instructors in the peacetime Army. Fluency in Latvian was a 
prerequisite for any government job and minorities did not frequently find employment in the 
civil service. 
 It was not a perfect system. By the end of the 1920s, amid growing international 
turmoil and political radicalization in Europe, the parliamentary system became gradually 
more unstable. As elsewhere in Europe, the onset of the Great Depression ratcheted up the 
vitriol and acrimony and led the public to seek increasingly radical solutions in the voting 
booths and in the streets. Well after Lithuania and about the same time as Estonia, Latvia too 
succumbed to the trend sweeping Europe: one-man rule. Already a national icon as an 
Independence War hero and the state’s first President, Kārlis Ulmanis took power in a coup, 
dissolving the Saeima and casting himself as the bringer of order. 
 
The Ulmanis Dictatorship 
Oddly, one of the most accomplished alums of the University of Nebraska at Lincoln 
was the Latvian Independence War hero Kārlis Ulmanis. After graduating with his diploma 
in agriculture, returning to his home in the Russian Empire, and acquitting himself with a 
storied war record as a freedom fighter, he became one of Latvia’s Founding Fathers. No 
Washington or Cincinnatus, however, after the interlude of the late 1920s and the climax of 
the political and economic crises at the end of that decade and the beginning of the next, 
Ulmanis determined to intervene again – this time unilaterally and without reference to the 
will of the citizens or the democratic process he had fought for and helped to establish.31 
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While among the mildest of Europe’s rightwing dictatorships of the period, its 
fundamentally authoritarian nature is not to be forgotten. Two conclusions are ultimately the 
most important for the purposes of this study. First, various policies enforced by the anti-
democratic Ulmanis regime played concretely into the hands of Latvia’s large, hostile 
neighbors during their subsequent respective takeovers, such as the consolidation of state 
control over banks and industry that would later facilitate nationalization and centralized 
control for running the occupied country’s economy on a war footing. Second and equally 
significant, the censorship of the press by the government, though designed to preserve 
absolute neutrality and avoid provoking either the Nazis or the Soviets, wound up simply 
keeping the Latvian people terrifically ignorant of the true meaning of international 
developments and the nature of the two emergent totalitarian systems that would shortly 
envelope them. Hence, Ulmanis left the people of Latvia, Jews and non-Jews, unprepared to 
cope with the coming tests.  
When Ulmanis seized power, no fatalities were incurred, although opposition leaders 
on both the extreme Right and especially the Communist Left were immediately arrested and 
sent to labor camps. There was no Ulmanis dogma, philosophy, worldview, or ideology. As 
evidenced by its actions, the regime did not respect personal freedom and scorned 
democracy, but it was pragmatic and enacted successful policies without much interfering in 
the affairs of the country’s minorities. While promoting the slogan of “Latvia for Latvians,” 
the government did not subscribe to racism or anti-Semitism. 
In character, Kārlis Ulmanis’s public image stood in great contrast to most of 
Europe’s other rightwing ‘strongmen’ of the 1930s. Ulmanis did not project the image of the 
medal-bedecked Generalissimo, the overbearing aspiring Caesar of the modern-day, or the  
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raging visionary of racial politics that have become some of the 20th century’s most enduring 
political clichés. The regime and persona of Kārlis Ulmanis are more resistant to caricature. 
He fostered the image of a post-partisan pragmatist: a self-assured father-figure and 
technocrat standing above the bickering, dithering, and sophistry stereotypically associated 
with the last gridlocked governments of the Republic he toppled. Ulmanis never approached 
developing a fanatical personality cult remotely comparable to those of Hitler or Stalin 
during his tenure as “Vadonis,” the Latvian word for “leader.” Ulmanis always wore a suit. 
There was no Party, much less a Party uniform. In fact, all political parties including the 
Agrarian Union Party from which Ulmanis had himself emerged were banned. The duration 
of his tenure was unconstitutional, but credibly or not, he was viewed by many as a 
competent quasi-regent who would administer Latvia until the crises passed and democracy 
could be safely reinstituted.32 
His foreign policy was quiet and moderate. Latvia under Ulmanis had no territorial 
claims against its neighbors, nor any messy irredentist problems. With Latvia’s sizable 
Russian and German populations, the government had every incentive for gentle policies 
toward minorities. There was far more continuity than change between the parliamentary 
government’s liberal attitudes towards minorities – including Jews – and Ulmanis’s, although 
as a rule their situation was less favorable after his coup than before. The government’s chief 
foreign policy goals were to avoid stepping on Nazi or Soviet toes; strengthen economic and 
diplomatic relations with Great Britain, France, and the United States; and continue attempts 
to forge a Baltic political bloc with mutual military guarantees – the latter effort brought to 
naught by insoluble differences between Poland and Lithuania regarding territory.   
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Domestically, the rule of Ulmanis was not without some impressive economic 
accomplishments. Most notable was Latvia’s rapid recovery from the effects of the global 
depression through government infrastructure initiatives like rural electrification and public-
private cooperative enterprises that led to large profits from the export of lumber and dairy 
products (drawing seasonal labor from Lithuania and Poland owing to Latvia’s nearly full-
employment) as well as high-quality consumer electronics like cameras and radios. 
Older Latvians living in exile after the war, remembering the Latvia in which they 
grew up, often likened Kārlis Ulmanis to a “Saimnieks.” It is a difficult term to translate in 
this context but roughly means the (male) head of the household, the master of his house, or 
patriarch.33 In their minds, Ulmanis symbolized the high-water mark of independent Latvia. 
His popularity at the time seems to have been genuinely widespread, at least among ethnic 
Latvians. With the passage of time, he has become an almost totemic figure to many who 
consider themselves Latvian patriots.34 
The “benign” dictatorship was undone by decisions taken far outside the control of 
any Latvian. In Moscow, during the night of 23-24 August 1939, the Non-Aggression Pact 
was signed between Nazi Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, removing 
the last obstacle separating Hitler from his war. Underneath the mild-sounding title of the 
agreement were manifold odious provisions. Among them: a new partition of Poland by the 
two bellicose totalitarian signatories; a guarantee that Germany would not be threatened by 
another two-front war when it turned its attention to France and Britain; and the consignment 
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of the Baltic states to the Soviet sphere.  
Little time was lost by the Soviet Union in asserting control over the countries 
illegally ceded to its sphere of influence by Hitler and the Nazis. Within two months, it had 
forced a “Mutual Assistance” agreement on Latvia, allowing the presence of nearly 30,000 
Soviet military personnel on sovereign Latvian soil. After spuriously alleging a series of 
provocations on the part of the Latvians, the Soviets engaged in a brief exercise in sham 
diplomacy by demanding emergency “negotiations” with the governments of the Baltic states 
for the establishment of Soviet military bases on their respective territories. With no capacity 
to resist, the Soviet threats and ultimatums were heeded. Soviet control of Latvia was 
effectively established by a military occupation on 17 June 1940 
 
The Baigais Gads, or “Year of Horror” 
The Baigais Gads, or the “Year of Horror,” is the term current among Latvians to 
denote the year of Soviet occupation from the entrance of Soviet troops in June 1940 through 
the establishment of a Soviet puppet regime and absorption into the USSR to the forcible 
ejection of the Red Army and Soviet control by the Wehrmacht in early July 1941. A total of 
about 35,000 people were killed or deported during that one year of Soviet control. This 
figure approaches about two percent of the total population of the country at the time. In its 
most spectacular exercise of power, on the night of 14-15 June 1941, the Soviets conducted a 
massive sweep of the country. Literally overnight, the NKVD managed to round up and 
deport almost 15,000 people. One week later, German Army Group North chased the Soviets 
out – an event that made a fateful impression on the Latvian population. 
Self-appointed president-for-life Ulmanis urged calm in the face of initial Soviet 
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military occupation, famously telling his people to remain in their places just as he would 
remain in his.35 He was soon deposed in obviously illegitimate “elections” with close to 99% 
turnout rates. A pro-Soviet regime was installed that immediately requested Latvia’s 
admission into the Soviet Union. Stalin graciously accepted the staged request and Latvia 
became the 15th Soviet Socialist Republic. Banners proclaiming the good news were shipped 
by rail from factories in the Soviet interior.  
Radical Soviet reform measures were imposed rapidly. Industries were nationalized 
while agricultural estates were divided and land and livestock distributed to smallholders in 
preparation for full-scale collectivization. Banks were nationalized and private savings were 
confiscated. Ordinary consumer products long taken for granted immediately became scarce 
or unobtainable except on the black market. The educational system at all levels was 
“revolutionized.” Schoolchildren were fed crude propaganda while the more sophisticated 
university students were required to study Marxism-Leninism. Faculties were purged. 
Virtually whole libraries were boxed up and pulped as subversive to the People’s cause. 
Church attendance was sternly discouraged, services were disrupted by agitators, and notable 
clergymen disappeared. Pre-occupation affiliations with organizations deemed “counter-
revolutionary” were punished retroactively. The Latvian officer corps was decimated as 
politically unreliable and replaced by Soviet commanders. The men were given political 
instruction and folded into the Red Army. Soviet troops left their new Baltic bases and were 
seen everywhere in public. Portraits of the old leader were replaced by bigger portraits of the 
new foreign one. Escape from the country was made nearly impossible, except through the 
intercession of the USSR’s ally, Nazi Germany. This was done as part of Himmler’s 
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resettlement scheme for the “repatriation” of “ethnic Germans,” and applicants had to meet 
certain “racial” requirements. 
It has been claimed, and not only in Soviet propaganda literature, that the Baigais 
Gads was a “made-up tragedy” first proposed in the Latvian-Nazi collaborationist press and 
then further embellished and mythologized by Latvian émigrés in the West after the war to 
justify Latvian collaboration with the Nazis and participation in the Holocaust. This 
‘confabulation thesis’ does not hold up to scrutiny.  
That Latvian Jews were deported by the Soviets in numbers disproportionate to the 
size of their community is certainly true. In fact, Latvian Jews were deported to Siberia at 
more than twice the rate of their non-Jewish Latvian neighbors.36 However, it should be 
unnecessary to point out, neither the Soviets nor the Nazis published statistical data on the 
demographic makeup of those murdered or deported. 
 It is also true that some of the deported Latvians, including Jews, would return from 
Siberia in the 1950s and 1960s. But people at the time could certainly never have imagined 
that this would be the case. Also, when those men and women did return to Latvia, they often 
did so as physical wrecks and psychological cripples. 
 In any context, but especially a pre-Holocaust context, a nation that loses two percent 
of its population – not to mention the most visible two percent, including all high-level 
government officeholders, military leaders, athletic and artistic celebrities, economic 
magnates, and so on – in the span of one year to state-orchestrated violence cannot be said to 
have endured a mere “made-up tragedy.” Nothing but an event on the scale and of the nature 
of the Baigais Gads could have prepared Latvians to welcome Hitler’s army given their long 
                                                           
36
 Jewish overrepresentation among the deportees was more a reflection of Jewish overrepresentation in 
economic activities that caused them to be classified as “capitalists” and “class enemies” in the eyes of the 
Soviet authorities, than as a reflection of racial persecution. 
 32 
 
and acrimonious history with the Germans. Soviet abuse alone can account for the weird and 
wonder-struck welcome of the swastika into Rīga documented in Propaganda Minister 
Goebbels’s film reels. 
What happened to the Latvians under the Soviets in 1940-41 was the worst 
conceivable fate at that time. What was to happen to the Latvian Jews under the Nazis, 
however, was so bad that it was not even conceivable. Ironically, most Latvian Jews who 
survived the war did so because they had been deported to the Soviet interior during the 
Baigais Gads. Seen retrospectively, a non-Jewish Latvian’s nightmare scenario was the 
greatest stroke of good fortune that a Latvian Jew could have hoped for.37 As a percentage, 
only Lithuanian Jews faced more grim odds under German occupation than Latvia Jews. 
What Latvian leadership might have coalesced to oppose the Nazis or attempt a more 
independent course were all dead or gone, from Ulmanis on down. The Soviets had taken 
care of that. Such leadership as did arise was quickly co-opted or eliminated. On 1 July, 
Walter Stahlecker, the commander of Einsatzgruppe A who was tasked with the murder of 
every Communist and, as became clear by the end of that month, every Jew – man, woman, 
and child – in the invasion’s northern sector, arrived in Rīga.38 The first person he met was 
Viktors Arājs. 
 
The Plowman: Viktors Arājs 
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 Before the summer of 1941, Viktors Arājs, whose last name means “plowman,” was 
fairly unremarkable. His biography, which he himself articulated several times – whether for 
his fraternity in 1935, the university in 1941, or before medical examiners and judges in the 
second half of the 1970s – gives no indication of what he would become under German 
occupation. It reveals only a hard-working man, the son of a single mother, who struggled to 
better his social position and was interested in all aspects of the law – both its philosophy and 
its implementation.39 
 On 13 January 1910, Viktors Arājs was born in the hamlet of Baldone, not far from 
Rīga. His mother, Berta Burkevics, had some Baltic German background which may have 
increased her son’s appeal to the race-obsessed German authorities during the Second World 
War. Nevertheless, his German was poor at the beginning of the war, since it was generally 
not used at home. His father, Teodors Arājs, had an interesting life. He fought in the Army of 
the Russian Empire from the beginning of the First World War as a conscript. Somehow, 
against the backdrop of the Russian Civil War, Teodors found himself in China having 
apparently chosen the losing side of that conflict, for he was killed by the Soviets after the 
Second World War officially for fighting on the side of the Russian Whites. In the interwar 
period, however, he returned to Latvia with a Chinese wife. He divorced Berta in 1927 and 
with that, took leave of his former family entirely. Viktors also had a younger sister, Elvira. 
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 Both the Arājs family home and the farm of Viktors’s surviving grandparents were 
destroyed in the First World War. The young Viktors, his sister, and their mother relocated to 
Rīga. When he was old enough, Viktors was sent to the countryside to earn money as a 
cowherd. When his grandparents died, Berta used the inheritance money to establish a 
boarding house in Jelgava with Elvira, while Viktors continued down his humble career path 
of cowherd and agricultural day-laborer. He attended school only in winter when there was 
no farm work to be done. At age 16, he threw in with a group of itinerant carpenters. 
Eventually, Viktors enrolled in school in Jelgava, where he excelled in his studies. After 
graduating in 1930, he enlisted in the Vidzeme artillery regiment, eventually being promoted 
to Corporal. At the same time, he was able to secure his admission to law school of the 
University of Latvia in 1932 with his full tuition paid by scholarship. Additionally, within a 
few years he was able to gain membership in Lettonia, the most prestigious Latvian student 
fraternity about which more will be said below. 
 Although Viktors had done remarkably well climbing the social rungs from landless 
peasant to a respected up-and-coming student in the capital, he was still poor. Looking for 
part-time work, he fatefully joined the police reserve. This side-occupation gradually took 
more and more time away from his studies, eventually causing him to suspend his studies 
altogether several times. He went professional in 1935 and received a posting outside of 
Rīga, interrupting his studies for the foreseeable future. It was on this posting that he met his 
wife, Selma Zeibots. 
 In 1939, then Lieutenant Viktors Arājs retired from the police force to rededicate 
himself to obtaining his law degree. Indeed, he was awarded the degree in March of 1941, 
but by then Latvia had become part of the Soviet Union. He was licensed to practice Soviet 
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law. This was Viktors Arājs less than four months before the German invasion: a newly-
minted Soviet jurist with military and police background, married, and living in the capital.40 
 
The Composition of the Arajs Kommando 
On 4 July 1941, the newly-established Latvian-language daily newspaper, Tēvija, or 
“Fatherland,” ran the following announcement. It turned out to be the original muster call for 
the Arajs Kommando. 
A CALL  
All nationally-thinking Latvians – members of Pērkonkrusts, students, officers, Home 
Guards [“Aizsargi”], and others, who wish to take an active part in the cleansing of 
our country from harmful elements, can register themselves at the Headquarters of the 
Security Kommando at Valdemars Street 19, from 9-11 and from 17-19.41 
 
Arājs wished to command a unit composed of radical nationalists and the cream of 
pre-war Latvian society. He wanted members of Pērkonkrusts as well as the Aizsargi, 
military officers, and university students to join his unit. The first two groups largely failed 
him – even if only perhaps for reasons beyond their control – but the second two satisfied 
him in the unit’s early days. However, the Kommando’s recruitment base had to be greatly 
enlarged by the inclusion of men from less socially exalted cadres, also including peasants 
and workers, before it could expand to its ultimate size of approximately 1,200 men. Each 
group and its connection to the Kommando will be explained in turn below. 
As to the nature of Pērkonkrusts, one sometimes comes across the formula 
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“Donnerkreuz = Hakenkreuz,” or “Thundercross (Pērkonkrusts) = Hookcross (swastika).”42 
In today’s parlance, Pērkonkrusts was a “hate group.” And its members incontrovertibly did 
collaborate with the Nazis in a variety of capacities, from pseudo-intellectual scribblers of 
repellent racist diatribes to shooters of Jews. These individuals are not to be defended, nor 
are their contributions to Hitler’s cause to be minimized. However, to identify the whole 
group or would-be “movement” as allied with German National Socialism per se is to make a 
serious error. Pērkonkrusts was certainly fanatically nationalist, anti-Communist, and fascist-
oriented. It favored authoritarian single-party (if it was their party) or even one-man (if he 
was their man) rule, pro-natalist policies and the active enforcement of ‘traditional’ gender 
roles and norms and the persecution of homosexuals and persons of other gender identities, 
economic protectionism with aspirations to autarchy, militarism and the national security 
state, strict immigration controls, discriminatory language laws, quotas in university 
enrollment and in the professional occupations according to ethnic identity, and the like, 
while it rejected internationalism and pluralism of any stripe.  
But to describe Pērkonkrusts as “National Socialist” is to ignore completely its 
foundational ideological hatred of Germans, specifically, as the principal hereditary enemy of 
the imagined ethnically and culturally pure Latvian “Tauta” – a term much more readily 
identified with the ethnically charged German word “Volk” than the blander English 
equivalent “People.” For more than 700 years, the ruling German minority had been a 
detested presence. Compared to Jews or even the pre-Soviet Russians, the Germans were by 
far the key target for Latvians’ historical resentment and animosity. Far from fetishizing such 
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crackpot racial theories as were current across almost all of Europe at the time, however, 
Pērkonkrusts’s ideology was largely simply an outgrowth of this concrete historical legacy: 
seven centuries of class exploitation, brutalization, and segregation at the hands of Germans, 
coded by language and ethnicity. Pērkonkrusts, awful as its views indubitably were, was 
simply the most radical manifestation of the anger that could for the first time be lawfully 
expressed in public in the freedom of the first democratic and independent Latvia. 
Pērkonkrusts was, nonetheless, also almost prototypically a part of Europe’s so-called 
New Right in the 1930s. This was owed to a unique historical contingency: the traditional 
conservative elites of pre-independent Latvia belonged to the pre-World War One German 
baronial class. They were largely dispossessed by the land reform of the early parliamentary 
period after having gambled and irreversibly destroyed their own legitimacy in a Latvian 
national state by their subversive pro-Kaiser machinations and outright military opposition 
during the Independence War. All this built upon their previous historical baggage from the 
repression that followed the 1905 Revolution and further back all the way to the year 1201. 
In other words, since Latvian national independence was predicated on the removal of 
foreigners, or at least non-ethnic Latvians – overwhelmingly of German extraction – from 
access to the levers of control, there simply were no Old Regime fossils left in the running 
for power. Pērkonkrusts could not, by virtue of the transformation that had occurred, have 
been other than part of the New Right.43  
Whatever squalid “philosophies” they may have held in common with some groups in 
this category in other European countries, however, in Latvia Pērkonkrusts was notably 
deficient in at least one defining characteristic of the New Right: the politics of mass-
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mobilization. At no point in history did its membership exceed approximately 6,000 people 
in a country of about 2,000,000 that included 1,500,000 ethnic Latvians.44 They were 
declared illegal by the rightwing Ulmanis government. 
Also, unlike the Italian Fascists, the Romanian Iron Guard, the Hungarian Arrow 
Cross, the Croatian Ustaše, the Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging in Nederland (or 
“National Socialist Movement in the Netherlands”), the Russian Vlasov Army, much less the 
pro-Anschluss Austrians, or even the Baltic Germans living in Latvia before the war for that 
matter, the Nazis had no interest in working together with Pērkonkrusts.45 The proof that the 
organization, however despicable, cannot accurately be described as “Latvian Nazi” is that 
the actual Nazis themselves outlawed the group during their occupation as hostile to German 
interests. After a honeymoon period of about two months, the group was banned and its 
leader, Gustavs CelmiĦš, was eventually sent to a concentration camp for operating an 
underground press. Pērkonkrusts insisted upon “Latvia” as a geo-political concept, and 
whatever other common ground they may or may not have shared, this was unacceptable to 
the Nazis. Fruitful collaboration was a non-starter once German intentions – which did not 
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involve any future reconstitution of the independent Latvian state – became clear.46 
Indubitably, some members of Pērkonkrusts joined the Kommando, presumably for 
hyper-nationalist reasons. Their numbers must have been few, for although victim testimony 
refers often to Pērkonkrusts in the role of their persecutors, the organization is mentioned in 
perpetrator testimony exceedingly rarely.47 And those who did join the Kommando would 
have been compelled to repudiate their membership in Pērkonkrusts when the ban was 
imposed by the Nazis. 
 The Aizsargi, or “Home Guards,” are frequently mistakenly portrayed as “Latvian 
pro-Nazi nationalist army members” and the like.48 “Home Guards” is a very imprecise 
translation of the plural Latvian term “Aizsargi.” The connotations of the word come closer 
to the literal German meaning of “Abwehr” a word meaning “defense” with a prefix denoting 
the idea of “warding off.” As a rule, they were not, as many have charged, “pro-Nazi 
extremists,” except insofar as they shared the Nazis’ determination to oppose Communism 
along with the bulk of the Latvian populace at the time. It would be more instructive to think 
of them as an aging, culturally conservative, male, and rural bulwark against radicalism or 
change of any stripe in Latvian society. The members of this group were generally respected 
in Latvian society because of their association with the Independence War. The Aizsargi had 
also been part of the informal coalition behind the 1934 coup of Kārlis Ulmanis, who was 
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himself an Independence War veteran. But that was precisely the problem with the Aizsargi 
in 1941: too many were twenty years past their fighting prime. Though the Aizsargi did have 
a “youth” component, the Jaunsargi (“Young Guards”), and the group’s membership was 
especially singled out for persecution by the Soviets in 1940-41, yet they too, largely 
disappointed Arājs. Almost never in the depositions of captured Kommando members after 
the war is the Aizsargi organization mentioned. The simple but undoubtedly resonant 
inclusion of their name in Arājs’s appeal, however, strengthened its potency.  
With members of the former Latvian military, Arājs was more successful: many of 
the Kommando’s first entrants came from this set of men. Two factors, both concerning the 
preceding Soviet occupation, help explain their attraction to collaborationist formations 
including the Arajs Kommando. The first is the surrender of Latvia to the Soviets in the 
summer of 1940 without a fight, and the second is the subsequent incorporation of the 
Latvian armed forces into those of the Soviet Union. Although both eventualities were 
completely beyond the power of these men to change, the Army was exposed to back-to-back 
accusations first by some Latvians of being cowardly and then by the Germans of being 
influenced by Communism. As a further twist of the knife, both of these developments also 
seemed to confirm Soviet claims that Latvia had entered the Union voluntarily.  
The Ulmanis government’s policy of offering no resistance to the entrance of the Red 
Army in 1940 was the only real option Latvia had in response to Soviet ultimatums and 
threats.49 It likely saved many Latvian lives, although not that of Ulmanis himself. Unlike the 
plucky and much-admired Finns who mortified the Red Army in the Winter War (November 
1939 – March 1940), the Latvian Army, following its orders, did not use force to oppose the 
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Soviet takeover. The soldiers thereafter could not even take pride in having bloodied the 
enemy in a hopeless but hard-fought war. They had not given the enemy battle. This fact was 
probably a more-or-less conscious factor in the algebra of motivations among the former-
military segment of the Kommando membership. Joining German or German-sponsored 
military and security forces for some men may have been a potential vehicle of the recovery 
of self-respect and a feeling of manhood. It could take them down an avenue for both proving 
themselves and taking revenge against the source of their humiliation. 
Further compounding the fact that the Red Army had taken Latvia without firing a 
shot was the later incorporation of the Latvian soldiery into the Soviet military. The rank and 
file of the prewar Latvian armed forces was transmuted into the 24th Territorial Corps of the 
Red Army. This new formation was composed of the politically purged rump of the prewar 
Latvian Army’s officer corps together with a transfusion of mainly Russian officers and 
political commissars. Therefore, since many of the Kommando’s personnel had first 
belonged to the Latvian military, a good number of them had also been folded into the Red 
Army in the year preceding the German invasion. This category of men had an urgent need to 
prove their loyalty to the new German occupiers in 1941. There was hardly a more direct 
route to proving one’s anti-Communist bona fides than volunteering to do the Nazis’ “dirty 
work.” 
A conspicuous segment – probably a plurality – of Arājs’s very first recruits came 
from the lofty ranks of university. With the University of Latvia (quickly demoted to the 
“University of Rīga” by Nazis eager to excise the concept of “Latvia” from history) closed 
by the German occupation authorities for an indefinite period of time, joining some kind of 
security force in the summer of 1941seemed like a good option to many. The majority of the 
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student population of Rīga, a modern, highly-developed city, was constituted of eligible 
military-age males. Perversely then, the university formed a natural pool of recruits who 
were standing by. Many were caught up in the furious excitement of the times and had few 
other attractive options.  
As a subset of the recruits from the University, those individuals in the initial group 
of volunteers who became the hard core of the Kommando were drawn from the 
“korporacija,” or student fraternities.50 After the war, men who got into the Kommando on 
the ground floor described the fraternities as “the skeleton” of the Kommando.51 In interwar 
Latvia, such associations were highly prestigious and served as lifelong social patronage 
networks and ‘good ‘ole boy’ clubs. Obtaining membership was a major distinction and a 
powerful indicator of the promise of future success and social prominence. They were also 
quite exclusionary. Arājs’s fraternity, Lettonia, for example, recruited only male ethnic 
Latvians: Russians, Jews, and Germans were ineligible, but were free to found their own less 
esteemed and influential associations. As bastions of elite bourgeois class enemies and 
nationalists, the fraternities were immediately banned during the first Soviet occupation and 
eager to make a comeback in the summer of 1941. Their very mention in Arājs’s recruitment 
call would itself have been viewed as a repudiation of the fleeing Communists and a proud 
demonstration that their power in Latvia was gone.  
More than just a student, Arājs himself was a member of Latvia’s largest and most 
esteemed fraternity: Lettonia.52 Members of the fraternity, individually called “Lettons,” 
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provided an appreciable number of the unit’s first recruits. To choose a prominent example, 
Leonīds Jansons, who was to testify in many of the postwar trials including that of Arājs 
himself, joined the unit in the first days of July 1941. He knew Arājs only because of their 
mutual membership in Lettonia.53 “I personally handed out the identification papers that 
Arājs had signed to the members of the Latvian Auxiliary Police [sic.] and maintained the 
personnel rosters.” He was convicted of participation in the shooting of approximately fifty 
male Jews in the Biėernieki Forest in the first weeks of the German occupation.54 
 Overlapping with the Lettonia connection, an appreciable number of the initial few 
score of members of the Kommando were recruited on the basis of personal acquaintance 
with Arājs in other spheres of life, such as the pre-war Latvian Army. Some also joined upon 
the advice of friends or family members who knew Arājs through various happenstances. In 
other words, the ranks were filled at first by roughly the same informal mechanism by which 
Arājs was given the green light to instantiate the armed unit in the first place. Walter 
Stahlecker, commander of EG A, learned of Arājs through his official translator, the Baltic 
German Dressler. Dressler remembered Arājs from before the war when he drilled under 
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Arajs’s supervision in the Latvian Army. He recalled Arājs fondly as one of the few 
instructors who did not show him any prejudice because he was a Baltic German. Here, as 
was so often the Nazi way, hugely consequential decisions were made and events and 
outcomes determined totally haphazardly on the basis of personal contacts, connections, and 
cronyism.55 
There are many examples of men being drawn to the Kommando because they knew 
Arājs. It does not, however, seem that even the first wave of recruits were drawn in by 
charisma or personal magnetism, although Arājs was very handsome. Instead, most accounts 
show men just stumbling into the Kommando because they needed a job and they knew that 
Arājs was hiring. Many such depictions are suspect because their narrators subsequently tried 
to distance themselves from the man and obscure their commitment to the unit and its 
mission. Nevertheless, it is a nearly consistent feature of the entire body of testimony. For 
example: after being laid-off from a desk job in the office of Rīga’s Central Prison – 
repurposed from its former NKVD days in form if not in function – an unexpectedly 
unemployed Arnis Upmalis was perhaps worried about being drafted for labor in Germany.56 
He spoke on the matter with his older brother. “My brother was an acquaintance with Arājs 
through the University. Jānis Upmalis studied in the medical faculty there and Arājs, as my 
brother said, studied in the Law faculty.” Until 1940, when the organization was dissolved by 
the Soviets, both were members of the Lettonia student fraternity. In January 1942, the 
younger Upmalis joined the Kommando. “Arājs answered that I would have to keep guard 
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duty [“daß ich Wachdienst zu leisten haben würde.”].”57  
Another member of the Kommando, Kārlis Kencis, also joined based on his personal 
acquaintance with Arājs. He was the son of a career officer in the Latvian Army who had 
been deported, along with Kencis’s mother, by the Soviets in the Baigais Gads. His brother 
was killed by Soviet forces near Leningrad; he had presumably volunteered as a Hilfswillige. 
Such volunteers, called Hiwis, were locally-recruited non-German men attached individually 
or in small groups to frontline Wehrmacht units or Luftwaffe air-defense batteries as helpers. 
The exact circumstances of Kencis’s brother’s death are unknown, but he was killed virtually 
as soon as the city was reached by German forces. Apparently in an effort to continue the 
family’s military tradition, Kencis claimed at his trial that he applied for membership in the 
unit “Since for me Arājs was not an unknown person and I really wanted to ready myself for 
military service [“mich ja für den Militärdienst zur Verfügung stellen wollte”].”58 
As the Kommando was transformed into a professional standing unit, its ranks were 
filled out by men from less exalted social tiers. Laborers, farm-hands, and other working-
class men fleshed-out the expanding outfit until they constituted the absolute majority. The 
easily-anticipated postwar Soviet “class enemy” canard that the Arajs Kommando was 
composed purely of men of bourgeois background has been refuted by scholarship.59 The 
reality is much more troubling in that, over time, Latvian men from all sections of society 
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were attracted to it. Although they joined at different times and for different reasons, which 
will be treated below in detail, the Latvian Auxiliary Security Police ultimately would draw 
men from all stations, high and low, in Latvian society. 
 
The Arajs Kommando and Terror in the Nazi Ostland60 
One of the major historiographical bones of contention about Latvian participation in 
the Holocaust and the Arajs Kommando’s contribution in particular centers around the 
question of whether, as Andrew Ezergailis has phrased it, the crimes committed were of 
“passion” or of “organization.” Bound up with either answer to this question is an 
implication about the relationship between and relative blame to be apportioned to the 
German and Latvian perpetrators. In fact, the Kommando perpetrated the Holocaust along the 
lines of both models. At its inception, the unit rampaged in a manner only relatively loosely 
directed by Einsatzkommando 2, in accordance with Heydrich’s instructions to foment local 
pogroms without leaving any trace of German involvement in order to strengthen the 
appearance of local spontaneity. Quickly, however, the unit came under a form of 
paramilitary discipline, ordered by its Nazi masters. In time, the Kommando matured into a 
professional death squad, the actions of which were under tight German control.  
The Kommando, in its infancy in July and August 1941, conducted what have been 
termed “wild actions.” These included the pogrom-esque burning of Rīga’s beautiful 
synagogues. At least in the case of the Choral Synagogue on Gogol Street, the arson was 
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committed by Arājs and some of his men on the orders of Einsatzkommando 2. This earliest 
phase of the Kommando’s existence was also characterized by random home invasions of 
Jews that ended in the arrests, usually, of males, and the theft of property. All of the 
Kommando’s initial activities were carried out locally in Rīga.61  
As a first step to permanence, the growing unit was installed in a bank building that 
had been nationalized by the Soviets but was formerly owned by a Latvian Jewish family. It 
was securely walled and gated, contained ample office space to conduct logistics for 
relatively small unit of men, boasted a canteen as well as a large cellar easily converted into a 
holding area for detainees, and also had a garage. Multiple accounts lead to the plausible 
conclusion that female prisoners were commonly raped in the building.62 From this base, 
detachments of the Kommando were sent to perform various missions that included the 
escort of Jewish forced laborers; the guarding of the camps being established by the Germans 
such as Salaspils, Jungfernhof (Jumpravmuiža), and Kaiserwald (Mežaparks); making arrests 
and confiscating property at the homes of Jews; and conducting shootings in the Biėernieki 
Forest. 
 The Biėernieki shootings were the first real test of the Kommando and the resolve of 
its members. Designated (and overwhelmingly Jewish) prisoners – at first it seems most were 
men, probably of military age – were taken from the Kommando’s own detention area and 
later exclusively from the Rīga Central Prison on busses and, if necessary, flatbed trucks to 
pre-selected locations in the forest. This happened in the early hours of the morning. If 
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properly executed, the sun would just have risen when the disoriented prisoners and their 
guards arrived. Only very early risers in the city would be on the streets to observe the 
convoy. The forest was not distant, probably a trip of some 20 or 30 minutes depending on 
how deep into the woods the site was situated. German supervising officers and, often, Arājs 
would arrive early by automobile. Kommando troops would be taken in trucks separately 
from the officers. A guard or two would ride along in the trucks with the victims. Upon 
arrival, procedures seem to have varied; in general, the efficiency of the operations increased 
with practice and the number of victims per operation increased concomitantly with the 
Nazis’ rising confidence in the unit’s capabilities. The number of victims per execution 
fluctuated between 200 or 300 up to a maximum of about 1,000. The pits were invariably 
prepared beforehand, dug out by Soviet POWs. The victims were let off of the trucks in 
groups of ten – or, if the trucks needed to return to Rīga for another load, were made to sit on 
the ground within earshot, but not sight, of the ongoing shooting. When their turn came, the 
ten victims of each group were made to stand along the edge of the pit. Usually, 20 shooters 
in two rows kneeling and standing respectively, delivered one salvo per group from full-size 
battle rifles. These were usually English or Czech weapons of the former Latvian Army. The 
victims were supposed to topple back into the grave. In practice, dead or dying victims 
sometimes had to be kicked into the grave. It seems that sometimes a ratio of two shooters 
per victim was deemed superfluous and ten victims would be apportioned to ten shooters. No 
escape from these operations has been documented. Machine gunners were posted visibly to 
deter any mass attempts at flight. In cannot be determined when or how the transition to 
primarily targeting woman and child victims was made. The testimony of former Kommando 
members suggests that military-age male Jewish victims were exclusively selected for 
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shooting in Biėernieki for most of the first month of the Kommando’s operations.63 As a rule, 
alcohol was in fact not consumed at the site but for reasons of safety and efficiency only 
given to the actual shooters after the operation, while drivers and those maintaining the 
cordon were rewarded with a less generous ration.64 Exceptions were apparently made during 
longer operations. 
 This is how most of the members of the Kommando passed July, August, and 
September 1941. The shootings proceeded at a pace of at least two per week. In relatively 
short order, the unit cohered, and the volunteers were issued standardized weapons by 
Einsatzkommando 2. Gradually, the hodge-podge of Latvian Army uniforms and different 
armbands described in the postwar testimonies disappeared in favor of SD uniforms with the 
identifying armband of the Auxiliary Security Police. The actions of the Kommando became 
ever more systematized and coordinated.  
 Another step on the ladder of the unit’s increasing sophistication and capabilities was 
the simultaneous routinization of the so-called “Blue Bus actions.” While approximately half 
of all Latvian Jews lived within easy reach of the Arajs Kommando in Rīga, the other half 
did not. Swedish busses from the city’s public transport authority were commandeered by the 
Germans and given to the Kommando. Using these capacious blue-painted busses, 
detachments of thirty to sixty men could be conveyed throughout the Latvian hinterland. The 
Jews of Latvia’s villages and small towns were rounded up and concentrated by personnel of 
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Einsatzkommando 2 and provincial Latvian police and volunteers. Then the men of the 
Kommando would arrive, dismount, and perform the shooting. Graves for the victims and 
food, alcohol, and fuel for the Kommando’s return trip were provided locally. 
Disappointingly little additional concrete information is available about this itinerant function 
of the Latvian Auxiliary Security Police. No Jewish survivors were ever left behind who later 
emerged to describe these operations, although several of the drivers survived the war and 
were captured.65 Only a few of these excursions have been documented at all, however, the 
most notable being those directed toward Madona and Liepaja, where the shootings were 
comparatively large and Viktors Arājs himself was probably present. These mobile 
operations began in July and continued into December 1941. By the time they ceased, for all 
intents and purposes, every Jew in Latvia was either imprisoned in the large ghettos in Rīga, 
Daugavpils, and Liepaja or dead – many at the hands of Arājs’s men.  
Already by the middle of October 1941, just before the Rīga Ghetto was sealed, 
according to Dr. Walter Stahlecker, the commander of Einsatzgruppe A, 30,025 Jews and 
1,843 Communists had been executed. In other words, more than one in three Latvian Jews 
were already dead.66 The Arajs Kommando was indispensable in producing that figure. But a 
new challenge awaited Einsatzkommando 2. German authorities in Rīga were told to expect a 
massive transport of Jews from the Reich and Heydrich’s Protectorate of Bohemia and 
Moravia amounting to well over 20,000 people. The highest Nazi police authority in Latvia 
and the architect of the Babi Yar massacre outside of Kiev the previous September, the 
Höhere SS- und Polizeiführer Lettland, or “Higher SS and Police Leader” in Latvia, 
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Friedrich Jeckeln, decided that to accommodate the fresh deportees, the Rīga Ghetto needed 
to be cleared. Thus 25,000 Jewish inmates were to be killed – a challenge that required the 
participation of the proven killers of the ensanguined Kommando of Viktors Arājs.  
The shootings occurred over the course of two days: 30 November and 8 December 
1941, at a site Jeckeln personally had chosen in Rumbula Forest ten kilometers distant from 
the ghetto. On each day, the operation began before first light and lasted until after sundown. 
He did not entrust the actual shooting at the pits to Latvians and had his own men perform 
that role using captured Soviet submachine guns set to fire single shots. However, Latvians 
were necessary to carry off the entire operation by brutally rousing and assembling the 
inmates, organizing them into columns of 1,000 persons each, and ensuring that none 
escaped along the way. They were, of course, authorized to use deadly force at their 
discretion to prevent escapes and eliminate stragglers. In the event, approximately 1,000 
Jewish victims were killed before even reaching Rumbula. Arriving in the forest, the victims 
were rushed by Latvian guards under German supervision through a conveyor belt of stations 
at which their shoes, clothing, and valuables were removed for sorting and redistribution 
later. The pits themselves were cavernous, with ramps carved into the sides. Victims were 
forced to descend the ramp and lay prostrate on the layers of victims previously shot. It was 
called “sardine packing” and it was a method devised personally by Jeckeln to maximize 
utilization of the pits’ volume. When it was over, the Jewish population of Rīga – over 
43,000 in 1935 – was reduced to fewer than 1,000 men capable of labor. Arājs and his men 
had taken part. 
Strikingly, membership in the Arajs Kommando seems to have been fluid, with 
people both volunteering to join and choosing to leave the unit during its first phase prior to 
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its official militarization detailed below. Jānis Babulis was a civil administrator who worked 
for the District Commissariat of the City of Rīga throughout nearly the entire period of 
German control from August 1941 to April 1944. In August of 1941, he was introduced to 
Viktors Arājs himself by their mutual acquaintance Konrāds Kalējs. Over time, Babulis was 
made aware of the deeds of the Kommando, but learned that some personnel were desperate 
to leave it. Among them, for example, was Edgars Rikurs, a Lieutenant in the former Latvian 
Army who joined the Kommando in its first days. Rikurs personally told Babulis that “he 
[Rikurs] was no murderer, but a soldier and that he did not wish to take part in murdering 
people.”67 According to Babulis, “Since he no longer wished to serve in the Arajs 
Kommando, he [again] became a soldier and fell at the front, as was reported in the press.” 
Another man whom Babulis knew from service in the Kommando was also trained in the 
peacetime Latvian Army. This man, Feliks Dibijetis, gained a reputation even among other 
Kommando members for exceptional cruelty during Actions, but soon committed suicide – 
an alternate form of permanently leaving the unit.68 
Babulis’s claims conform to a more general pattern in the wider testimony collected 
after the war. Further bolstering his credibility is the unusual circumstance that Babulis 
rescued and eventually briefly married a Jewish woman, Selda Schepschelowitch, who 
escaped from her work detail in November 1941 and alternately hid with either Babulis 
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himself or his parents for the duration of the war and later moved to Israel.69 
  Even if a relatively small number out of the total complement of the Kommando, 
there are other proven examples of men who voluntarily joined the Kommando and then later 
exited it for various reasons. Jānis-Eduard Zirnis, who will reappear in a later chapter, is the 
most important member of this subset of Kommando members for the purposes of this study.  
In summary, during the first months of killings – at least up until the Rumbula Action 
in late 1941 and maybe even up to the time of an SS training program in Germany in early 
1942 to create a more militarily proficient force, individuals could enter or exit the 
Kommando with little difficulty, although perhaps not quite exactly at will. However, once 
the unit’s mission changed from mass execution of unarmed civilians to a more militarized 
combat role, it seems to have been much more difficult to exit, while entrance requirements 
and training prerequisites became more stringent. In other words, when the Latvian Auxiliary 
Security Police was gradually repurposed over the course of 1942, it also made a transition 
from a militia group to a regular force. Up until that point, there had been a notable, if 
statistically small, rate of personnel turnover in the Kommando. This was not the case after 
the unit was, in a word, professionalized. With this transition came a new mission profile and 
a great increase in the danger faced by Kommando members. 
Having proven the reliability and capability of himself and his men, Viktors Arājs and 
a large group of his men were given training at the elite SS and Police school at Fürstenberg, 
in the Reich. At the same time, the regular men of the Kommando received training with 
pistols, rifles, light machineguns, orienteering, and topography, as well as almost daily 
political education about the merits of National Socialism and the necessity of the fight 
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against Bolshevism.70 At this moment in early 1942, the Arajs Kommando was 
institutionalized and became something more than an improvisation of the commander of 
Einsatzgruppe A. Arājs was promoted to Major, indicating command over a battalion-sized 
unit. The smattering of prewar Latvian uniforms and occasional hybrid uniforms involving 
Latvian and German elements, not to mention civilian clothing with a variety of identifying 
armbands bearing different colors, ensigns, or phrases, had proliferated before the unit was 
institutionalized. Now, the men of the Latvian Auxiliary Security Police wore the uniform of 
the SD. In conjunction with its new permanent status and expanded role, the Kommando was 
given a larger and more high-profile headquarters. The move took place in early 1942, just as 
the first graduating class from officer training, which included Arājs himself, returned to 
Rīga from Germany. Like the old headquarters, the new building at Krišjanis Barons Street 
99 was also located in the heart of the city. In fact it was well-known: it was the former 
Latvian military academy. Thus did the Nazis stroke the egos of Arājs and his men and 
elevate their profile. It is also possible that it was a conscious attempt to besmirch the honor 
of the former Latvian Army by this grotesque association and widen, by insidious 
implication, the circle of complicity in the murder of the Jews of Latvia. 
The Nazis obviously had plans for Arājs and his group of true-blue “willing 
executioners,” to borrow a much-misused term, who had already proven their effectiveness 
and utility to Hitler’s cause. As a unit, the Kommando had previously enjoyed no formalized 
training. Although perhaps something approaching a plurality of recruits already had some 
firearms training either in the Latvian Army or police, officer training for the Kommando’s 
leadership and the additional military training for the men represented a quantum leap in the 
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unit’s progression from an ad hoc crew of militants to a disciplined, standing force.  
 After exhaustive study, Professor Andrew Ezergailis produced this tabulation of the 
know victims who were directly killed by members of the Latvian Auxiliary Security Police: 
Biėernieki (July-September 1941)    5,000 
Biėernieki (foreign Jews, January-March 1942)   8,000 
Jews of provincial towns (July-December 1941)  9,000 
Gypsies and the insane     2,000 
Latvian communists       2,000 
Total                 26,00071 
 
Thus, the minimum number of murders directly committed by the Latvian Auxiliary Security 
Police in Latvia is 26,000. The numbers here also do not reflect Arajs Kommando 
participation in support roles such as at the Rumbula massacres. Andrew Ezergailis has 
speculated that the Kommando’s total death-toll might be “easily” twice the number he was 
carefully able to determine for Latvia alone – for the unit’s area of operations was expanded 
beyond tiny Latvia’s borders in 1942.72 
With the Jews of Latvia dead or well in hand as slave laborers in camps together with 
the Jews later deported from the Third Reich to Latvia, new work for the men of the 
Kommando was found. As German military fortunes declined on the Eastern Front, partisan 
activity in the rear increased and threatened small occupation garrisons and inadequately 
guarded supply lines. Western Belarus, including Minsk, already appended to the artificial 
polity of the Reichskommissariat Ostland, was one such hot spot conveniently located next 
door to the General District of Latvia. It would be the Kommando’s new major area of 
operations. 
                                                           
71
 Andrew Ezergailis. The Holocaust in Latvia, 1941-1944: The Missing Center. Rīga and Washington, DC: 
The Historical Institute of Latvia in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 1996, p. 
188. 
 
72
 Ibid. 
 56 
 
Unlike the collection, transport, and execution of unarmed civilians in friendly 
territory, the unit’s new mission was actually quite dangerous. With a new base in Minsk, 
rotating detachments of the Kommando became heavily involved in anti-partisan hunts and 
reprisal actions across the swamps and countryside of Belarus, where pro-Soviet units 
operated. There, Arājs began to quickly lose members of his unit for a new reason: the 
Kommando took a very high rate of casualties.73 In fact, it is no hyperbole to state that one 
major reason so many of the Kommando’s members did not face trial after the war was 
because many had been killed before it was over. Elements of the Kommando participated in 
the massive “Swamp Fever” anti-partisan sweep in September 1942. It was the first of 
several such operations, carried out with ferocious brutality and criminal actions collectively 
against the entire populace of occupied Belarus, in which the men of the Kommando were 
involved. The largest of these was Operation “Winter Magic,” that took place in the winter of 
1942-1943. Indeed, Viktors Arājs did not survive the increasingly dangerous anti-partisan 
campaign unscathed; he received a combat injury in late 1943.74 
Further attrition of the unit’s men occurred even after the unit itself was disbanded 
sometime in late 1943 or early 1944. By then, the danger posed by the returning, resurgent 
Red Army far eclipsed that of the partisans. Most other armed Latvian formations had 
already been, or were in the process of being, absorbed into the Latvian Legion, which was 
founded with Adolf Hitler’s signature in March of 1943. With the real front inexorably 
approaching, the Latvian Auxiliary Security Police was cannibalized for manpower and 
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perhaps nearly all of its able personnel were transferred into the Legion. Sturmbannführer 
Viktors Arājs himself was inducted into the Legion and sent to the infantry school at Bad 
Tölz in late 1944. He remained in the Legion until he surrendered to the British at the end of 
the war. 
The combat deaths of so many of Arājs’s men made the capture, interrogation, and 
trials of the surviving members, including Arājs himself, were that much more important  for 
obtaining both knowledge of the Kommando and its deeds as well as exercising some small 
measure of justice for its victims. 
 
THE ANALYSIS 
The Motives 
Approaching the motives of the perpetrators of the Arajs Kommando’s crimes can 
only be accomplished by breaking the issue down into three separate questions. First, why 
the Kommando was able to attract the members that it did in July 1941 can be easily 
explained by both individual and structural factors. The second question of why a new recruit 
willingly remained, once he understood the Kommando’s real mission and especially the 
blood-soaked duties of its members regarding the killing of women, children, and other 
objectively non-threatening victims is vastly more resistant to comprehension. A similarly 
difficult third question must also be answered: why were men willing to join the Kommando 
later in the war – say in mid-1942 – even after its original gruesome purpose and past 
misdeeds were known to anyone who cared to know, and certainly to anyone who wished to 
throw in with it? 
Below is an analysis of a series of six hypothetical “push” and “pull” factors behind 
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joining the Kommando early and, less convincingly perhaps, behind remaining in the 
Kommando as a participating member or joining it later in the war. These are explained in 
descending order of significance. They are: misdirected anti-Soviet sentiment; the material 
advantages of membership; the initial aura of credibility surrounding the German forces and, 
by extension, their local allies; the pre-war authoritarian conditioning supplied by the 
Ulmanis dictatorship; the dynamic ethno-ideological relationship between the German and 
the Latvian perpetrators; and lastly, the combination of scant indigenous Latvian anti-
Semitism and the waterfall of anti-Semitism descending from the conquering Nazi state. 
 Before this analysis can commence, however, a serious epistemological note on the 
sources upon which it must necessarily be based should first be highlighted. As is to be 
expected, the Nazis tried to destroy as many of their internal documents related to the “Final 
Solution” as possible before their ultimate defeat. Fortunately, some of the most crucial 
documents related to the “Holocaust by bullets” in the Baltic have survived: the first and a 
draft of the second Comprehensive Report of SS-Brigadeführer Walter Stahlecker, the 
commander of Einsatzgruppe A, as well as a large number of Situation Reports – summaries 
of the grisly progress being made by the Einsatzgruppen compiled for consumption in Berlin, 
to name the most important, high-level examples. Unfortunately, almost no documents 
generated specifically by the Latvian Auxiliary Security Police are known to exist, although 
some may still be held secretly in Moscow. While deliberate destruction of such mundane 
documents as must have existed – payroll stubs; applications for medical leave; receipts for 
office and cleaning supplies; transfer forms; weapon and ammunition inventories; alcohol 
ration cards for the unit; sign-out sheets for vehicles from the motor pool; gas and electricity 
bills for the headquarters building; in short: everything pertaining to supply, logistics, and 
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human resources management – can be taken for granted, there is another consideration. It is 
known that, as far as possible, operational orders were only given orally to Arājs and his 
lieutenants by their German superiors. The mundane paperwork that kept the wheels of the 
Kommando spinning was destroyed. But the kill orders were never committed to paper in the 
first place. Just as a signed order by Hitler to carry out the Holocaust never existed, so too for 
orders from Stahlecker, Jeckeln, or Lange to Arājs to carry out mass-shootings. 
 Apart from the summary reports at the top level, therefore, the chief source base for 
this and every other chapter in the present study is, by necessity, that material which was 
produced during the postwar investigations and trials. To make their cases against the 
Kommando’s killers, prosecutors around the globe have augmented the scanty wartime 
record at hand with the words of these men themselves. Obviously, the various explanations 
defensively proposed by accused members of the Kommando after the war must be handled 
carefully, as must the testimony of their unrepentant sympathizers. Below, the large body of 
testimonies is analyzed critically and skeptically, leaving behind, hopefully, a residue of the 
truth. 
Lastly, the nature of the extant sources do not permit of an analysis of interpersonal 
and group dynamics within the Latvian Auxiliary Security Police such as Christopher R. 
Browning’s memorable dissection of Reserve Police Battalion 101.75 The Arajs 
Kommando’s members were tried in many different countries over many years. The 
investigators who produced these testimonies were rarely in direct dialogue with one another. 
Of course, the social-psychological factors and phenomena explained by Browning in 
Ordinary Men no doubt similarly obtained to some degree among the men of the Arajs 
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Kommando, but the historical and situational context within which the Latvian volunteers of 
the Arajs Kommando operated was quite different from that of the middle-aged German 
conscripts of Reserve Police Battalion 101. Therefore, when appropriate, elements of social-
psychological analysis will appear here. However, this study will also adduce a separate set 
of very particular historical and situational factors that are necessary to account for the 
behaviors of the men of the Arajs Kommando in the specific context of a collaborator unit of 
volunteers perpetrating the Holocaust in Latvia.  
 
The Latvians’ anti-Soviet Sentiment – Misdirected 
After the war, investigations into the crimes of the men of the Arajs Kommando 
examined the question of motive very seriously. Taken together, a key general feature that 
emerged during the prosecutions of the men of this unique Latvian unit was the competition 
between anti-Semitism and anti-Communism as explanatory factors for their actions – a 
tension absent or much weaker in dealing with perpetrators from notoriously anti-Semitic 
countries or who grew up under anti-Semitic regimes. The Soviets predictably believed that 
anti-Communism lay behind the crimes of Arājs’s men and anti-Semitism, if present, was 
wholly epiphenomenal. Meanwhile, Western authorities tended to believe the opposite and 
presumed that anti-Semitism was the root of the perpetrators’ evil and dismissed claims anti-
Communism as feeble excuses. 
This question, even if for the wrong reasons, the Soviet system answered correctly. 
Soviet interrogators unanimously found hostility to Communism to be the primary 
motivating factor behind their guilty captives’ wartime crimes. Soviet ideology could hardly 
produce or understand any other but the “counter-revolutionary” hypothesis, besides that of 
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crass material enrichment, perhaps. It was a tautology: fascism itself was fundamentally 
understood as anti-Communism and, hence, its agents acted out of anti-Communism. The 
dictum of the Communist line stated that racism and anti-Semitism were superficial elements 
by which the capitalist-imperialist system manipulated the masses and created “false 
consciousness” that masked the perpetrators’ underlying anti-Communist and anti-proletarian 
class motives. Neither were the Soviets interested in emphasizing Jewish victimization as 
special, or admitting that the Jewish fate was worse than what generic “victims of fascism” 
suffered. Soviet interrogators would not likely have credited those few who confessed their 
anti-Semitism and would have pressed for the “real” economic and counter-revolutionary 
reasons behind their behavior. But that so few of the captured men even offered it as an 
explanation for their murderous actions at all is remarkable and should not be dismissed.76  
Meanwhile, in Western investigations, defendants’ pleas that they had acted out of 
hatred of Communism were often viewed as a fig leaf to hide the anti-Semitism that was too 
frequently assumed to be the basis of all perpetrator motivations. Suspects being interrogated 
in the liberal-democratic West during the Cold War, after all, had every incentive to 
emphasize their anti-Communism and deny anti-Semitism.  
What seemed to be two very different forces – anti-Communism and anti-Semitism – 
to both sets of interrogators were simply two sides of the same coin in the understanding of 
the perpetrators back in 1941. But the historian can still ask which was primary. In the case 
of the Latvian perpetrators, they seem to have become anti-Semitic because in particularly 
traumatic historical circumstances they were virulently anti-Communist and allied to the 
virulently anti-Semitic and anti-Communist Nazis. More on the question of Latvian anti-
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Semitism will appear below in a separate section of this chapter. First, Latvian anti-
Communism and how it came to be expressed, de facto, as virulent anti-Semitism will be 
examined.  
Indeed, the most crucial motivating “pull” factor in joining the Latvian Auxiliary 
Security Police was the desire to strike out against Latvia’s Communist oppressors who, with 
the arrival of Germany’s forces, were in disarray. Anti-Semitism per se was actually a trivial 
component of most Latvian perpetrators’ outlook except insofar as it could be made to mean 
anti-Communism. The Nazis were able to convince a large enough section of the non-Jewish 
Latvian population that “Jew” and “Communist” were interchangeable terms in order to fill 
the quota of local collaborators necessary to carry out the “Final Solution” in that land. It was 
a fairly simple matter of trading on the suffering endured by Latvians during the preceding 
year of Soviet occupation. The Nazis only needed to stoke a pre-existing hatred among the 
Latvians with their propaganda and to make it interchangeable with their own pathological 
and all-consuming fetish-object of hatred. This is not a far-fetched or apologetic notion. After 
all: it should be remembered that the identity of Jews with Communism was already an 
article of faith among most German troops and had widespread currency in the German 
public, and the public of most other European countries as well, particularly in Eastern 
Europe. Propaganda for all audiences was produced to reinforce the linkage. But for 
Germans concretely, the belief in the identity of Jews with Communism was based largely 
upon vague recollections of the instability and national humiliation of 1918 and 1919 and the 
economic and political chaos that followed. Meanwhile, branded onto the brains of the 
Latvians who were to become the Nazis’ partners in crime, were red-hot, personal, direct, 
and devastating encounters with Soviet power in the immediate past and from which they 
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were rescued by the German Army. It should not be surprising that a traumatized population 
with the intensity of anti-Soviet hatred resulting from one year of real Soviet domination 
could be easily convinced of the guilt of any scapegoat whatsoever. Therefore: independently 
of the actual identity of the victims, to understand the Latvian perpetrators requires 
knowledge of who they thought – or at least were told – that their victims were and why this 
may have seemed credible to them.  
There were, indeed, a few Jews who ranked fairly highly in the Soviet Latvian 
hierarchy. Simon Shustin, the infamous NKVD chief, was the personage most frequently 
mentioned in the subsequent propaganda as the embodiment of the unity of “the Jews” with 
Communism. But the few real anecdotal examples alone could come nowhere close, of 
course, to proving that Bolshevism was some kind of Jewish plot. Other figures, such as the 
Soviet-installed Prime Minister of Latvia during the Baigais Gads, Augusts Kirhenšteins, 
supposed arch Jewish-Communist traitor, were falsely asserted to have been Jewish to help 
beef-up the objectively rather small numbers of Jews in the Soviet occupation apparatus. 
However, as visible symbols, they could serve the ideologically poisoned, the enraged, and 
the undiscerning as corroborating evidence of the larger Nazi trope of the grand Judeo-
Bolshevik world conspiracy.  
Generally, the tendency to accept false generalizations and false facts – such as that 
the Communist occupation was staffed overwhelmingly by Jews or that Kirhenšteins was a 
Jew – indicates the prior existence of such an ethnic prejudice. In this case, a pre-existing and 
unexamined assumption that Jews are evil would go far to explain the readiness with which 
Latvians, as they observed and mentally processed events, were prepared to lash out with an 
absolutely misplaced sense of grievance and righteousness. This was unambiguously the case 
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in the Polish response to the partition of 1939 and subsequent events, for example. But such 
was hardly the case in Latvia prior to 1940, as has been shown. This circumstance – the 
relative  absence of prewar anti-Semitism – seriously frustrates efforts at understanding the 
violent Latvian response unless focus is directed to the deliberate and unrelenting Nazi 
attempt to force the notion of the equivalency of “the Jews” and Communism on the Latvian 
public. 
As further evidence constantly adduced were the well-known demonstrations of a 
segment of the Jewish population and its real, if perhaps short-lived, enthusiasm for the 
Communist takeover in 1940. The motivations of these people are readily apprehended, for 
Soviet rule, bad as it was, held fewer terrors for Jews than Nazi rule. Even if Jews were 
overrepresented among the Soviets’ deportees, it was not because they were Jews but 
because they were clustered in groups identified as “capitalist” class enemies. On the other 
hand, the Nazis threatened every Jew without exception. Naturally, therefore, Soviet rule was 
preferred as a means of forestalling an even more menacing Nazi occupation. The natural 
distaste of any minority for living under a rightwing nationalist dictatorship and a heavy dose 
of naiveté about what the Soviets were really about – courtesy of that same dictatorship’s 
media censorship – is all that further need be adduced. However, given the sensitivity of the 
matter, it should be pointed out that such a scholar as Dov Levin, among the greatest Jewish 
historians of the Baltic, has documented in great detail the relationship between the Soviet 
Communists and the Jewish communities in the Baltic. In general, his expertise centers on 
Jews in Lithuania, but his knowledge of Latvia is also extensive. Levin agrees that a sizable 
segment of the Jewish population welcomed Soviet rule, and for idealistic, ideological, and 
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material reasons.77  
Added to these dubious examples based on kernels of reality, distorted and amplified 
as they were, the Nazis added totally bogus ‘evidence’ for their constant claims of the 
supposed Judeo-Bolshevik enemy as well. The Germans forced men easily identified as 
Jewish by their Orthodox garb to exhume the bodies of Soviet victims most famously in the 
capital but also, whenever practicable, in the larger provincial towns as well. The devious 
intent of these staged rituals was to demonstrate a linkage between Communist atrocities and 
the Jews. The trauma of the Latvians was diabolically instrumentalized to work in favor of 
Einsatzkommando 2 as the daughters, wives, and mothers of the dead were invited, on film 
and motion camera, to identify the mutilated and putrefying remains of the victims of the 
NKVD – victims that Jews had just laid out in fly-swarmed rows under the summer sun of 
1941. The effects of this practice cannot be quantified, but the framing in a single image of a 
woman consumed by grief, a mutilated and rotten cadaver, and a fearful Jew with filth and 
blood literally on his hands as he held a gravedigger’s shovel was not difficult to read. It 
must have had a powerful effect upon a traumatized and now wrathful people. As a 
technique, it was demonstrably effective in recruiting young men for the Auxiliary Security 
Police: 
In closing, I would like to add [“anführen”] why I went to the SD at the young age of 
16. The Russians had deported my father. After the Germans showed up [“Nach dem 
Einrücken der Deutschen”] a mass-grave was opened in the courtyard of the Central 
Prison in Rīga. According to the official tally, there were 800 in the mass-grave who 
had been shot. I walked around between the corpses and looked for my father who 
might have likewise been shot, since my mother had collapsed during her search of 
the dead. Later it was established that the atrocities against my people had been 
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carried out by the Russian NKVD-people who were predominantly Jewish men and 
women.78 
 
While the claim that the majority of the NKVD’s personnel were Jewish is totally erroneous, 
it is also completely irrelevant for the purposes of establishing the motives of the men of the 
Arajs Kommando: that they thought they were is enough. Why they grasped and acted upon 
false beliefs about Jews, not the falsity of those beliefs as historians can demonstrate now, is 
crucial for explaining their behavior. 
 The view that “Communist” and “Jew” were the same was cemented by yet more 
deliberate misrepresentations. These other effective means of spuriously linking Communism 
to Jews were hardly more subtle. The rituals of humiliation and public violence against Jews 
visually reinforced the concept of the existence Judeo-Bolshevism. One prominent observer 
said that in the early days of the German occupation, he saw Jews being pushed 
[“vorangetrieben”] down the streets by Arajs Kommando men who were mockingly forcing 
them to sing Communist songs.79  
The man who noted this was Dr. Julius Bračs, who had been a professor at the 
University of Latvia before the war. He was commissioned by the Propaganda section of 
General Commissar Drechsler’s Civil Administration for the General District of Latvia to 
head up a project documenting Soviet crimes during the Baigais Gads.80 This project was to 
serve the dual purposes of providing anti-Communist propaganda and contributing to internal 
security by identifying Latvians complicit in the Soviet terror. As such, Bračs was well-
situated after the war to testify about these matters, although his words must be treated 
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cautiously.  
Completely in accord with high-level German wartime documentation, Bračs charged 
that “the first members of the Arajs Kommando were people whose relatives [“Angehörige”] 
had been carried off [“verschleppt”] by the Russians.”81 This observation was quite correct. 
Walter Stahlecker himself, the commander of Einsatzgruppe A, specifically reported his 
success in recruiting his eager non-German gunmen from that large segment of the 
population who had had family members murdered or deported by the Soviets during the 
1940-41 occupation.82 A testament to the efficacy of Nazi efforts to equate Communism with 
Jews, the apparently unreconstructed and unapologetic Bračs was still convinced of the 
formula as late as 1970, and was furthermore comfortable in revealing this conviction to 
prosecutors in West Germany. He recalled the first Soviet occupation, saying that in the 
Soviet Latvian government  
The Jews were especially prominent [“exponiert”]. For me, that was dismaying 
[bestürtzend]. In the organized mass-demonstrations, the Jews marched in the front 
ranks… There were native Jews and those who came from the Soviet Union. The 
names of the leading Jews were known to everyone. Not much was spoken about that, 
because most people were afraid of surveillance [“Bespitzelungen”].83 
 
Unlike the members of the Arajs Kommando, however, Professor Bračs claimed he never 
saw any of the real dirty work being done: “No, that I never did at any point. Not even out of 
historical interest was I ever a spectator on a killing field [“Exekutionsgelände”] at a mass-
shooting [emphasis added].”84 
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But those who were present and participated in mass shootings generally tended to 
agree with Bračs’s position on the matter. On a series of mass-shootings at Dreilini in 1943, 
for example, in the course of the final liquidation of the Rīga Ghetto, one confessed 
Kommando member told prosecutors:  
I would have also extraordinarily disgraced myself in the eyes of my comrades if I 
had refused [to perform] this service. We belonged to an elite troop. I saw the whole 
thing as an act of vengeance [“Vergeltungsaktion”] against the Jews for the Russian 
mass-murders in Latvia, my homeland. The NKVD people who were responsible in 
that connection were mostly Jewish men and women... At the time I had such a 
feeling of revenge.85 
 
One Kommando member who joined as late as April 1942 explained that he was 
looking for work and joined the Kommando at the suggestion of a friend. He knew what the 
Kommando was about before joining: “I knew that they were hunting and killing 
Communists and Jews who were devoted to Soviet power.”86 
An unconfirmed story was told by a convicted member of the Kommando about a 
young man called Ustups who joined the unit and volunteered to be in the shooting teams 
“with deliberate conviction [“gewissen Überzeugung”].”87 According to this testimony, the 
family of Ustups, including mother, father, and an unspecified number of siblings, had been 
killed during the Soviet occupation. He was easily identified because, although they killed 
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his whole family, the NKVD had only “ripped the nails from [his] fingers.”88 If this story is 
true, it may be that his life was spared because he had denounced his family under torture. 
Either way – and whether true or not – the anti-Communist profile of “Ustups” is almost 
archetypically that of the Arajs Kommando recruit of the summer of 1941. 
The officially promulgated public consensus proposed by the pro-Nazi Latvian press, 
the entirety of the military and civilian occupation authorities, and the SS and Police, was 
firstly, that not every Communist was a Jew, but that every Jew was a Communist and bore 
collective (and individually punishable) responsibility for the horrors of the Baigais Gads. 
Secondly, the German Army was the only force that could protect Latvia from a Judeo-
Bolshevik return and that German goodwill toward Latvia had been sufficiently proven in the 
summer of 1941. Third and lastly, the permanent peacetime settlement with respect to Latvia 
after the conquest of the USSR would be contingent on the Latvians’ contribution to the 
German cause during the war.  
Still, the Soviets were not wholly bereft of Latvian supporters. Some down-and-out 
segments of the urban proletariat whose fortunes rose during the 1940-41occupation were not 
hostile to the Soviets, to whom they owed their temporarily elevated station and prestige. 
Men from this category and conviction were not among the first muster of men who joined 
the Arajs Kommando, to say the least.89 Instead, they either fled in the train of the Red Army 
or were, presumably, among the 1,843 non-Jewish Latvians shot at least in part by the 
Kommando in the first months of the German occupation, as recorded by Stahlecker under 
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the category of Communist “traitors.”  
The Soviets might have made much of bringing women out of the “traditional” sphere 
to which the Ulmanis regime had circumscribed them in propaganda and, to the extent 
possible, in reality. Working class women especially could have experienced something of a 
liberation with the establishment of the Communist system. They should have been a natural 
pro-Soviet constituency. However, the gigantic plunge in living standards, NKVD terror 
accompanied by  what was widely regarded in Latvian society as a foreign takeover, and the 
accumulated sum of everyday intrusions into ordinary life and the family by the Communists 
seem to have effectively nullified any support the Soviets might have hoped for from women 
as a bloc.90 Neither were women allowed in the Kommando, it should be superfluous to point 
out. 
Ironically, if hatred of Communism was a motive factor for those who joined the 
Kommando, so too was favorable past association with Communism. One Edgars Jurgitis, 
who joined the Kommando in the middle of July 1941, concluded his explanation to a Soviet 
Military Tribunal in 1946 by saying that “I did not desert the Red Army. I was forced to enter 
the police, because I possessed no other means of earning a living [“Lebensunterhalt”]. In 
addition, I feared that the Germans would persecute me since my wife’s brother had been a 
[Communist] Party member since 1917.” 91 This statement captures two motivating material 
factors, adducing at once a foolproof ward against the ill omen of associations with 
Communism, and an economic imperative. 
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The Material Advantages of Membership 
Mundane material reasons also provided a “push” factor towards the Kommando 
even as it competed with other nascent collaborationist formations for Latvian recruits in the 
early days of the German occupation. The Kommando could offer by far the greatest rewards 
at by far the least risk to life and limb to willing able-bodied males. The repugnancy of its 
duties notwithstanding, the Kommando was, from a totally amoral standpoint of pure 
selfishness and self-preservation, the best deal in town. Although the perks would change 
during the course of the war, members initially were even free to sleep in their own beds at 
home instead of barracks and could always count on receiving adequate supplies of food and 
liquor. Beyond the comfort of the first and the baseline necessity of the second, members 
could, besides their steady pay, also expect some amount of unofficial remuneration in the 
form of jewelry or clothing all the way up to whole furnished apartments. Finally, at least 
until around the middle of 1942, service in the Kommando guaranteed a post far from the 
front. All the while, members also enjoyed the confidence of the German power 
establishment – the value of which cannot be quantified in an occupied country. 
Personal enrichment is always an obvious motive, but it still needs to be 
contextualized. Among other forms of insecurity under the Soviet regime of 1940-41 were 
those of wealth and income. After being subjected to various Communist nationalization, 
expropriation, and social-leveling schemes, some Latvians were, in a literal sense, looking 
for payback in July 1941. Soviet policies had included the forfeiture of the contents of 
savings accounts above ludicrously small sums, the requisition of personal automobiles, the 
splitting up and communalization of apartments, the radical division and redistribution of 
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farmland and livestock, and so on. A new nomenklatura of Soviet-imported civil officials and 
military officers, along with their indigenous collaborators, supplanted the old elite and lived 
well. Meanwhile, the sudden vacuum of quality consumer goods led to the establishment of a 
black market that effectively priced the remnants of the middle class out of the comforts to 
which they were accustomed. Worse, these policies were implemented on a “shock” basis, 
with no time set aside for gradual adjustment or acclimatization. The aim of the policies was 
also nakedly to extract the wealth of the country and ship it eastward. Soviet soldiers paid for 
goods that had never been obtainable in the Soviet Union with worthless currency that the 
Latvians were forced to accept. Troop trains entered the main station in Rīga and most 
returned to Russia laden with high-quality consumer unknown in the USSR. The rest 
returned with Latvian prisoners. Store windows quickly were stocked with cardboard pictures 
of food and plastered with brave slogans about Soviet productivity. 
 This immediate background of scarcity could only have increased the allure of easy 
riches. The preceding state-directed impoverishment of the populace served to exacerbate a 
phenomenon well-attested-to in other national case-studies of the Holocaust: the frenzied 
rush for Jewish property.  
Rīga’s Jewish population – nearly half of the country’s Jews – constituted 
approximately 11% of the city’s total in 1935. It was approximately 43,000 strong.92 The 
nature of the community had been that of a prosperous and relatively cosmopolitan northern 
European port city: generally middle and upper middle class and substantially assimilated. 
As such, Jewish families disproportionately fell victim to Soviet depredations as putative 
“class enemies” in 1940-41. To choose one famous example: the banking family that had 
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previously owned the building that was to become the Arajs Kommando’s first headquarters. 
At least two Jewish witnesses later attested to the fact that “This was a villa-style 
[“villenartiges”] house. Before 1 July it housed [“Dort war... untergebracht”] the Banking 
House of Aron Schmuljan. Pērkonkrusts requisitioned it. In any case, the bank was already 
nationalized in the Russian time [1940-41].” 93 
To whatever degree they had managed to emerge from the Communist-engineered 
upheavals unscathed, Jewish families were specifically targeted that much more in the 
summer of 1941 and their remaining property again subject to summary theft. In other words: 
if the Soviets had not taken something, the Nazis and their henchmen did. Furthermore: if a 
Jewish family still inhabited a comfortable and semi-well-appointed apartment or house even 
after a year of the deliberate Communist-style pauperization of the country, this was easily 
seen as proof that the Soviet system favored Jews. From there it was no stretch to internalize 
an identity between the two. Thus, ironically, even the act of stealing from Jews could, in 
such a context, reinforce in the minds of Kommando members the notion of an alliance 
between Jews and Communists. At the very least, it was a convenient way for a man to 
justify his thievery to himself. 
In conclusion, it can be said that the wartime-specific political and economic 
conditions in Latvia, on the heels of the year-long Soviet disruptions, were considered 
dangerous enough by a large enough section of the non-Jewish Latvian population to 
convince some of them that serving the Nazis away from the front lines by participating in 
volunteer paramilitary units like the Arajs Kommando was the surest route to securing their 
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own personal comfort and safety. In short, seeming safety, regular pay, steady meals, 
abundant liquor, and occasional opportunities for officially-sanctioned theft were considered 
by many men to be adequate compensation for the job of mass murder. 
 
The Initial Aura of Credibility 
Linked to the perverse Judeo-Bolshevik propaganda was the persistent portrayal of 
Hitler and Germany as the rescuers of Latvia. The fight was cast as Europe versus the 
combined monsters of Jewish Bolshevism and degenerate oriental barbarism. This claim 
naturally lost credibility over the course of the war as it was undercut by exhaustive 
manpower levies; food, fuel, and property requisitions; high-handed Nazi behavior and 
occasional sneers at Latvians; the German authorities’ mulish refusal to discuss postwar 
Latvian independence, autonomy, or even “Slovakia status”; and finally, increasingly 
ominous German military defeats at the front. Nevertheless, it would have appeared self-
evident to most non-Jewish Latvians in the summer of 1941that the Germans were their 
saviors. No army had ever been defeated and humiliated in Latvia as easily as the Germans 
had defeated and humiliated the hated Red Army – one week after the terrifying nationwide 
nighttime sweep of 15,000 people for deportation to Siberia by the NKVD. While the Nazis 
found eager collaborators everywhere their army marched, virtually no other country invaded 
by Germany received the Wehrmacht with as much broad-based public enthusiasm as did 
Soviet-trampled Latvia.  
In a world turned upside-down, in which the Germans were cast, for the first time in 
Latvian history, in the role of liberators, Viktors Arājs made his appeal. He specifically 
sought people who considered themselves patriots. He called for military officers, hyper-
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nationalist Pērkonkrusts members, police, students, and the old veterans who made up the 
Aizsargi to join his force. Even if he failed to entice many suitable volunteers from the 
Aizsargi, their inclusion in his call possessed a totemic significance to the public. And Arājs 
indeed succeeded in recruiting educated members of the university student body and 
especially from his prestigious fraternity, Lettonia. To boot, he also drew trained and 
vengeful men from the Latvian Army, the very symbol of cherished independence. These 
groups – on the page and on the street – lent their credibility to the Kommando and gave its 
operations a veneer of respectability in the early days, both to the public at large and to 
prospective recruits.  
Under the Ulmanis regime, the Latvian public had been trained incessantly to revere 
the armed forces, old and young, in the forms of both the Aizsargi and the professional 
Army. The two holiest sites of the civil quasi-religion of Ulmanis’s Latvia were the Freedom 
Monument and the Brothers’ Cemetery – both firmly associated in Latvian history and ritual 
with the military. The former, the site of national holiday ceremonies commemorating 
Latvia’s first independence declared on 18 November 1918, stood in the center of the capital, 
flanked by honor guards. The second was the resting place of Latvia’s dead veterans from the 
War of Independence and also frequently had been the backdrop for Ulmanis’s speeches and 
solemn public rites and observances. The place is impressive: massive megalithic horsemen 
whose lowered flags touch the ground under which heroes were buried, blessed under the 
downcast eyes of the goddess of fortune (Christian imagery is conspicuously lacking at both 
sites).94  
Youth, in true 1930s dictatorial style, was fetishized and worshipped under the 
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Ulmanis regime as it was elsewhere in Europe, in both fascist and Communist systems. The 
inclusion of “students” might have evoked the prewar cult image. Their presence symbolized 
Latvian vigor as well as a Latvian future.  
 The only possible ‘black sheep’ in the coalition desired by Arājs, as it was advertised, 
was Pērkonkrusts. Judging by its tiny prewar membership, this long-banned organization did 
not enjoy much popular support. Yet in the minds of the public – or at least that of Viktors 
Arājs, assuming he actually authored the call personally – that organization might have 
ridden the Nazis’ coattails. The New Right’s seemingly undeniable ascendancy in the year 
1941 might have given Pērkonkrusts some credibility. Also, its members had been singled 
out for special persecution during the Soviet occupation as Latvian nationalists. Their 
inclusion in the call could have been interpreted as an emphasized rejection of Soviet 
authority and of seeming German tolerance for Latvian nationalism. 
These considerations were the most fleeting and help explain little beyond the 
motivation of the men of the Kommando for initially joining. In July 1941, scores of young 
Latvian men were tempted to associate themselves with men from groups of high prewar 
social standing – something Arājs himself indeed desired. This imperative would only have 
been heightened by the context: the war of all wars was thundering all around them. Bloody 
revenge was in the air. And a man who wore no uniform was barely a man at all.  
 
The Pre-War Authoritarian Conditioning of the Ulmanis Regime  
Studies of mentalité are notoriously eluvsive and complex, leading to conclusions that 
are often difficult or impossible to verify with certainty. Yet, the years of dictatorship in 
Latvia that preceded the Second World War presumably had some impact on the minds of 
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the men who joined the Kommando. The pre-war legacy of authoritarianism in Latvian 
society seems to have removed whole categories of behavioral options from the minds of at 
least some of those who engaged in the atrocities. This tendency towards obedience seems, 
logically, to have been strongest among the youngest members of the Kommando – the least 
experienced and most eager to impress and be validated. One confirmed Kommando 
member, seventeen years old at the time, explained that 
The whole thing was presented like an execution [“Das Ganze war wie eine 
Exekution aufgezogen”] and it absolutely never entered my mind that I could possibly 
refuse to carry out the order... In all of our instructional hours, nothing was ever said 
to us to the effect that we could refuse orders in certain situations [“ist uns nichts 
darüber gesagt worden, daß wir in irgendwelchen Situationen Befehle verweigern 
konnten”].95 
 
This statement might be more than simply a re-formulated plea by the killer that he had only 
been following orders. He goes further, saying that refusal to obey orders had been, for him, 
literally inconceivable.  
The imposition of military discipline and the attendant role adaptation that it implies 
may have been eased by the prewar experiences of the recruits.96 Most, aged between about 
17 and 24 by 1941, had spent their formative teenage years under the authoritarian Ulmanis 
government. Their minds forged under dictatorship, even the civilian men who joined the 
Kommando did so already accustomed to living in strict hierarchies that demanded obedience 
to authority.97 The seven years prior to the killing summer of 1941 were spent in a 
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regimented society cultivating a nationalist outlook, which in turn was confounded and 
outraged by the Soviets. By the same token, press censorship and the other trappings 
common to dictatorial states robbed the men of the experience of living in a pluralistic 
society and, concomitantly, of the freedom and necessity of forming, expressing, and 
defending their own views. 
It would be in error to over-emphasize this point – to do so would be to take from the 
men of the Arajs Kommando their historical agency and responsibility for their actions. 
Furthermore, it is virtually impossible to empirically demonstrate. Nevertheless, that the 
men’s backgrounds were steeped in dictatorship is not a factor in explaining their actions that 
can be wholly discounted. 
 
The Dynamic Ethno-Power Relationships Between Perpetrators 
The National Socialists’ proclivity to establish racial hierarchies everywhere they cast 
their gaze is notorious. They did this not only with their enemies, but also with their allies 
and clients. Therefore, there were important limits to and inherent tensions in any partnership 
between Latvian and German perpetrators.  
Nazi ideology variably placed the Latvian “race” on different levels on the racial 
hierarchy, depending on the Nazi espousing it. In general, Latvians occupied a middling 
rung, but one much higher than Russians owing to Latvia’s proximity to Scandinavia and 
Latvians’ seven century long contact with Germans. Nevertheless, a radical racial purge of 
the population was envisioned for after the war, with the details to be decided later. To give 
an idea of the level of Nazi contempt for Latvians, the German civilian occupation authority 
forbade marriage between German military personnel and even Estonian women who, on the 
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Nazi scale, were valued considerably more highly than Latvian women.98 One Nazi report on 
the “The Biological Condition of the Latvian Race [“Volk”]” was so bold as to make 
statistical projections out to the year 2000. It hinted at the necessity of a racial culling of 
unworthy elements before their numerical preponderance became a threat to the racially pure 
inhabitants of the country whose birthrate, owing to selfish decadence and the pernicious 
influence of Marxist materialism, was declining.99 Other Nazis toyed with the idea of 
“Germanizing” and assimilating the supposed racially worthy segment of the Latvian 
population and using the remainder for labor until they eventually vanished through 
attrition.100 Many additional examples of Nazi proposals for a postwar demographic 
revolution in the Baltic could be noted here. Put in bald terms, population decimation and 
even a partial genocide were being casually contemplated against the Latvian nation among 
some of those persons at the apex of power in the Third Reich. 
Hints of the beginnings of a “demographic revolution” were already very arguably 
emerging during the war. The first stages of such a plan were even implemented in 1939-40 
under the auspices of Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler in the form of the resettlement of 
the Baltic Germans and some claiming German ancestry.101 “Wiedereindeutschung [“re-
Germanization”]” processes to be applied to those judged worthy were established: 
resettlement in the Reich, education in German culture and Nazi ideology, training in the 
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German language, and so on. Not only Baltic Germans but also ethnic Latvians seeking to 
escape Soviet power during the Baigais Gads were involved. The other side of this coin – the 
selective culling of the Latvian population – was also begun during the war. For example, 
Latvian “work-shy,” dubbed “asocials,” formed a major part of the non-Jewish population of 
the Salaspils concentration camp. More notably, a squad of Arajs Kommando men 
“liquidated” 243 Latvian psychiatric patients – regarded as “useless mouths” and “life 
unworthy of life” – in April 1942.102 
An aside should be made. In one sense, the Red Army did save the Latvians who 
fought on the side of Germany from themselves – the ones that they did not kill, anyway. 
Whatever the perils of immediate re-absorption into the Soviet Union, which are not to be 
minimized, the long-term plans of the Nazis promised much worse. As radical and extreme 
as the Nazis’ various plans were, they have to be taken seriously. The Nazis have proven 
what they were capable of. 
It is firmly established in the literature that no mass shootings took place solely on 
Latvian initiative, but only under German authority.103 This proposition rings true in light of 
the common-sense assumption that the Germans were committed to controlling every last 
weapon on the territory they occupied, particularly as they were well aware of historical 
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Latvian animosity towards the Germans.104 The presence of armed natives beyond the gaze 
of German supervision was anathema to the goal of securing total power. German personnel 
were always present at the shootings and gave oversight and direction when not, as they quite 
often did, participating directly, weapon in hand.  
Under such circumstances, the Latvians could always tell themselves that the 
Germans were making them do it, designating the targets, providing the logistics, and giving 
the orders. For their part, the Germans could make themselves believe that it was really the 
Latvians who were the inhuman (or perhaps subhuman?) killers, while they distanced 
themselves both physically and via this psychological abstraction. These respective attitudes 
and division of labor might well have made it easier for both the Latvians and the Germans to 
keep doing what they were doing in the task of killing. It can well be imagined that the 
existence of two distinct groups of perpetrators operating at opposite ends of the command 
hierarchy made it easier for both to ‘get on with it.’ It was a self-reinforcing dynamic, 
undergirded by the two parties’ objective power disparity and supported, for the Germans at 
least, by ideological assumptions of racial difference. This mechanism may have functioned 
within individuals of both groups to diminish or even shed the psychological burden of 
responsibility for the deaths – objective reality aside, of course.  
Perversely, both Latvians and Germans invoked this division of labor as an alibi or at 
least a mitigating factor after the war as the accused attempted to absolve themselves. 
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Latvians could tell themselves as well as interrogators, judges, and courtroom audiences that 
nothing happened except under German control and direction. Viktors Arājs himself claimed 
as much at his trial. Meanwhile, the former German overseers could tell themselves and the 
same postwar interrogators, judges, and courtroom audiences that it had been the Latvians 
who were the depraved butchers and, if anything, German participation had functioned to 
bring order to the slaughter and thereby lessen, in some measure, the suffering of the 
Latvians’ victims.  
For example, the shotgun marriage of psychological convenience during wartime 
bore postwar offspring such as the following grotesque reframing of the events. SS-
Obersturmführer Arno Besekow was attached to Einsatzkommando 2 and is one of the 
figures who most frequently appears in later testimonies at the side of the pits.105 He would, 
after the war, blame Latvians he identified as,  
the Pērkonkrusts people who were known by their brownish, earth-colored uniforms 
[sic.: the Pērkonkrusts uniform was grey and black]. They wore blouses, riding pants, 
and high boots. The Pērkonkrusts people separated themselves into two sections of 
which one would rest while the other conducted executions... I also know that 
[Obersturmbannführer Rudolf] Batz [who first commanded Einsatzkommando 2 and, 
thus, was Besekow’s superior] established connections with the Pērkonkrusts people 
and often sought them out... The members of the Waffen-SS [some members of his 
details at Biėernieki were actually Waffen-SS] gave the mercy shots, since the 
Pērkonkrusts people did not do so. One can only describe the conduct of the members 
of the Waffen-SS like they were administering the last rites to the victims [“dass sie 
den Opfern den letzten Dienst erwiesen”].106 
 
Also according to Besekow, the members of the Waffen-SS whom he describes at the sites 
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did not like shooting. Besekow explained that “sometimes they let curses flow [“teilweise 
stiessen sie wüste Flüche aus”] and sometimes tears ran down their faces.” No matter the 
self-exculpating lies told by Besekow, in reality, among other things, he was responsible for 
instructing inexperienced Latvian shooters as to the distance they should stand from their 
targets to avoid mussing their uniforms with the blood, potentially dangerous bone 
fragments, and sundry tissue that would burst from their mutual victims’ wounds.107 
 
The Nebulous Phenomenon of Latvian Anti-Semitism 
The question of Latvian anti-Semitism is particularly interesting because, prior to the 
Second World War, Latvia had not been known as a home of anti-Semitism. In the context of 
Eastern Europe, together with Estonia and in sharp contrast to Lithuania and Poland, Latvia 
was almost singularly devoid of anti-Semitism. In fact, even more strangely, if Latvians did 
harbor historical animosity towards a specific ethnic minority in their country, it was towards 
the Germans. The historical context explained at the beginning of this chapter underscores 
the poverty of Daniel Goldhagen’s reductionist thesis when he dismissively assumes that 
Latvian culture was “profoundly anti-Semitic.”108 
This is not at all to say that Latvia was without anti-Semitic extremists. Pērkonkrusts 
was the largest bloc in interwar Latvian society that expounded anti-Semitism as part of some 
sort of “philosophical” worldview or political platform. However, the membership of this 
organization comprised less than half of one percent (6,000 out of around 1,500,000 people, 
or 0.004%, in 1935) of the ethnic Latvian population before the Second World War. History 
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can rightly discount their importance, even if their claims of twice the number of members 
cited here were true. After the installation of Ulmanis as dictator, furthermore, this pitiful 
“movement” was banned. During the war, the highest Latvian official of the pre-1940 
government living abroad, the ambassador to the United States and longtime friend of Kārlis 
Ulmanis, Alfreds Bilmanis, made explicit guarantees to the World Jewish Congress that after 
the war, the rights of Latvian Jews in the restored independent state would again be 
respected.109 His repudiation of anti-Semitism during the war touched upon a topic about 
which even the Western Allies are well known to have equivocated while combat operations 
were ongoing. 
Understandably, after the Holocaust and the undeniable participation in it by so many 
Latvians against their neighbors, the huge majority of Jewish accounts of this relationship – 
from the earliest postwar iterations by, for example, Max Kaufmann in 1947 to the volumes 
of witness memoirs complied more recently by Gertrude Schneider in the 1980s and 1990s – 
cast it in very blackened terms.110 These depictions often refer to Jewish shock at Latvian 
anti-Semitic attitudes, speech, and behavior, but almost universally only after the arrival of 
the Germans. They were quite right to do so. But even an account that notes “the pervasive 
anti-Semitism endemic to Latvia” also admits that before the war “the Latvian Jewish 
community pulsated with vitality.” It boasts of Jewish educational institutions and “seats of 
higher learning,” and “a splendid Jewish press, libraries, publishing houses,” theaters, and 
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museums, and notes that Austrian Jewish refugees had “found a haven in Riga.”111 The 
“Latvian hordes” that appear in account after account always seem to have suddenly arrived 
along with the Germans “with a brutality unmatched by any other European country.”112  
In fact, the mirror image of this attitude also prevailed.  Latvians’ attitude toward 
Latvian Jews – however scant and distorted its justification – was also that of shock and a 
sense of betrayal. As argued above, the Latvians who shot Jews did so at least in large part 
because they saw them as traitors to Latvia and collaborators with the Communists. The 
court that convicted Viktors Arājs himself concluded that there was no evidence suggesting 
that even he had harbored anti-Semitic attitudes before the war.113  
The book most frequently adduced by Latvian apologists to explain the historically 
harmonious co-existence of Jews and Latvians before the Second World War is Frank 
Gordon’s Latvians and Jews Between Germany and Russia.114 Gordon deliberately produced 
his account, in fact, as pushback against the negative view shared by most other Latvian Jews 
and German Jews sent to die in Latvia. He encourages them not to “blame ‘the Latvians’” 
and notes that “[t]he brown fascists were masters at setting peoples against each other.”115 
The extent to which real anti-Semitism emerged during the war, it did so at the instigation of 
the Nazis through their propaganda. Also, the repeated acts of killing and the observation of 
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Jews who had been subjected to every conceivable method of mockery, robbery, and 
dehumanization probably functioned to actually instill a previously absent anti-Semitism in 
the perpetrators.  
Finally, none of this is to say that the Jews who were killed were not ultimately killed 
simply because they were Jews. Indeed they were. However, given the long-term context of 
the relationship between Jewish and non-Jewish Latvians, it appears very probable that the 
anti-Semitism evident in 1941, 1942, and 1943 was almost solely a product of Nazi 
instigation, exploiting a volatile local situation, rather than an autonomous local product 
emerging free of outside influence. The Nazis, by claiming that their Jewish “enemy” was 
identical to the Latvians’ perceived enemy – the Soviets – gave those men who were willing 
to kill an outlet to see their wishes of revenge fulfilled in a way that did not jeopardize their 
own personal safety (in fact, it was enhanced), promised some lucre, and even allowed them 
to posture as patriots in a land not only saturated by Nazi propaganda, but where any 
semblance of a free civil society had long been dead. 
 
SUMMARY 
The Second World War in Latvia can be regarded as yet another in a near-
millennium-long string of perennial conflicts fought in Eastern Europe. The “Bloodlands,” as 
Timothy Snyder has so memorably described these territories combined, have historically 
been engulfed in the struggles between various iterations of West and East.116 While massive 
bloodshed and atrocity has doubtless attended every one of these struggles, that between the 
Nazis and the Soviets distinguishes itself from the rest not only by its staggering enormity, 
but also by the Holocaust. The question of Latvian participation in it requires an answer.  
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The Holocaust could and would never have occurred in Latvia without the policy of 
the Nazis which commanded and orchestrated it. Without the Soviet occupation and the 
trauma of the Year of Horror, 1940-41, the Holocaust would still have undoubtedly taken 
place there so long as the occupying Nazis had demanded it, but it very likely would not have 
had the benefit of the participation of nearly as many willing Latvian executioners as it did in 
the actual event. Yet, the Soviet occupation that preceded the German one can only go so far 
in making explicable the decisions taken by the men of the Latvian Auxiliary Security Police 
to take up their posts in that organization and discharge their hideous, Nazi-appointed duties. 
Other factors intervened, including crass, material appeals; the electrifying sensation of being 
on the winning side of an apocalyptic war; the pre-formed authoritarian mindset with which 
most of the men entered that war; the warped and unequal interracial relationship between 
the Nazi German overlords and their subservient Latvian collaborators, who found common 
ground in hunting their mutual Jewish quarry; and the interbreeding of the foreign 
incarnations of anti-Semitism with whatever pre-existing domestic anti-Semitism as may 
have been found. 
That there were no non-Jewish voices to publically oppose the Kommando’s doings is 
a testament to the level of oppression imposed by the Nazi occupation as well as the 
methodical determination with which the Soviets before them had decapitated Latvian 
leadership cadres. But it also suggests a more thorough-going and deeper societal decay 
among the everyday people – ordinary people who had long lived in a political culture 
saturated with propaganda; who might not have even remembered enjoying real freedom of 
speech; and who were afraid, mourning, outraged, and in search of scapegoats. Proof that 
society was a shambles is that someone like Viktors Arājs could succeed in stepping in as a 
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leader and find people willing to join with him to plow the furrows of Hell.  
 
The Sole Exception 
In Düsseldorf, West Germany, in May 1961, Egons Jansons (no relation to Leonīds 
Jansons), a Latvian immigrant born in Rīga in 1925, was arrested at ten-thirty at night for 
threatening random passers-by with a pistol. The police who disarmed him found a second 
pistol on his person and a total of fifteen rounds of ammunition. At the station, it was 
discovered that Jansons had been in and out of jail ever since the end of the war, earning a 
rap-sheet that included numerous counts of fraud, attempted fraud, and petty larceny across 
the entire breadth of the Federal Republic of Germany. When averaged out, Jansons had been 
arrested once nearly every year since 1945.117 To this record, he seemed determined to see a 
new charge added: murder in connection with National Socialist violent crimes. In August, 
while still in remand awaiting trial for his alarming public gunplay, Jansons spoke with a 
priest named Kauffenstein and thereafter penned a confusing and ungrammatical but very 
passionate letter to the State Prosecutor in Düsseldorf, Mr. Abramowski, entirely unique in 
all the annals of the Arajs Kommando:  
This conversation was [inspirationally] decisive to my letter to you today. In my heart 
[I have been] decided for days – yet I have lacked the courage to confess myself 
before worldly judges. Freely [“Unbeeinfluβt”], in full realization of the gravity of 
my plea of guilt and the consequences to be expected – in order to be rid of the 
weight on my conscience [“Gewissenlast”] that I have borne for nearly twenty years 
and which, especially in recent months, has allowed me no peace. To obtain God’s 
irrevocable and permanent reconciliation [“Verbindung”] and forgiveness, I declare: 
as a member of the Latvian Security Kommando [“Sicherungskommando,” sic.] of 
the Commander of the Security Police and SD in Latvia, did I in two cases in the year 
1943, personally shoot two members of the Jewish and Russian people, respectively. 
Additionally, on multiple occasions I took part in Ghetto-to-Salaspils [escort] actions. 
Today I would relinquish all that is dear and precious to me if I could undo this 
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[“wenn ich das ungeschehen machen könnte”] – I repent of it deeply and am ashamed 
of myself. And I am prepared to accept the punishment I am due without objection or 
complaint and lay in abjection!118 
 
Every detail offered by Jansons in subsequent statements corresponds exactly to what 
is known today, from the dates of the Fürstenberg police training to uniform descriptions to 
the demographic composition of the inmate population at the Salaspils concentration camp 
by gender, national origin, approximate average age, and total number. Nothing he said is at 
odds with the known reality as proven in courtrooms either before or since, and accurately 
maps onto the known timeline of the Kommando’s development. He was certainly telling the 
truth or, at least, was telling some of it.  
In the late summer of 1942, Egons Jansons was stationed in the area of the Salaspils 
concentration camp and regularly had the duty of escorting and guarding labor columns 
between the camp and various work sites. The killing of his first innocent, Jansons describes 
as follows: 
Alerted by the alarm siren, we assembled with about twenty men in front of the 
guardhouse. A ranking fellow countryman [“vorgesetzter Landsmann;” the meaning 
of Landsmann is ambiguous here, but seems to refer to a Latvian superior] then led us 
into the camp, where the Jewish labor groups were assembled. The Communists and 
work-shy were not assembled. One Jew stood slightly apart from his group. After a 
while, a German Sergeant [“Oberscharführer”] from the Headquarters 
[“Kommandantur”] came. He affirmed that the Jew standing apart there was supposed 
to be shot. He also gave the reason for it, but I no longer know what was mentioned. I 
stood in the first rank of the three columns as the left wingman. The Sergeant 
designated me and both of the two comrades standing behind me in the second and 
third ranks for the shooting. The Jew who was to be shot was led to the vicinity of a 
concrete wall... The man continued to pray and called to Jehovah. He stood with his 
face to us. From a distance of about ten paces, the three of us in the detail fired a 
salvo at the man from our Czech rifles... The man fell and was immediately dead. 
After a little while, we were then marched back out of the camp. The one who was 
shot remained where he lay while we departed... That evening, I heard that the Jew 
was supposed to have stolen something. At the time, I was 17 years old. The shooting 
of this unarmed man had agitated me exceptionally. I got drunk the evening after the 
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shooting. I had had the intention to travel to my mother in Rīga that evening. Rīga 
was only 17 kilometers distant from the camp. Because of this experience, I did not 
go to Rīga... How old the one who was shot was, or what he was called, I do not 
know. Like all of the Jews, he wore civilian clothing. I only remember that he shouted 
“Jehovah” before he was shot. What language he spoke, I do not know [emphasis 
added].119 
 
The fact that the victim was alleged to have committed the offense of theft – whatever that 
could possibly have meant in his context – invites the suggestion of a connection with 
Jansons’s own postwar serial misdemeanors on the same charge. It is especially curious that 
early in the confession he claimed to have forgotten the alleged charge, but later admitted 
that the Jew had been accused of stealing. The apparent ineptitude that led Jansons to the 
interior of so many West German jail cells may have been, if not intentional, then perhaps 
unconsciously symptomatic of guilt, a wish to perhaps identify more somehow with his 
victim, and the need to feel himself redeemed in some measure through experiencing some 
form of punishment. 
In his second story, Egons Jansons related how he was ordered, fairly fresh from his 
SD police training, to execute a Russian male during the gigantic “Winterzauber” anti-
partisan operation in Belarus in early 1943. Suddenly coming under machinegun fire, the 
German in charge of this column of the Kommando believed that the Russian, who had been 
attached to the platoon as a guide [“Wegführer”] and interpreter, had attempted to lead them 
into an ambush. This was later proven not to have been the case, and the column eventually 
arrived safely at its destination by following the then-dead Russian’s instructions. 
Nevertheless, upon a direct order, Egons Jansons shot the man in the head with a non-
government issue Walther PPK handgun that he privately owned. With German forces, it was 
quite common for troops to bring their own sidearms with them to combat areas as backup 
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weapons.120 Jansons was one of the few who would, however, continue the practice of 
carrying a weapon into peacetime civilian life.121 
After Operation Winterzauber, Egons Jansons returned to Rīga, where he twice 
attended mass shootings of 100 to 200 Jews from the Rīga Ghetto in April or May of 1943. 
This is plausible in that it was the period that immediately preceded the relocation of the 
ghetto’s last remnant of Jews to labor camps across the country that began in July 1943 and 
ended with the closing of the ghetto in November of that year. The two executions he 
attended may have been the killing of those inmates no longer considered fit for work. 
Jansons said that he personally drove groups of victims to the Dreilini Forest and waited 
about 100 meters away for them to be shot. He described the “the wailing [“jammern”] of the 
people” as “simply terrible.”122 By 1944, Jansons had been transferred to the Latvian Legion. 
Fighting on the Eastern Front against the Red Army for the remainder of the war, he was 
wounded three times. In March 1945, the hospital where he was convalescing in western 
Germany was captured by advancing US forces. His entire family had stayed behind in 
Latvia. With his family, therefore, he had had no postwar contact. And by the time of his 
confession, he had been living separated from his West German wife for a year and a half.123 
After months of further investigation in the fall of 1961, it was eventually decided by 
the State Prosecutor not to pursue any charges against Egons Jansons except those related to 
his recent episode in Düsseldorf where he had publically brandished his pistols. Several 
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reasons were given, including that Jansons had been a minor at the time of the events and 
additionally, that as such, he would have been particularly vulnerable to the maleficent Nazi 
indoctrination he had been given. As importantly, it was observed that both of the shootings 
had occurred upon direct orders with no sign of personal malice or base motives. The Jew 
was shot as an offending prisoner, rather than as a Jew, it was decided. And the shooting of 
the Russian might have been partly justifiable in context, since Jansons could plausibly have 
believed himself to be protecting the safety of his unit. Also, the latter incident having taking 
place in an area of active military operations, refusal to carry out the order could have been 
met with summary justice for Jansons himself, reasoned Düsseldorf’s senior public 
prosecutor. Although all of this information came purely from Jansons’s own accounts, 
investigation was halted. The prosecutors concluded that “It is therefore, on the grounds of a 
lack of suitable evidence to the contrary, to be assumed that these killings should be seen not 
as murder but as manslaughter [“Totschlag”].”124 Unlike murder, the statute of limitations 
had run for out the crime of manslaughter. Under West German law, Jansons could not be 
tried for the crimes to which he himself had voluntarily confessed once they were defined as 
just manslaughter. 
 Having been so informed, Jansons later wrote back to Abramowski at the 
prosecutor’s office that the notice “was my most beautiful Christmas present. It has already 
pained me a thousand times to have taken part in the shooting actions as a young man... I 
thank you again for the great understanding that you have shown me. Devotedly Yours, 
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Egons Jansons.”125 For his role in the atrocities, Egons Jansons, like the absolute majority of 
the other members of the Latvian Auxiliary Security Police, was never punished by any 
court. He was, however, exceptional insofar as he is the only member of the Arajs Kommando 
to ever have volunteered himself to justice unsolicited and uncoerced.   
 In the following chapters, such postwar fates as are known of his less candid and 
forthcoming officers and comrades from the Kommando will be explored. While Egons 
Jansons confessed of his own accord and was spared by the technicalities of West German 
law, his former friends never ceased their efforts to evade the law and defeat the course of 
justice. 
Long before Jansons spoke up in West Germany – indeed before the war was even 
over – Soviet authorities were not making for themselves a reputation for leniency, nor 
would they require any such voluntary admissions as his.
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CHAPTER 3 
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS: 
PROPAGANDA ALONGSIDE JUSTICE 
OVERVIEW 
Both in terms of chronology and number of convictions, the Soviet Union was the 
leading post-war prosecutor of Arajs Kommando members. A total of 356 former members 
of the Latvian Auxiliary Security Police are known to have been captured, tried, and 
convicted by the Soviets. Almost all of them were apprehended between 1944 and 1950. 
After peaking in 1947 with 87 convictions, the number of suspects dwindled to a trickle in 
the 1950s and 1960s, with individual years seeing one, two, three, or sometimes no arrests at 
all.  In 1967, the Soviet Union captured its final former Kommando member.126 
But Soviet justice, as pertained specifically to the men of the Arajs Kommando, 
should actually be considered as arriving in three unique waves. These three waves were 
motivated by different imperatives ranging from security during and in the direct aftermath 
of the Second World War and the maintenance of domestic cohesion and the dominance of 
the Communist Party in re-annexed Latvia in the first; through the promotion of the Soviet 
image abroad and the discrediting of the anti-Communist Latvian exiles in the second; to the 
real service of justice and a desire for a normalization of relations with the West in the third. 
In other words, Soviet efforts followed first a wartime and immediate postwar track; 
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followed by a classic Cold War track; and finally, an “Ostpolitik” track reflective of détente. 
Prosecution of Arajs Kommando members on Soviet territory brought to an end the “first 
wave” of Soviet justice. But Soviet impact continued to be felt in the two other slightly 
overlapping waves, both in a propaganda-heavy effort to internationally demonstrate the 
superiority of Soviet justice and the USSR’s commitment to punishing fascist criminals and 
later in serious and reasonable legal assistance to Western prosecutors first in West Germany 
and later in the United States. 
The first wave began during the Second World War as the Red Army returned to 
Latvia. As it battled its way westward, recapturing Rīga in October 1944 and accepting the 
surrender of all remaining German and Latvian forces allied to the Germans in May 1945, 
many suspected fascist criminals fell into the hands of the Red Army and the NKVD 
(Narodniy Komissariat Vnutrenneekh Dyel, or “People’s Ministry of Internal Affairs.”). This 
first wave crested late in that decade as Soviet control in Latvia was consolidated and the 
adjudication of fascist crimes there was systematized. The initial efforts to deliver justice to 
Viktors Arājs’s men tapered gradually through the 1950s and into the 1960s as fewer and 
fewer suspects remained to be identified and captured. There are three key things to be 
examined in connection with this wave. The first are the reports generated by the 
Extraordinary State Commission on Crimes in Latvia, the Soviets Union’s official 
comprehensive assessment of the crimes of the German fascists in the Latvian Soviet 
Socialist Republic from 1941 to 1945. The second is the trial and execution of Höhere SS- 
und Polizeiführer Lettland (HSSPF) or “Higher SS and Police Leader” Friedrich Jeckeln in 
early 1946, which neatly encapsulated this phase’s most important features. Finally, there are 
the actual interrogations and verdicts against the captured men of the Kommando. 
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Interestingly, in contrast to the prominently-staged trials of their criminal German 
counterparts, the prosecutions of Latvian perpetrators were handled quietly and without 
public spectacle. While the political interests of the Soviet Union played a large role in the 
inspiration and implementation of this phase of its post-war justice when it came to the 
question of public consumption, on the level of the individual perpetrator, this phase was 
marked by a desire to know the real truth – by any means necessary and with no regard for 
liberal-democratic conceptions of due process. 
The second wave of Soviet efforts at justice for Latvian Nazi collaborators (only 
indirectly affecting the men formerly of the Arajs Kommando, it should be said), was more 
blatantly a political exercise and therefore the most dubious from the standpoint of the 
historical data it may have uncovered for posterity. It began in the mid-1960s – just as the 
final Kommando members who would face Soviet justice were apprehended – and lasted into 
the early 1970s. Its most outstanding feature came in the form of a series of what the Latvian 
exiles in the West uniformly termed “show trials.” Many of the defendants did not even live 
in the Soviet Union, but rather were being tried in absentia while living in West Germany, 
Canada, and the United States as immigrant citizens in good standing. Western public and 
government response is a complicated issue to be dealt with in subsequent chapters, however. 
No defendant swept up in this wave was actually accused of membership in the Arajs 
Kommando. Yet, a major change had occurred regarding the Soviet line towards local 
collaborators that did affect the men of the former Kommando. A part of this change, 
illustrated by the bevy of propaganda materials that accompanied the cases, was a new Soviet 
willingness to publically point the finger at people who had been technically considered 
Soviet citizens for willing participation in the crimes of the Nazis – former Kommando 
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members included. Previously, the preferred term for the wartime enemy in official Soviet-
speak had generically been “fascists” or “German fascists.” It was only in the 1960s that 
Latvian perpetrators entered the Soviet official consciousness on a meaningful and 
systematic scale. In the end, while this was a major step in the direction of the truth about the 
participation of Latvian collaborators in the Holocaust, it was nevertheless again marred by 
considerable unnecessary propagandizing and political interference that clouded or 
scrambled perhaps as much new knowledge as it revealed. Perhaps its most significant 
contribution is the pressure it may have placed on Western governments to revisit the issue of 
Nazi crimes in Latvia.127 
The third and final wave of Soviet justice for the men of the Arajs Kommando came 
in the form of legal aid rendered to prosecutors beyond the borders of the Soviet Union – 
chiefly in the West, but also, in at least one known case, inside the Warsaw Pact as well.128 It 
was, in fact, a parallel process that slightly overlapped temporally with the USSR’s domestic 
and international propaganda offensive described above. This phase began in the 1960s when 
German trials of Nazi crimes sharply intensified and continued though the 1980s when the 
United States finally renewed its own prosecutions of suspected Nazi criminals within its 
jurisdiction. Soviet assistance to the West would in fact continue as long as the Soviet Union 
still existed. No Western prosecutor’s office was fully equipped to gather the evidence 
necessary to confidently convict a man suspected of membership in the Arajs Kommando 
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without at least some Soviet help. They possessed the basic documentation concerning upper 
echelon decision-making and reporting but not the low-level documents and testimonies 
required for the conviction of an obscure, individual man. Also, the bulk of the witnesses, not 
only those among the few survivors but also quite large numbers of convicted perpetrators, 
could only be identified, made accessible to Western investigators, and deposed with the 
cooperation of the Soviet state. By virtue of controlling the territory on which the crimes took 
place, the Soviets could also offer certain pieces of forensic evidence. Prosecutors in both of 
these Cold War adversaries of the Soviets benefitted substantially – at least in some cases 
even decisively – from the legal assistance of their Communist counterparts. By and large, 
the Soviet authorities appear always to have behaved assiduously and correctly with the West 
in an honest pursuit of justice. Not one of the manifold witnesses or pieces of evidence 
supplied by the Soviets to Western prosecutors, unlike the USSR’s array of propaganda 
intended for public dissemination, was ever exposed as false or fabricated when subjected to 
careful historical or forensic examination. However, such participation in Western processes 
also conveniently aided the propaganda objective of claiming, to use a cliché, the “moral 
high-ground.” In their aid, then, the Soviets were serious and unstinting if smug and self-
righteous. 
Hence, every aspect necessary to consider when evaluating the postwar legal 
reckoning with the crimes of the Latvian Auxiliary Security Police anywhere in the world 
invariably relates back directly to the Soviet Union. Overall, compared to prosecutors and 
courts in liberal democracies such as West Germany and the United States, the Soviets were 
far more aggressive in their pursuit of suspects and far harsher in their sentencing of the 
convicted. West Germany’s maximum penalty was life imprisonment, and that of the United 
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States was denaturalization and deportation. It should also be noted that the severity of the 
Soviet sentences generally lessened with time as the more draconian code decreed during the 
war was phased out – a measure that included the abolition of the death penalty.  
The first two waves of Soviet justice will be summarized in the current chapter; the 
Soviet role in foreign trials will be discussed subsequent chapters.  
 
THE EXTRAORDINARY STATE COMMISSION AND THE EARLY TRIALS 
Immediately upon their re-entry into Latvian territory, the Soviets began assembling 
evidence about the crimes of the German fascists on the territory of the Latvian Soviet 
Socialist Republic. This evidence took many forms, including physical and documentary 
evidence, as well as voluminous interviews with the general populace, the surviving victims 
of fascist terror, and German and collaborationist prisoners. The entity dedicated to formally 
establish what had gone on during the occupation was called the Extraordinary State 
Commission on Crimes in Latvia, although it drew upon the resources and assistance of a 
panoply of other Soviet entities including the Red Army, the NKVD, and SMERSH (SMERt 
SHpionam, or “Death to Spies,” the name for the Soviet Chief Directorate of Counter 
Intelligence), to name the most important.129 
The Commission’s findings were very seldom cited during the actual proceedings of 
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg.130 Thus, whether or not it had been the 
intention from the start, in fact the published and publically-accessible reports were primarily 
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used for internal Soviet judicial purposes and public consumption.  
The points on which the conclusions of the Extraordinary State Commission are at 
odds with our current state of historical knowledge can be illuminating. Predictably, these 
variances bear the stamp of political interference emanating from the Communist Party 
leadership and perhaps from ambient ideological presuppositions and expectations at the 
lower levels as well. Beneath the often tedious and cumbersome Communist phraseology, 
several general aspects of the Soviet reports are worth pointing out. First, they reflect 
Soviets’ the well-known attitude towards the Holocaust: Jewish victimhood is not totally 
effaced from the narrative, but neither is it given proportionate consideration or emphasis. 
Second, the reports show that the obverse is also true: the identity of many of the perpetrators 
as Latvians is veiled, not to say completely hidden. In short, the particular ethnic identity of 
both Latvian perpetrators and Jewish victims is obscured. Third, the Latvians are 
characterized as victims and their specific national tragedy under Nazi misrule is highlighted. 
Fourth, the Soviet Extraordinary State Commission’s reports needlessly exaggerate horrific 
crimes by inflating the already staggering numbers of victims. The given number of total 
victims is typically tripled, not only putting it (and the derivative numbers at individual sites 
or of individual operations) at odds with Western estimates, but also sometimes leading to 
internal inconsistencies as well. Thus, the figure of “more than 300,000” people killed in 
Latvia appears with regularity in contrast to Western estimates of approximately 85,000 to 
90,000 Jews killed. Fifth, some specific Soviet claims regarding Nazi crimes are unsupported 
by the evidence, leading to the conclusion that some allegations were propaganda 
fabrications.  
However, while the larger narrative made available to the Soviet public thus 
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contained serious errors and distortions, Soviet convictions of the individual perpetrators 
seem to have been based on real rather than falsified evidence. These low-level trials were 
not staged as events for public consumption. Even if the gathering of this evidence was not 
attended by any legal protections of due process for the suspects, the investigators seem to 
have adhered at least to procedures designed to reveal the actual truth. 
 
The Question of Latvian Participation 
Some illumination into the question of the original Soviet attempt at the effacement 
of the Latvian identity of some of the perpetrators comes from an unusual source: the Finnish 
Communist noted for his litigiousness and Russophilia, Mr. Johan Bäckman, who has also 
advocated the criminalization of referring to Soviet “occupation” in the Baltics. Given 
special permission by the post-Soviet Russian government to peruse otherwise tightly 
controlled archives, Bäckman established the St. Petersburg-based Johan Beckman [sic.] 
Institute. The Institute has assembled a useful collection of documents detailing atrocities 
committed in Belarus by Latvian formations, including the Arajs Kommando. In the preface 
to his collection of primary source documents, Bäckman boasts of the special access to the 
archives he was given by the Russian authorities: 
The collection presented to the reader’s attention contains documents from the 
National archives of the Republic of Belarus, the Central archives of the Federal 
Security Service of Russia [the successor organization to the KGB] and the Central 
archives of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation most of which are 
published for the first time [emphasis added].131 
 
It is in the “Editor’s Note” to the document collection of Bäckman that an ingenious 
explanation for the initial Soviet suppression of the fact of Latvian collaboration with the 
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Germans is posited:  
The atrocities shock shock [sic.] by their scope. So, how did the Nazis succeed in 
realization [sic.] of their misanthropic genocide plans? In the Soviet epoque [sic.] this 
question was suppressed since a blunt reply could disturb international peace in the 
country. The main cause is that collaborationist unions formed by the invaders from 
among the Soviets [sic.] citizens figured prominently in realization [sic.] of the Nazis’ 
genocide plans. The Russians, the Byelorussians, the Ukrainians, the Lithuanians, the 
Estonians and the Letts [i.e. Latvians] took part in such unions [emphasis added].132 
 
The odd phrase “a blunt reply could disturb international peace in the country” is probably 
best interpreted to mean that inter-ethnic comity within the USSR might have been 
threatened if the ethnic identity of the Nazis’ accomplices were overtly and publically noted. 
This is the fascinating but also intuitive complement to the universally attested propensity of 
the Soviets to downplay the ethnicity of the Jewish victims. It also goes well beyond the 
simple ideological wish to live among a de-nationalized world-brotherhood of workers and 
peasants, no matter whom the fascists wished to either kill or employ. 
This illustrates that the first impulse was to control and define the realities and 
experience of the Nazi occupation in such a way as to politically benefit the USSR. Most 
basically, it functioned to defuse potential ethnic strife. In this calculation, the Soviet 
leadership may well have acted shrewdly, even presciently, for with hindsight, the example 
of Yugoslavia in the 1990s automatically comes to mind. It was also central to the 
justification narrative of Stalin’s re-establishment of control over territory in the new postwar 
order that he had first gained through his pact with Hitler in 1939. And the imperative to 
officially homogenize the populations of a multi-national bloc and unite everyone under the 
same banner – the victims of, victors over, and even when necessary, collaborators with 
fascism– must have been powerful.  
 Of course, this discourse of professed brotherhood was totally insincere. Fresh 
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deportations from Latvia to the Soviet interior resumed with the return of the Red Army and 
culminated in the massive deportation of more than 42,000 Latvians between 25 and 28 
March 1949.133 It should also be noted that the desire to keep the ethnicity of the perpetrators 
out of sight did not prevent the pursuit and punishment of the Latvian perpetrators – only that 
publically “this question was suppressed.” In other words, the reality was perfectly known to 
the authorities but not proclaimed to the public because it was seen as politically 
inconvenient at the time. 
 
The Pro-Latvian Propaganda of the Soviets 
One report specifically concerned the crimes committed by the Nazis and their 
collaborators in Rīga. It can be read as a late example of the extensive Soviet propaganda 
attempts during the war to convince Latvians that the USSR was not hostile to Latvian 
national pride and distinctiveness and was actually the true guardian of Latvian culture 
against the fascists.134 Indeed, this commission was headed by a Soviet Latvian, KalnbērziĦš, 
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who was also the First Secretary of the Latvian Communist Party.135 Many of the other high-
level commissioners were also Latvians who had been waiting to return to their country in 
triumph. In effect, they were the Soviet Union’s ambassadors to re-conquered Latvia – 
“Communism with a Latvian Face,” in a way. In its comprehensive indictment of the German 
occupation of Latvia, the report seems consciously designed to sooth local feelings and 
smooth the permanent re-integration of Latvia into the USSR. 
The first charges against the German occupation listed in the report were all things 
that any average, apolitical, vaguely patriotic Latvian could identify with. “The henchmen of 
Hitler mocked the city of Rīga – the shrine of the Latvian people. They attempted to destroy 
everything that was bound up with the national traditions of the people.”136 It is noted that 
Brīvības [“Freedom”] Street was renamed after Adolf Hitler, while streets named for the 
greatest cultural figures in Latvian art and literature were renamed after other “criminals of 
the Hitler clique.”137 It notes that a large part of the cultural center of Latvia, Rīga’s Old 
Town, was destroyed by the Germans.138 The closure of schools and universities, and the 
destruction or removal to Germany of the contents of Latvia’s libraries, archives, 
conservatories, and museums is particularly deplored in terms of the violence this did to the 
preservation of Latvian culture. That the Germans suppressed Latvian music and forced the 
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choirs to sing in German particularly rankled Latvian feathers and was also stressed in this 
report. In other words, the language of the report was so framed as to appeal to the 
nationally-inclined feelings of the people in the country as recognized by the Soviets. 
Another striking feature of the Extraordinary State Commission’s reports comes in 
the form of what they did not say. The Commission went to extremes to soft-pedal the 
collaboration of the indigenous population that did occur and basically baldly omitted 
mention of any active, voluntary, or autonomous Latvian participation in fascist criminality. 
It seems almost certain that this was an attempt to propagate the perception that Latvians had 
stood in socialist solidarity with their brothers in the Soviet Union, to present a uniform anti-
fascist face, and to promote the internal postwar cohesion of the USSR. This line would give 
the citizens of the resurrected Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic a victim narrative of their 
own and put them, as part of the Soviet Union, on the winning side of history. In exchange, 
this construction would also require that the inhabitants of the restored SSR accept the notion 
that Latvia had, in fact, been liberated, rather than re-occupied, by the Red Army in 1944 and 
1945. 
The political objective behind this minimalist view of Latvian complicity extended at 
least as far as the explicit claim that the men of the Latvian Legion were press-ganged and 
forced into the formation against their will by SS recruiters:  
The German aggressors tried to force the Latvians to fight for the interests of 
predatory [“räuberischen”] Hitler-imperialism. They carried out a violent 
mobilization of the so-called ‘Latvian Legion.’ Those who refused were sent to a 
concentration camp and shot. Those invited to the recruitment stations 
[“Einberufungsstellen”] were compelled to sign a statement attesting to their 
‘voluntary’ entry into the Legion.139 
 
Unlike the twin claim that the Legionnaires had deserted in droves to join the ranks of 
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the Red Army, in many cases the claim that they were conscripts was actually in accord with 
reality. Again, however, this assertion was only intended for public consumption. Actual 
Legionnaires who were captured by the Red Army experienced a decisively less sympathetic 
attitude on the part of the Soviets. Many were executed as traitors and members of the SS. 
Unlike the Legion, other German-oriented formations such as the Arajs Kommando 
and the Schutzmannschaft units received fairly scant attention in the published reports of the 
Commission. Latvian complicity with the “German Fascists” is often minimized almost to 
the point of exclusion.  
 When admission of the existence of Latvian collaborators was totally unavoidable, a 
bizarre formulation was sometimes used to describe them: “The accomplices and participants 
in the abuses of the German hangmen were Latvian-German nationalists [“lettisch-deutsche 
Nationalisten”] who unmasked themselves completely as henchmen of German fascism 
[emphasis added].”140 Clearly, the nature of the perpetrators as Germans and fascists was 
emphasized, while their Latvian identity was downplayed to appear almost wholly incidental.  
 Many of the names, positions, and deeds of the principle German figures involved in 
the conquest, administration, and policing of the territory are accurately presented in this 
particular report. Listed are, for example: the Generals Model and Schörner, serially the 
commanders of Army Group North; SS General Schröder and HSSPF Lettland Jeckeln; 
Ostland’s Reichskommissar Lohse; Generalkommissar of Latvia Drechsler; Viktors Arājs’s 
direct superior, Dr. Lange; and another half dozen major police officials in charge of ghettos, 
camps, and prisons. No Latvian names appear on this published list of the principle 
criminals. Štiglics [“Stieglitz,” sic.], Police Prefect in Rīga in charge of the Central Prison, 
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was a Latvian, but his ethnic identity was hidden behind a German-sounding name.141 The 
consistency with which Latvian criminals were excluded from official public documents like 
this one – while behind the scenes, of course, they were being swiftly captured and punished 
– can safely be interpreted as the result of a centrally commanded policy.  
 
The Estimated Number of Victims 
Perhaps one of the Finnish Communist Johan Bäckman’s finest contributions to the 
understanding of the Soviet response to the Arajs Kommando comes in the form of his 
archival discoveries. Below is reproduced one of the few wartime Soviet documents relating 
specifically to the unit available. It was possibly generated by the special SMERSH unit that 
is believed to have been dedicated solely to the quiet investigation of the Arajs 
Kommando.142 It is included here in its entirety because it offers a glimpse into what the 
Soviets knew about the Arajs Kommando, its commanding officer, and its mission even 
before the war ended. 
 
Special message on completed investigatory case for the group of punishers from the 
detached unit under command of the German Army [sic.] Major Arajs coordinated by 
SD 
 
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SERVICE “SMERSH” 
OF THE 3RD BALTIC FRONT LINE. 
 
March the 10th, 1945 
№ 4/1727 
Top secret 
 
TO THE HEAD OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
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HEADQUARTERS “SMERSH”– 
STATE SECURITY COMMISSIONER 
OF THE 2ND RANK 
com. ABAKUMOV 
 
In January – February 1945 the Counterintelligence Service “SMERSH” of the 3rd 
Baltic Front Line detained the group of officers of the punitive detached unit under so 
called “Latvian security police – SD” headed by the German Army [sic.] Major 
ARAJS: 
 
Mirvald Andreevich LAVINISH [sic.], 
Alexander Albertovich VANAGS, 
Peter Ivanovich STANKEVICH, 
Imants Teodorovich GAILIS, 
Visvaldis Gerbertovich GRINTZEVICH, 
Peter Frantzovich BUTLERS, 
Khariton Теодорович [sic. Cyrillic characters appear in the translation] 
LOCKMANIS, 
Vladislav Stanislavovich BALALAIKA, 
Zigfrid Ivanovich VICKELIS 
 
The carried out case investigation has revealed that: 
 
since the first days of occupation of the Latvian SSR capital by the fascist troops the 
German punitive forces started killing the Soviet Union citizens in great numbers. At 
the beginning of July 1941 the concentration camp and ghettos were set up, which 
were the places for blood purging of the innocent soviet citizens. 
 
Over three year’s realization of such a fascist punitive policy, the German aggressors 
and their supporters among the anti-soviet elements only in the district of Riga killed 
more than 300 hundred [sic.] thousand Soviet people [emphasis added].  
 
Especially for making arrests and executions the occupation authorities set up a 
punitive detached unit under so called Latvian security police “SD”, this detached 
unit was under command of the German Army [sic.] Major ARAJS, who was well 
known of [sic.] his cruelty in bloodpurging the soviet citizens: 
 
The ARAJS’s detached unit created on the voluntary basis amounted up to 3000 men 
[sic.]. This detached unit was divided into squadrons and carried out the following 
punitive actions: 
 
– Arresting of the anti-fascist activists all over the territory of the Latvian SSR; 
– Mass executions of the soviet citizens; 
– Punitive raids against the partisans; 
– Guarding of the concentration camps and ghettos. 
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ARAJS’s detached unit was also the base for formation of the enemy's 
counterintelligence forces [quite what this means is uncertain]. 
 
Most of the persons who served in this detached unit had been sent to the Furstenberg 
SD school (Germany). After completion of this school they carried out the punitive 
actions as the official SD officers. 
 
 ...  [the findings related to each of the listed individuals are reported] ... 
 
HEAD OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
SERVICE “SMERSH” OF THE 3RD BALTIC FRONT 
LINE– LIEUTENANT GENERAL 
(BELKIN) 
 
FSB of Russia, Central Archive, 
F. 100, Inv. 11, Doc. 1, Sheets 219-224 
An authenticated copy.143 
 
A cursory examination of the document, if it is assumed to be authentic and 
accurately reproduced (though poorly translated) in the Bäckman collection, shows that the 
number of Arajs Kommando members as estimated by the Soviets was almost triple the 
likely actual figure: 1,200 became 3,000. The Jewish identity of the bulk of victims is, 
typically, almost totally elided, surviving only in a single offhand mention of ghettos. The 
document also reveals that the number of victims of fascism in Latvia – in Western 
scholarship by far the largest group being approximately 85-90,000 Latvian and foreign Jews 
deported to Latvia – according to the Soviets was predetermined at “more than 300 hundred 
[sic.] thousand.” The document is dated 10 March 1945, two months before the war ended. In 
the meantime, “Fortress Kurland” remained in the fight until 8 May, holding considerable 
tracts of Latvia’s westernmost territory and the major port city of Ventspils, among other 
population centers. True, Rīga was recaptured as early as October 1944 and eastern Latvia 
even earlier, but less than six months could not have been sufficient time in which to reach a 
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complete estimate: much of the territory remained unconquered, other areas were still subject 
to very credible German counterattacks, and all efforts were directed towards combat 
operations and press-ganging the remaining military-aged Latvian males into the Baltic 
Front. Even once the remaining German and Latvian Legion forces surrendered and the Red 
Army gained full control of all of Latvia’s territory, it would still necessarily take time to 
conduct thorough and credible investigations involving thousands of interviews, the 
methodical collection and analysis of captured documents, and the sifting of forensic 
evidence from the concentration camps and the opened mass graves. Other documents, as 
will be shown below, prove that the figure of “more than 300,000”was pre-set at least as 
early as December 1944. 
The Bäckman document further shows that this figure of more than 300,000 was 
already known to high-level officials ostensibly charged with actually determining the 
number of victims of fascism in Latvia even while their investigations were yet ongoing. The 
obvious conclusion is that this number was centrally dictated. Ranking investigators were 
made aware of the expected tally long before their investigations were complete. Good data 
was no-doubt collected at the bottom rungs of the investigatory apparatus. As it was passed 
up the chain, however, the task seems to have had less to do with establishing what really 
happened under the German occupation and more to do with reaching the number imposed 
by those farthest away from the piles of exhumed corpses. In other words: the highest level 
of those running the investigation process was corrupted by political dictates. How or by 
whom or by what committee the figure was actually generated will probably never be known. 
A separate document, similarly authored by high-level Commission functionaries, 
makes the impossible claim that 240,000 Jews from almost everywhere else in Europe, 
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including Romania, Hungary, and Norway were brought to the Rīga Ghetto in the middle of 
December 1941 following the Rumbula massacre.144 The total number of deaths in the 
metropolitan area of Rīga alone is set by this official report at more than 170,000 – 44% of 
the city’s total prewar population of 385,000. Apparently in addition to this figure, it is 
further claimed that 140,000 Soviet prisoners of war were also murdered in Rīga and its 
vicinity.145 Why the Soviets decided that the Nazis’ crimes required gross exaggeration is 
difficult to understand. The figure of “more than 300,000” here again appears, qualified as 
“civilian persons – children, women, and the elderly and Soviet prisoners of war.” Adding 
together the Soviet estimate of dead Rīga civilians and Red Army POWs who are said to 
have died in and around Rīga, while disregarding Jewish deaths, alone produces the figure of 
310,000 – close to the impossibly precise 313,798 victims of fascism in Latvia ultimately 
given as the official final tally by the Soviets. To this must presumably be added, however, 
the dead from the rest of the country – geographically between a quarter and a third of which, 
at the time this report was produced, was still unconquered – and the local and foreign Jews. 
The Soviet numbers are internally inconsistent and transparently inflated. They cannot be 
relied upon.  
A special medical-forensic commission of experts from the Red Army, a part of the 
Extraordinary State Commission, was specifically assembled to examine the locations around 
Rīga where the victims had been interred en masse. Exhumations were conducted according 
to a rapid schedule between 24 November and 6 December 1944. The victims are identified 
simply as prisoners of war and Soviet citizens in this report. The following estimated 
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numbers of victims are given for the major killing fields, in addition to a large number of 
smaller sites:  
46,000 in Biėernieki 
38,000 in Rumbula 
13,100 in DreiliĦi 
101,100 in Salaspils 
 
Here again, the total estimated number of “more than 300,000” victims appears.146 
Yet the actual evidence gathered – as distinct from claims such as those described 
above which were not based strictly upon the evidence – is indispensable. For example, the 
same medical experts correctly concluded that attempts to conceal mass graves had been 
episodically undertaken. For example, individual crosses and headstones were found to have 
been transplanted from graves elsewhere and placed over some mass graves. These bore 
inscriptions such as: “Soldier of the 2d Company, NCO Training Battalion of the 15th 
Schlüsselberger Regiment, Nikita Savelzov,” or “Eternal Rest – Soldier of the Malo-
Yaroslavl Regiment, Pavel Feodorovich Dezev, died 10 September 1895.”147 Low-level 
investigations, before they were processed by higher levels and prepared for public 
consumption, did produce excellent facts and data – putting aside the exaggerated figures. 
 Another finding of this medical commission was that a large-scale but mostly 
unsuccessful attempt had been made to exhume and burn the bodies at some sites, as 
quantities of charred bones were discovered. Also, it was found that the bodies had been 
placed in the graves “chaotically.” In some graves, the bodies were naked; in others, they 
were clothed – sometimes in uniforms, sometimes in civilian apparel. Some graves contained 
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victims with their hands bound behind their backs. Autopsies of bodies sampled from among 
the victims revealed the likely cause of death to be gunshot wounds to the head or thorax. 
Other bodies indicated deaths possibly caused by starvation or disease.148 The discrepant 
levels of the deterioration of the corpses in the various graves led to the conclusion that they 
had been killed at different times between the end of 1941 and 1944, amounting to “a 
systematic annihilation of prisoners of war and Soviet citizens in the course of three years.” 
All of this data is consistent with the historical record as established by subsequent Western 
legal and academic findings. 
 This forensic report is meticulously correct in all aspects save the estimated total 
numbers of victims and the elision of their actual identity.  
 
The Gratuitous Sensationalist Claims 
Typical unwarranted and needlessly sensationalist Soviet misrepresentations also fill 
the reports on Crimes in Latvia: “Ten thousand people” were killed “in the first days of the 
occupation,” for instance. In addition, children were given poisoned milk to drink; multiple 
full-blown death camps were operating in the territory and gassings were taking place; 
prisoners were commonly trampled upon until they defecated, upon which, they were forced 
to eat their own excrement; ingeniously devised portable gallows travelled the land; everyone 
recognized the “isolation wagon” called “Black Bertha” that would suddenly appear and gas 
Soviet patriots; psychotic medical doctors performed their gruesome art by vivisecting 
conscious victims and slicing open their arteries to observe the effects of catastrophic blood-
loss upon the organs while humming, bizarrely, the Marseilles; other victims were forced 
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into the boilers of a navy cruiser in Rīga harbor and pressure-cooked alive.149 
The agents of the Extraordinary State Commission, among other reports, prepared a 
finding on the deaths of 35,000 Soviet children.150 Perhaps its most ghoulish allegation is that 
the German fascists established an industrial-scale “factory for child blood” at Salaspils that 
operated to constantly pump a supply of fresh blood plasma to slake the thirst of a ravening 
vampire Wehrmacht. Executed in a “cannibalistic manner,” this program was reported to 
have eventually resulted in the death from blood loss of almost every one of the estimated 
12,000 ‘donor’ children involved. The Soviets calculated that approximately 3,500 liters of 
blood were rendered to the German armed forces via this rich vein.151 In addition to this 
grisly effort, 150 children were also supposed to have been killed every day at Salaspils in 
medical experiments.152 The Communist Party’s political intrusion into the Soviet process of 
discovering Nazi crimes perhaps reveals itself most obviously in the claim that the Nazis in 
Latvia organized a child slavery ring from which “Kulaks” could purchase young Soviet 
citizens who had been “ripped away from [their] mothers.”153 
Further complicating the endeavor of using public Soviet sources to ground historical 
knowledge is the fact that these erroneous claims appear together with completely accurate 
ones. For example: in the midst of some of the false atrocity propaganda is mention of the 
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murder of Latvian psychiatric patients – a claim that may seem similarly incredible but is 
documented, follows well-established patterns of Nazi criminality, and is in accord with the 
‘logic’ of the ideology of the Third Reich. Even then, however, the death toll proclaimed by 
the Soviets was roughly tripled from the known number of 243 to 709.154  
The real Holocaust was more horrific in its actuality than the chaotic madcap freak 
show depicted in the official Soviet accounts released for public consumption. Its reality 
required no embellishment. Gas vans did of course exist, but none seem to have ever been 
used in Latvia; grisly Nazi medical experiments did take place, but elsewhere; and itinerant 
hangmen to operate mobile scaffolds would have been far too inefficient for HSSPF Lettland 
Friedrich Jeckeln’s tastes. Thus, by unnecessarily appending various hideous but untrue 
outrages to the already horrific bill of actual crimes committed by the Nazis and their 
collaborators like the men of the Latvian Auxiliary Security Police, Soviet authorities 
undermined historical knowledge for perceived political gain even as they sought to bring the 
perpetrators of real crimes to justice. 
 
The First to Be Tried 
Although the captures, investigations, trials, and sentencing of the perpetrators of the 
Holocaust in Latvia would quietly continue for years, the trial and execution of HSSPF 
Lettland, Friedrich Jeckeln, can be regarded as the official capstone of this initial wave of 
Soviet justice. It at once combined the real work of justice occurring for individual 
perpetrators with its public transmutation in service of the political and didactic goals of the 
state. 
 Jeckeln was the highest-ranking Nazi criminal to face justice in Latvia. He was 
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captured by the Red Army at the end of the war in Czechoslovakia where he had been 
leading a Waffen-SS combat unit and transported back to Rīga to publically stand trial. Why 
he was not tried in Kiev, for example, where he had orchestrated the Babi Yar massacre in 
September of 1941, is unclear. Perhaps this was because the shootings at Babi Yar targeted 
solely Jews, while in Latvia some of Jeckeln’s victims were also non-Jewish. In any case, the 
proceedings were conducted in Rīga very expeditiously by a Soviet military court and lasted 
only one week. It was attended by an applauding audience and trumpeted in print and on the 
radio. The case, while occurring simultaneously with the International Tribunal at 
Nuremberg which tried the highest-ranking Nazi defendants accused of truly pan-European 
crimes, was handled exclusively by the Soviets. It was concluded on 3 February 1946. 
Jeckeln, together with his several German co-defendants, was found guilty and hanged the 
same day before an expectant crowd.155 
 Justice was swift. The accused was indeed guilty as changed and was not afforded 
any opportunity to delay the process or to play games with technicalities. Justice also carried 
the ultimate penalty. His public hanging by the Soviets represented a symbolic act of official 
closure regarding the German fascist occupation and a validation of the Soviet cause. 
However, the investigations and trials of the men of the Latvian Auxiliary Security Police 
would continue discreetly, without public fanfare.  
The indispensable Rūdite Vīksne has calculated that of the 356 captured Kommando 
members, 44 were sentenced to death (of which 30 executions were actually carried out); 156 
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were sentenced to 25 years of labor; 36 sentenced to 20 years of labor; 43 sentenced to 
between 15 and 18 years of labor; 10 sentenced to 15 years of labor; and 76 sentenced to 10 
years of labor.156 Most sentences also included clauses for the seizure of the convicted man’s 
property and the forfeiture of his rights as a Soviet citizen. He, and his family if he had one, 
would also bear a suffocating and perpetual but unofficial social stigma. 
Just because coercion was likely often involved in the Soviets’ collection of their 
evidence about the Kommando does not ipso facto mean that fabrication was taking place on 
this level. Examination of the depositions suggests that the low-level Soviet investigators 
really did want to know what happened during the German occupation of Latvia. First, some 
testimonies contradicted themselves and other testimonies. If the interrogators’ mission was 
to railroad the former Kommando members and coordinate their testimonies to reach pre-set 
conclusions, this would not have been the case. Second, if the interrogators were putting 
words in the mouths of their prisoners, it is curious that the testimonies did not resemble the 
sensationalized accounts that circulated in public but rather more closely fit the details and 
patterns subsequently established by Western jurists and scholars. Third, there is strong 
evidence that prisoners were rewarded with reduced sentences in return for cooperation – a 
totally unnecessary step if the results of the investigation of the crimes of the Arajs 
Kommando had already been determined by some kind of politically-inspired fiat. It may be 
objected that leniency was shown to prisoners willing to comport their stories to an official 
narrative desired by their captors, but again, since the stories neither always matched each 
other nor ever matched the needlessly overstated Party line on the atrociousness of German 
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fascism (although, in fairness, some testimonies were allowed to stand that somewhat 
reflected the 1940s Soviet line minimizing Latvian collaboration), this does not seem to have 
been the case. 
The nature and deeds of the Latvian Auxiliary Security Police gradually came into 
focus in the course of the interrogations of hundreds of its former members by the Soviet 
authorities. The various key dates in the unit’s history such as its first muster, its brief phase 
of running amok in Rīga, the Biėernieki shootings and their frequency, the cordon duty at 
Rumbula, its change of headquarters, the training program in Germany, and so on were 
established, as were the unit’s changing armament, attire, and personnel compliment (which, 
admittedly, was sometimes still inflated even in the internal Soviet documents) as well as the 
identities of its leaders. Voluminous quantities of information were cross-checked with 
captured German documentation, examination of the crime scenes, and the testimonies of 
other captured Kommando members and either discarded or considered as corroborated. 
Naturally, since many of the criminal events were already several years distant and the 
atmosphere in which many of them took place was so fluid and chaotic, the content of many 
of the detainees’ statements were contradictory. This was especially so when it came to 
questions of uniform, specific dates, and the structure of the fascist hierarchy and the 
interrelationships of the various police and paramilitary agencies in the earliest weeks and 
months of the German occupation. In the gradual establishment of the main facts and the 
sifting and refining of inconsistencies, the Soviet process resembled its Western counterparts 
very closely.157 
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In connection with the dispassionate assessment of the validity of Soviet findings in 
individual cases, it should be stressed that the interrogations do not contain the type of 
outlandish claims typically found in the publically circulated materials. Outrageous acts of 
individual sadism and peculiar depravity to not appear in the statements of the accused or 
their confessions. The absence of such underscores the dual nature of the Soviet inquiry. The 
very fact that the testimonies obtained by Soviet investigators did not conform to the 
sensationalized public story strongly suggests that the prisoners were not being told what to 
say. 
This holds even in the case of one Kommando member who unabashedly referred to 
“the Führer” in front of his interrogators. Arturs Abols almost wistfully recalled a speech 
given before his detachment was deployed to an anti-partisan mission: Arājs himself 
exhorted the men “not to let our swords rust,” according to Abols’s account.158 But even in 
this exceptionally unashamed example, no lurid details of implausibly bizarre atrocity such 
as were commonplace in public discourse on the fascist occupation were wrested from the 
prisoner’s mouth. 
Finally, the Soviets were not above rewarding helpful prisoners. The most extreme 
example is that of Captain Arnolds Laukers, one of the Kommando’s chief officers. After 
supplying valuable information not only about himself but also about specific crimes and the 
identities of other Kommando members, he was offered a reduced sentence. Even though 
convicted of treason against the Soviet Union, he received a relatively light penalty from his 
Red Army tribunal: the loss of his rights as a citizen of the USSR, the confiscation of his 
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property, and ten years’ labor.159 He did, it must be admitted, die while serving his sentence. 
Still, the example suggests that detainees – even top-tier officers in the Latvian SD – were 
encouraged to cooperate in the Soviet investigation with the promise of reduced penalties, 
particularly in return for naming names and providing evidence against others. If the guilt of 
all suspects was already presumed, the content of their testimonies scripted, and the verdicts 
predetermined regardless of the facts, making concessions to some to obtain further evidence 
against others was scarcely necessary. Inducing suspects to turn states’ evidence is, of course, 
a common practice in Western criminal investigations as well and, while potentially open to 
abuse and offering no guarantee of the truthfulness of the testimony so induced, is not in 
itself considered a violation of “due process.”160 
 In another illustrative case, Roberts Gulbis blatantly lied about how he came to be in 
the Arajs Kommando: “Formally, the filling up of the ranks of the ‘Security Police’ had a 
voluntary foundation; in reality, young people were forced into it though methods of 
blackmail and deception.”161 So set against the Kommando was he, he claimed, that “In 
October 1943 I fled the ‘Security Police’ and hid myself in Bulduri with my mother-in-law, 
Alma Eglīte, but was arrested at the end of October that same year.”162 While his attempt to 
portray himself as an opponent of the very paramilitary band in which he admittedly served 
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for years comported with the official line regarding the coerced collaboration of Latvians 
with the German fascists, his questioners by dint of their very mission probably knew better. 
Yet he was apparently allowed to get away with these self-exculpating fictions by SMERSH 
in exchange for the excellent information he provided about the Kommando’s Blue Bus 
rampages in Salda and Jelgava, as well as detailed and accurate descriptions of the routine 
shootings in Biėernieki and the clearing of the ghetto in Daugavpils. These were more useful 
pieces in the mosaic being constructed of the Kommando’s activities by the testimonies of 
hundreds of captured members.163  
Another man from the Arajs Kommando who was swept up by the Soviets late in the 
war, Ričards Ligotnis, was permitted by his interrogators to claim that his “comrades” fled 
the German invasion with the Red Army, but that he stayed behind because he did not want 
to abandon his mother. From there, his was the tale of a totally inert particle: arrested by the 
German police because he had been misidentified as an aide to a known NKVD officer, his 
release was supposedly conditional upon total cooperation with the Nazi police organs and 
participation in the crimes of the Arajs Kommando. This was apparently allowed because he 
also simultaneously related a quantity of correct and usable details such as the fact that a 
segment of the Rīga ghetto’s male population capable of work avoided the otherwise 
complete annihilation at Rumbula in 1941 and that Arājs was given an Iron Cross and a 
Major’s rank.164 He also accurately supplied the names of a number of his former 
confederates.165 
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Taken together, the depositions from the 1940s have stood the test of time. These 
volumes of testimonies by the men of the Kommando were provided to West German and 
United States prosecutors decades later, who – together with judges, defense attorneys, and 
eventually historians – subjected them to exacting scrutiny. As a body, they have been found 
to paint an accurate and coherent picture of the Latvian Auxiliary Security Police and its 
crimes. 
 
THE “SHOW TRIALS” AND INTERNATIONAL AGITATION IN THE 1960S 
The Advent of the “Latvian Fascists” 
Faced with a new political situation and therefore a new set of needs in the 1960s and 
1970s, the USSR changed its public line on the participation of Soviet citizens in Nazi crimes 
and “Latvian fascists” entered the Soviet lexicon and Soviet official history. Like the Soviet 
Union’s preceding efforts, then, the “show trials” and the international propaganda push that 
accompanied them were designed to achieve political objectives desired by the highest levels 
of the Communist Party leadership. Nevertheless, despite the shabby political motives behind 
them and the even more distasteful way they were carried out, like its predecessor this wave 
of prosecutions and associated materials produced for  public consumption still resulted in 
the punishment of some indubitably guilty individuals. 
Within the Soviet Union, the simultaneous opening of similar trials across a variety of 
non-Russian SSRs was almost certainly calculated to tamp-down potential nationalist 
revivals in the Khrushchev era. They would at once strike at the national pride of minorities 
and send a warning to them that even a decade or more after Stalin’s death the Soviet Union 
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had not forgotten its old enemies. The implied identification of Latvians with fascism could 
also serve to justify various ongoing Russification measures. Meanwhile, the international 
function of this fresh wave of prosecutions was twofold. First, it was an attempt to embarrass 
Western countries for their relative failure to mete out justice and to tout the Soviets Union’s 
unmatched anti-fascist dedication. This point was underscored by the indictment of various 
exile Latvians living in peace under Western governments. Second, it invited discredit upon 
all Latvian exiles in their respective countries of refuge and tried to alienate them from the 
favor theretofore shown them by their hosts as staunch and reliable anti-Communists.  
In Latvia, there were three such trials or sets of trials: the 18th Police Battalion trial in 
1961; the Rēzekne trial in 1965; and the 21st Police Battalion trials between 1972 and 1974. 
Each involved multiple defendants and resulted overwhelmingly in convictions with tough 
sentences. While none of the accused Latvians during this phase of Soviet justice was tried 
by the Latvian SSR as a former member of the Arajs Kommando, it is still integral to 
understanding the changing official Soviet attitude on the question of dealing with fascist 
crimes and the Holocaust. This stage of Soviet justice was the first time since Nuremberg that 
the legal aftermath of Nazi crimes again became an international issue, and it formalized the 
new line on the existence of “Latvian fascists.”  
 
The “Show Trials” 
 The Latvian exile response to the staged trials and severe sentences was predictable. 
The Latvian exile journalists expressed the outrage of their communities in the United States 
and West Germany. The Latvian weekly published in New York, Laiks (Time) wrote that 
“The Show Trial taking place in Rīga in the AudriĦi Case was modeled after Stalinist Show 
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Trials.”166 The Latvian monthly of record in West Germany, Latvija, said “Terror Trial in 
Rīga is an Unlawful Act of Violence.”167 The responses of the governments and wider 
publics of West Germany and the United States are more complicated, and must be addressed 
in later chapters. However, 1960s Soviet efforts did have a corrosive long-term impact on the 
meting out of justice abroad that is proper to address here.  
Soviet practices in the 1960s and early 1970s, the second wave of Soviet justice, did 
not do justice many favors abroad either at the time or in subsequent decades. Because of 
these procedures, Western defense lawyers could always and with good reason lampoon 
Soviet judicial practice as farcical and call down discredit and opprobrium upon any Western 
prosecutor relying on the Soviets for anything, be it forensic evidence, documents, or 
witnesses. Said Ivars BērziĦš, a very successful American Latvian defense attorney to whom 
this study will return later: 
What happened there was: the Soviets had arranged a show trial for Linnas [an 
Estonian tried in absentia in 1962 by the Estonian SSR in a process parallel to those 
in Latvia]. Linnas lived here on Long Island. This was along all the show trials the 
Soviets staged back in the sixties. Yeah, they had the trial starting at a specific date 
and one of the reporters from the most prominent law journal [Sovyetskaya 
Zakonnost, or “Soviet Legality”] in Moscow was sent to Tallinn to report on the 
Linnas trial. But for one reason or another, the reporter arrived there and the trial got 
postponed. And the reporter had to get back to Moscow before the trial actually 
started. Well, he got back to Moscow and he wrote up his article. The whole thing 
with the Linnas conviction – everything in it. And the article by mistake got 
published before the trial began. Well this, I think, is the starkest example of Soviet 
justice at that time. In other words, it wasn't justice; it was all propaganda.168 
 
The article reporting on the trial and sentence was published in December 1961, and the trial 
itself was held in January 1962. The article was, however, completely accurate in all 
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particulars. 
 As the historian Jerome Legge has pointed out:  
 
The trial itself made no attempt at impartiality. ‘Defense’ lawyers as well as the 
prosecutor attacked and intimidated Jüriste, along with analogous denunciations of 
the other defendants [including Linnas]. As was usually the case in Soviet political 
trials, the verdicts never were in doubt. Nevertheless, the evidence against the 
defendants, in particular the testimony of witnesses, was overwhelming.169 
 
Here as before, the Soviets employed a two-tier system: the better for actually finding and 
punishing the appropriate offenders, a real investigative system was established; the public 
was kept in ignorance of the reality established by Soviet investigators and offered spectacles 
to achieve the Party’s political goals. 
  
The Attendant Media Blitz 
Accompanying these much ballyhooed trials in the Latvian SSR were a number of 
publications designed for public consumption abroad. The two most important and effective 
were Daugavas Vanagi – Who Are They? and “Political Refugees” – Unmasked.170 As 
indicated by its title, the first book attempted to besmirch the totality of the membership of 
Daugavas Vanagi, a Latvian veterans’ welfare organization, and brand it as criminal.171 The 
second book more generally targeted Latvians who had fled the Soviets and survived in their 
enclaves in the West. Ergo: they were devised with political intent. Even further, at least in 
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the case of Daugavas Vanagi – Who Are They?, the authorship of the KGB – hiding behind 
pseudonyms – has since been proven and even admitted.172 
The two books contain considerable amounts of false information and conform to the 
Soviet reports generated during and in the immediate aftermath of the war. Body counts are 
typically multiplied about threefold, for instance, and the sites of some crimes are incorrectly 
described or exaggerated. Salaspils appears as an extermination camp virtually on par with 
Auschwitz, for instance. In these accounts, gas vans abounded in fascist-occupied Latvia, and 
the mass sterilization of Soviet women occurred. Neither publication contains much, if any, 
detail about the sources on which it was based. In other words, the books reproduced, this 
time expressly for an international audience, the same false claims promoted in the reports of 
the Extraordinary State Commission – the Soviet Union’s official history.  
The nomenclature in both books was often frightfully imprecise as well, not to 
mention saturated by unhelpful propagandistic jargon. The texts barely distinguish between 
the bootlicking sexual perverts of the Arajs Kommando; the cringing and scraping Quisling 
lickspittles of the Latvian Schutzmannschaften; the German-Fascist bourgeois Waffen-SS 
exploiters and their imperialist Latvian Legion hirelings; the butchers, psychopaths, and 
hangmen of the anti-proletarian Gestapo; the reactionary gangsters of the Hitlerite 
Feldgendarmerie; and other sadistic enemies and traitors of the Soviet People. The books 
only occasionally refer to the victims as Soviet Citizens of Hebrew Nationality. 
The harm rendered to justice by these publications because of the naiveté shown at 
first by some Western prosecutors has been more than ably chronicled by the historian 
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Andrew Ezergailis.173 A separate question is their reception to the wider Western public. The 
books, after all, were not really written for a sober audience of legal experts or scholars but 
rather as polemics for the consumption of the lay reader in the West. Their impact in the 
United States and West Germany will be treated in the appropriate chapters later in this 
study.  
 
The Sparking of International Interest 
 Despite its serious flaws – including abuses against the defendants’ rights that would 
not have been tolerated by the courts of Western liberal democracies, the deliberate 
dissemination of misinformation and the pollution of historical knowledge, and the egregious 
politicization of justice – this second wave of Soviet justice did affect a few war criminals far 
from Soviet shores. The recrudescence of the institution of the show trial was no credit to 
justice, regardless of the guilt of the accused. Yet, whether they were inspired or shamed into 
taking action, West Germany and the United States opened investigations as a result of this 
Soviet agitation that they otherwise would not have. And in some cases, the new Western 
investigations bore fruit. For example, BoĜeslavs Maikovskis was found deportable by a US 
court as was Konrāds Kalējs, and Alberts Eichelis was convicted by a West German one – 
although the latter died before sentencing. Here, at least, were some guilty men who 
otherwise would have gone unpunished and their names unblemished. Other cases were 
brought by these governments that did not lead  to conviction only because of technicalities 
and the initial inexperience of the prosecutors in handling such cases. Still more cases were 
settled out of court on terms favorable to the government.  
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 Much more on these cases, the knowledge they salvaged through their investigations 
and the public reactions to them, will be said in the chapters to come. 
 
SUMMARY 
The Soviets pursued the men of the Arajs Kommando vigorously, produced 
individual investigative results that were basically accurate, and normally punished the 
convicted unforgivingly. For all of the formal breaches of liberal-democratic notions of due 
process that the Soviets committed simply as standard procedure, the investigating 
functionaries of the Soviet Union made absolutely indispensable contributions to today’s 
knowledge of the Arajs Kommando through their individual casework. The testimonies 
wrung by whatever means from the hundreds of Arajs Kommando men by the Soviet 
authorities – indexed, compared, and distilled in the service of not only determining 
individual guilt, but also finding more culprits – forms a large part of today’s fairly detailed 
knowledge of the unit. 
Paradoxically, although the USSR was responsible for bringing to justice about 95% 
of the members of the Arajs Kommando who would ever face punishment, on another level it 
also did by far the most among the polities involved in this study to distort the public 
representation  of the historical reality of wartime Latvia. The Soviet system was two-tiered. 
While dispensing harsh but deserved justice to individuals by the lowest rungs of the Soviet 
state apparatus, the larger picture projected for the public was determined according to the 
Communist Party’s political needs, not by such standards of the historical or judicial 
professions that prevailed in the West. The Soviet Union deliberately failed to accurately 
determine and communicate the overall truth of the Holocaust in Latvia to the Soviet people 
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and the international audience, substituting its own preferred version according to the times. 
This occurred because at the highest levels, findings were warped by the influence of 
overarching political objectives and made to accord to a useable narrative. In the publically 
aired results of both of the first two waves of the Soviet process as described in this chapter, 
the “German fascists” and their “hirelings,” respectively, appeared as cartoon “bad-guys,” 
caricatures of the real evil they represented – leaving serious historians and jurists to 
disentangle reality from imagination. The Soviet exaggeration of the numbers of victims and 
gratuitous invention of atrocity stories have actively misinformed a world of readers and 
listeners and hindered the process of creating real, usable knowledge and evidence about real 
Nazi crimes. This has done appreciable damage to the effort to establish the facts, both in 
courtrooms and history books.  
Ironically then, the following chapters will show that the legal assistance of the Soviet 
Union abroad in the West nevertheless provided a crucial contribution to bringing to justice 
the men of the Arajs Kommando. Jewish survivors could be found as witnesses in Israel and 
the United States, and Germans could be found as witnesses in West Germany. But from the 
1960s in Germany and in the late 1970s and the 1980s in the US, Western prosecutors would 
rely on the Soviet Union for perhaps a majority of their Jewish witnesses and certainly the 
crucial testimonies of convicted Latvian perpetrators. Forensic evidence that could only be 
supplied by the Soviets would also be occasionally used in the West. Finally, low-level 
documents of the type that could prove individual identity and ascertain individual guilt were 
also to be found only in the USSR. The remaining cases described in the following chapters 
will all have their Soviet intersections.
  
CHAPTER 4 
WEST GERMANY: 
THE PURSUIT, PROSECUTION, AND PUNISHMENT OF “THE CHIEF” HIMSELF 
OVERVIEW 
 What is known about the Arajs Kommando comes to us largely as the fruit of a series 
of West German investigations of war crimes committed in Latvia during the Second World 
War that were conducted mainly during the 1960s, in addition to the large number of Soviet 
findings in individual cases. That is to say: the Soviets made reliable determinations about a 
great many Kommando members, but West German prosecutors created the most reliable 
‘big picture’ of the Kommando and its deeds. Arājs himself, though he had led this largest 
and most notorious unit of Latvian Holocaust perpetrators, managed to go underground and 
was not arrested until 1975. Utilizing the tremendous quantity of evidence amassed in the 
course of the investigations of the previous decade and more, the Arājs pretrial investigation 
and the trial itself required four-and-a-half years to complete. It involved about one hundred 
and thirty witnesses and received the cooperation of both the United States and the Soviet 
Union, as well as Israel, among other governments.174 As a result, Viktors Arājs was finally, 
in December 1979, convicted in the District Court of Hamburg of participating in the 
murders of at least 13,000 people and was sentenced to spend the remainder of his life in 
prison.  
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It is vitally important to pause here to note the difference between a liberal-
democratic judiciary and the academy – or, more specifically in this case, between a 
prosecutor and an historian in a free state. Each may examine the same evidence, often even 
in similar ways, but they do so with different objectives in mind in order to fulfill different 
duties to society. This difference can be seen clearly in the ‘conservative’ estimate of the 
number of victims attributed to Arājs in the verdict. The imperative of the prosecution was to 
obtain a conviction that would at once be based upon only the most incontrovertible 
evidence, the better for it to resist the appeals process, yet would be sufficient to condemn the 
accused to the maximum possible penalty under the law. But it is a very unsatisfactory 
approximation of the truth in the view of an historian. As much has been said, in this 
particular case no less, by Professor Raul Hilberg.175 In short, the figure of 13,000 was a 
judicial convenience, not at all an historically-based best estimate.176 In a criminal case, the 
standard of proof is “beyond a reasonable doubt,” but the standard for an historian is more 
like that of a civil case: “a preponderance of evidence.” Thus, a prosecutor will omit from a 
case those charges and pieces of evidence that do not meet the highest standard, while the 
historian will include consideration of all relevant pieces of information and build the 
ultimate conclusions upon what is deemed, if not provable, the most probable and 
convincing. 
This being so, the trial of Viktors Arājs nevertheless did represent the culmination of 
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West German investigations of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Latvia. 
What follows in this chapter is an account of the disappearance, capture, trial, conviction, 
punishment, and death of Viktors Arājs. It contends, in the first place, that the postwar 
experience of Arājs exemplifies both the successes and, especially, the shortcomings of West 
Germany’s legal efforts to come to grips with the Nazi past. The excessively restrictive 
nature of the West German judiciary will be stressed, as will the fact that the process 
generated a trove of unique testimonies that, even if not entered into evidence by the Court, 
still exist for the consideration of historians. This chapter also seeks to present a fair and 
nuanced assessment of an additional question looming in the background: the attitude of 
Latvians then living in West Germany towards the Holocaust which had taken place in their 
country, and in which some of their countrymen, men such as Viktors Arājs, had taken part. 
 
THE FUGITIVE 
The Escape 
 There is a convoluted and poorly-understood period of several years in the life of 
Viktors Arājs in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War during which he was 
transferred between a series of British prisoner-of-war camps, from the last of which he 
ultimately executed a baffling escape.177 Only several known details are pertinent here, to 
wit: at war’s end, Arājs found himself in command of a formation of wounded Latvian 
Legion troops convalescing in Denmark who were slated to return to the fight in Kurzeme 
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(Kurland), Latvia. Instead, Arājs burned his documents and dressed himself in civilian 
clothes before surrendering to British troops near the Danish border with Germany. In an 
obviously premeditated attempt to conceal his true identity, he had somehow procured papers 
that identified him as Viktors Ābel. In the months following the unconditional surrender of 
Germany, he was interned in a camp specifically for Latvian prisoners-of-war, where an 
unknown Latvian told the British who “Ābel” really was. Compromised, Arājs was next sent 
to a camp exclusively for SS. However, he did not remain there for long, but instead was 
transferred among a number of different camps and seems to have somehow faded away and 
avoided much official scrutiny until he was again ‘betrayed’ by another Latvian, this time 
supposedly in exchange for no more than two bottles of beer.178 Found out again, this time 
Arājs was sent to a major British camp in Braunschweig where a special Commission of the 
War Crimes Group of the British Army of the Rhine began investigating his war crimes and 
crimes against humanity in what was called the “Riga Ghetto Case.”179 
 This investigation was still in progress when jurisdiction for the case was transferred 
from the British to the justice authorities of the freshly-christened Federal Republic of 
Germany.180 More specifically, the responsibility was handed over to authorities in Hamburg, 
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the Examining Magistrate of which, on 11 October 1949, issued a warrant for Arājs’s arrest. 
For reasons that are not clear to this day and probably never will be, however, Arājs was 
simply absent from the camp in which he was supposed to be interned at the time of the 
warrant’s issuance, so it could not be served.  
 Arājs had vanished.  
 
The Disappearance 
 After what must have been several harrowing years living underground in the new 
West Germany, Arājs was able to create a very flimsy yet nevertheless official alternate 
identity. In 1953, he obtained both indispensable false papers identifying him by his 
estranged wife’s maiden-name, “Zeibots,” as well as a travel pass under the same name, from 
the Latvian Legation in London. He would rely on these documents until his capture decades 
later. He was able to gain these indispensable papers, in large part, on the strength of a single 
written statement. A certain Mr. Alberts Austris Spunde legally vouched for the person and 
character of “Viktor Seibots,” whom he claimed to have known since their days together in a 
“Studentenkorps” starting in 1935 or 1936, and that back then, “Seibots” lived in Rīga with 
his single, Baltic-German mother, while his father was somewhere outside of the country.181 
These biographical details today leave no doubt that Viktors Arājs was, in fact, the man in 
question. Satisfied at the time, however, the Latvian Legation in London duly issued the 
official papers. However, two attestations of identity were required by the Legation for it to 
issue new papers to claimants. The identity of the second attestor is unknown. Meanwhile, 
frustrated in all attempts to locate Viktors Arājs, the case pending against him in Hamburg 
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was indefinitely suspended by the Court two years later, on 13 August 1955.182 
 It seems reasonable to speculate that Spunde did not offer his legal sponsorship to 
Arājs simply because he was personally fond of the man. More probably, he assisted Arājs in 
his disappearing act in order to protect a compromised past of his own. For in the very same 
document – unfortunately the only one we have from him – Spunde claimed to have been an 
ordinary police officer in Rīga and Rēzekne (Rositten), Latvia, in the years 1941-1943, 
before receiving a commission in the Latvian Legion. A considerable Security Police 
contingent was stationed in Rēzekne, making it in fact one of the more important SD 
strongpoints in Latvia outside the major cities during the years in which Spunde claimed to 
have served there. It was also the scene of the murder of its sizable Latvian Jewish 
population of about 800 people at the hands of an Arajs Kommando detachment in the fall of 
1941.183 Given such circumstantial evidence, it is difficult to imagine that Spunde did not 
know full well who “Seibots” was and what he had done during the war. It is possible, 
perhaps even likely, that Arājs blackmailed Spunde by threatening to reveal Spunde’s own 
wartime deeds in Rīga and Rēzekne should he himself be arrested. However, by the time the 
document surfaced in connection with the Arājs case, it was too late to call Spunde to the 
stand to clarify the matter, for he died in 1966. Arājs claimed only to have met him in 
1949.184 
 And so, the thinly-masked “Viktor Zeibots” was able to elude a disinterested West 
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German legal system. In fact, no one was even looking for him any longer. Arājs’s story up 
to this point fits the generally observed pattern: if not prosecuted by Allied Commissions, 
Holocaust perpetrators were generally allowed to fade away and live in relative freedom in 
West Germany throughout the 1950s. 
 
The Rumors 
 While Arājs himself had disappeared, there were many other suspected war criminals 
living in West Germany who were thought to have committed crimes in Latvia during the 
Second World War. The judicial apparatus of West Germany would, however, not gear up 
and seriously begin investigating and prosecuting these suspects until the breakthrough 1958 
Ulm Einsatzkommando Tilsit trial and the related founding of the Zentrale Stelle der 
Landesjustizverwaltungen zur Aufklärungen nationalsozialistischer Gewaltverbrechen or 
“Central Office of the State Ministries of Justice for the Investigation of National Socialist 
Violent Crimes” in Ludwigsburg, in the Federal State of Baden-Württemberg.  
 After the tide of judicial disinterest that marked most of the 1950s had turned, West 
German prosecutors also recognized the need to include the Latvian community in their 
investigations. A word, then, about the Latvian diaspora in West Germany after the Second 
World War is in order. It was largely concentrated in the south – that is, in the former 
American occupation zone. It was, and remains, a point of pride among Latvians everywhere 
that the “Viesturs Company,” a guard detachment at the Nuremburg Trials, was composed of 
Latvians in American uniform. By the 1960s, many in the Latvian community either worked 
directly as members of the United States armed forces stationed there, or as military 
contractors. A particularly large contingent had, or even continued, to work in various Labor 
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Service (LS) companies for the US Army. The involvement of so many Latvians with the 
American armed forces indicates, among other things, their zeal for contributing to the Cold 
War effort against the Soviet Union, which they considered to be a foreign occupier of their 
country. All of this is fairly unsurprising given the composition of the community, which 
consisted basically of four categories of person: those Latvians who had been members of the 
forces fighting alongside the Germans – both volunteers and conscripts – and who had been 
determined to surrender to the Western Allies rather than to the Soviet Union; those Latvians 
who had been conscripted for labor and sent to Germany over the course of the war; those 
Latvians who as refugees had fled to Germany during the Soviet offensives of 1944 and 
1945; and those descended from the three above-mentioned groups. The Second World War 
was the only reason there was anything like a significant Latvian community in West 
Germany. An unknown, but presumably large, percentage of them probably would have even 
preferred to live in the United States but for a variety of reasons could never manage to make 
the move. Although there certainly were generational differences within this community, 
they would never rise to the degree of acrimonious generational discord that would become 
so notable in the mainstream population of West Germany. A major reason for this was their 
coherence as an isolated societal out-group in exile. And they absolutely considered 
themselves to be exiles, in contrast to mere “émigrés,” as the Soviets held them to be. 
Younger Latvian generations were less inclined, overall, than their German opposites to 
question their progenitors’ wartime actions – actions that had objectively, quite irrespective 
of any consideration as to their moral content, at least bequeathed to the new generations 
their safe and free existence in the West. 
 In their overdue efforts to locate witnesses and hopefully uncover other guilty parties 
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to National Socialist crimes, West German police and prosecutors’ offices combed the ranks 
of male Latvians resident in their country in the 1960s. The authorities resorted, in essence, 
to ethnic profiling. The files of the Arājs trial contain many depositions of Latvian males who 
had been of or near to military age during the war and who were repeatedly hauled before 
West German police examiners in the 1960s and into the 1970s even in the absence of an iota 
of evidence of complicity in Nazi crimes. During the preliminary investigation following 
Arājs’s eventual capture, to name but one example, police in Hanover sent the prosecutors in 
Hamburg a document containing a “List of former Latvian citizens within the Federal 
Republic who are in American service.”185 It is nothing but a list of 123 male Latvians who 
had been of approximately military-age during the war. Apparently, merely because they 
belonged to such a category, the police seem to have presumed that these men (unlike their 
German counterparts, one would be remiss in not pointing out) were either themselves 
criminals or at least were keeping information from the authorities and needed to be 
questioned. The German police presumed that there was a greater likelihood that the average 
Latvian exile was either complicit in or at least more informed about the relevant crimes than 
the average German, and statistically this was probably the case. However, the practice 
ignored equal rights and due process. 
 Yet it is fair to say that, despite repeatedly bringing men in – and casting their nets 
very widely and indiscriminately in doing it – these German investigative efforts were 
effectively fruitless. Certainly they were so in terms of obtaining concrete information 
pertinent to Arājs’s wartime crimes or postwar whereabouts. Rumors – none of which were 
ever proven and most of which were conclusively disproved as the real facts of the matter 
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emerged through real police work – were all that the authorities were able to glean, despite 
their heartening, newfound commitment to the prosecution of the war criminals in their 
country. There was, literally, one single exception. It will be treated below. 
For the rest, in their vast, pointless majority, the depositions make clear many 
Latvians’ simmering resentment towards the Germans – a negative attitude which was 
exacerbated by the fact that they were denied West German citizenship unless they were 
willing to pay a substantial fee and were otherwise relegated to the status of “stateless 
foreigners” despite having fought on the German side against the Soviets during the war, 
more often than not as conscripts. Perhaps a preponderance of them had also been wounded 
in the fighting – in many cases, multiple times. Further still, all without exception had lost 
family members, both those who were physically killed and those who were as good as dead 
to them, trapped as they were behind the “Iron Curtain” and with whom communication was 
virtually impossible. They considered their country occupied by the Soviet Union due to the 
war that Germany started in 1939 with the signing of the perfidious Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact 
and its dastardly and illegal cession of Latvia by Nazi Germany to the USSR at that time. 
And now these Latvian men – farmers, teachers, tailors, authors, dockhands, clerks, in any 
case refugees – were being put to the question under the microscope by Germans whose own 
country had orchestrated the Holocaust.186 
 By far the two most popular threads of speculation among the Latvian exiles in the 
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Federal Republic in the 1960s were that Arājs, along with so many other known National 
Socialist war criminals, had either fled to South America or had become an agent of a 
Western intelligence service, usually postulated to be British since the British were his 
original captors. Both plausible theories had variations, which depended on the person being 
interviewed. For example, some Latvians had heard that Arājs had returned to West Germany 
from South America out of fear upon hearing news of the sensational assassination of 
Herberts Cukurs – far and away his best-known accomplice during the war years – whose 
battered corpse was discovered inside a large piece of luggage in Montevideo, Uruguay, in 
February 1965, and who was thought by many even at the time to have been the target of a 
successful clandestine Israeli operation.187 Others maintained that Arājs was still probably in 
the service of and protected by British intelligence. After all, how else could one explain how 
he “escaped” from them in the first place back in 1949? This being arguably the height of the 
Cold War – these depositions were collected largely in the early- and mid-1960s – it was 
assumed that Arājs was and remained an intelligence asset in the ongoing struggle against 
Communism. 
 In the end, however, no theory of Arājs’s current station was found to have any 
substantial truth to it; no leads were even considered actionable by investigators. The trail 
was cold. The Arājs case remained suspended for lack of a warm body to put in the dock. 
 
The Sightings 
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This is not to say that absolutely nobody in the Latvian community in West German 
had seen and recognized Arājs during his days as a fugitive. On the contrary, two accounts 
would emerge during the eventually reopened investigation that claimed, separately, that 
Arājs had indeed appeared to Latvians living the West Germany. 
Chronologically, the first supposed appearance of Arājs during his years as a fugitive 
was before Mr. Alberts Eichelis, a Latvian living in West Germany who had served in the 
Rēzekne SD during the war.188 Arājs was already in custody when a threatened and defiant 
Eichelis told investigators that he had been an acquaintance of Arājs off and on since their 
police training together in 1936, and had seen him again during their training for the Security 
Police in 1942 in Berlin. He then related the following story: 
It was in the middle of the 1950s, probably on JaĦi [the pagan Latvian name for the 
Feast of St. John the Baptist, which occurs on the summer solstice], a major Latvian 
holiday. I received unexpected guests, as is traditional in Latvia. Two trucks arrived 
with Latvians from the LS [US Army-affiliated Labor Service] in Ettlingen. I knew 
many of them, but others had just sort of tagged along [“waren einfach so mitgebracht 
worden”]. Arājs was among them... I can’t say if Arājs was using another name, as 
we only spoke using our first names, which is the Latvian custom. It was a great feast 
[“Esserei und Trinkerei”]. I don’t know if Arājs told me anything about his fate. I 
can’t rule it out, but I don’t know any more... If I had known, I wouldn’t have 
reported it, because I’m not a traitor. I only saw Arājs after the war on this one single 
occasion.189 
 
Eichelis was among those who had been tried in absentia in the USSR in the 1960s “show 
trials” and found guilty of war crimes during his time in the Rēzekne SD. He would also be 
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tried and convicted on charges in West Germany, but was to die before sentencing.190 His 
testimony during the trial of Arājs was considered by the Court to have been crafted 
deliberately to defend the accused.191 
Mr. Eichelis was not the only person who was to claim to have seen and recognized 
Arājs. The second sighting of Arājs qua Arājs after the war was alleged by Mr. Aleksandris 
Puėitis. During the war, Puėitis had been a young teenager, but his uncle had been in the 
Rīga “Schutzpolizei.”192 Once, in 1941, when he was fourteen years old, Puėitis had been 
introduced by his uncle to Arājs. His next encounter with the man, he claimed, occurred in 
West Germany around 1960.  
On the occasion of a gathering of Latvians which was to be followed by a ball in 
Viersen at Mönchengladbach, I bumped into Arājs in the hall of a hotel, I think called 
‘Fatherland.’ About three- to five-hundred people were participating in the gathering, 
and had traveled there from all over the Federal Republic. As far as I can still 
remember today, the gathering was organized by a Latvian soldiers’ welfare 
organization. Like the other Latvians, I was trying to get a room in this hotel. While I 
was still lingering in the hall with another Latvian, Arājs entered the hall. I had the 
impression that he likewise wanted a room in the hotel. After exchanging a few 
meaningless [“belanglose”] words, Arājs excused himself and left the hotel hall, 
pretending to have forgotten something. He did not return. I am almost positive that 
he recognized me.193 
 
Neither account can be entirely proven, but both are possible and taken together, 
assuming both are true, seem to indicate two separate modus operandi of Arājs which 
depended on his company. In private company and in the presence of those whom he knew 
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from the war in their former capacities in the police, he felt comfortable. It is even possible 
that he circulated in such groups with regularity, although this likewise cannot be proven. On 
the other hand, in larger, more public gatherings in which he could not control which 
Latvians would see him, he was nervous, easily startled, and apt to flee. Neither conclusion is 
very surprising. In this respect too, Arājs followed a predictable pattern. 
 
The Capture  
 The key figure who actually triggered the reopening of the case, which in turn led 
rapidly to the discovery of Arājs, was a bizarre one indeed. It is because of him that the post-
war trajectory of Arājs diverged from the general pattern: Arājs was actually caught, tried, 
and punished relatively severely. Mr. Jānis Eduard Zirnis was a Latvian who lived in 
Ludwigsburg, West Germany, after the war. His wartime activities are uncertain. Apparently, 
and by his own admission, he had served in the Arajs Kommando from 23 March 1942 until 
sometime in October 1942, when he quit or was relieved of duty. At the very least, his 
membership has been confirmed.194 According to his own account, his ejection from the unit 
was the direct result of his refusal to follow an order to participate in a mass-shooting.195 
Decades after the war, he claimed to have actually infiltrated the Kommando “as a 
clandestine agent of the resistance,” although this highly unlikely and extremely self-
exculpatory assertion cannot be independently verified.196 Zirnis even went so far as to 
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declare that he organized and led a group of thirty underground resisters between September 
1942 and January 1943, although it is practically certain that this claim is a pure 
fabrication.197 No evidence for it beyond the word of Zirnis exists. It does, however, seem to 
be plausible that after leaving the Kommando, he was arrested on suspicion of having 
Bolshevist leanings and sent to the Rīga Central Prison on 6 January 1943. There, he was 
supposedly subjected to torture. As a result, after the war he would describe himself as a 
“psychic cripple.”198 A female acquaintance of Zirnis explained to officials in Hanover at the 
time of the reopened Arājs investigation that Zirnis was, “as one says, broken in the 
chambers of the SD.”199 He was released from custody in April 1944. Although he was 
questioned about his wartime activities many times by West German police, Jānis Eduard 
Zirnis was never charged with any crime by the Federal Republic. Nevertheless, it is not 
entirely impossible that Zirnis witnessed or perhaps even personally committed war crimes 
and that his postwar persona was either a deliberate camouflage, a reflection of genuine guilt 
and regret, or simply symptomatic of a unbalanced mind – or perhaps all of these.200 
 In the 1960s and 1970s, Zirnis fairly dedicated his life to the rooting-out of Latvian 
war criminals he believed to be hiding in West Germany and tried to portray himself as the 
bleeding conscience of the whole Latvian community in exile. And he was probably correct 
in his assessment that by-and-large the members of this community were, if not disinterested 
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in the history and legacy of the Second World War and the Holocaust in Latvia, then 
preoccupied with their own personal and national losses in that conflict. As such a vocal 
agitator, Zirnis was well-known among the Latvians living in West Germany, widely 
resented, and stigmatized as a Communist sympathizer if not a paid Soviet fifth-columnist. In 
the Arājs case records, rare is the deposition of a Latvian who, when hearing of Zirnis, did 
not spring to derisively reference his putative left-wing political ideology.201 He published 
often and spared his countrymen no criticism, writing, for example, such exhortations as the 
following: 
Latvians who still possess a scrap of honor and integrity must endeavor to expose 
their war criminals and criminals against humanity, who still run around free. The 
Latvian people are not evil and have suffered much. [But] [t]hrough such fellows as 
involved themselves with this dirty business, the Latvians’ honor and morality has 
been corrupted. Therefore, we that live in exile must see that the honor of our people 
is restored.202  
 
 To that end, Zirnis worked for a series of anti-Fascist and Nazi-hunter organizations, 
holding, for example, a position as “Directeur du Service” of the self-importantly-named 
“Comitée International de la Résistance / Koordinationsrat / Freier und Unabhängiger 
Sozialisten / ständige Vertretung der UdSSR / Baltikum / Antifaschisten,” or “International 
Committee of the Resistance / Coordination Council / Free and Independent Socialists / 
Permanent Mission of the USSR / Baltic States / Anti-Fascists.” In reality, this and all the 
other such “institutions” with which he was affiliated over the years were one-man 
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operations that Zirnis founded and ran by himself. In fact, it is apparent that Zirnis operated 
his strange outfits out of his own apartment, since some depositions recorded by the West 
German police are listed as having taken place in his apartment, and these give the same 
address as that printed on Zirnis’s miscellaneous organizations’ “official” letterheads. Others 
included “Der Bund des Verfolgten des Naziregimes Baden-Württemberg,” or “The 
Federation of Victims of Nazism in Baden-Württemberg” and the “Centre du documentation 
Baltic des combattants aux résistance et les victims du fascism,” or “The Baltic 
Documentation Center for Resistance Fighters and the Victims of Fascism.” Both of these 
names were probably conscious attempts on the part of Zirnis to somehow identify himself 
with Simon Wiesenthal’s Vienna-based “Dokumentationszentrums des Bundes jüdischer 
Verfolgter des Nazi-Regimes,” or “Documentation Center of the Association of Jewish 
Victims of the Nazi Regime,” with which he is known to have had episodically 
corresponded.203 In some versions, perhaps depending upon the sensitivities of the receiving 
party, the following was appended to the letterhead with a typewriter using a slightly 
different color of ink: “-- comunisme” or “Baltic Information Service of the Latvian 
Democrats.”204 Still another one of Zirnis’s organizations was called the 
“Arbeitsgemeinschaft zur Förderung der Beziehungen zwischen USA und der Sowjetunion. 
Exilkomitee antifaschistischer Widerstandskämpfer und Opfer des Faschismus der UdSSR,” 
or “Working Group for Promoting Relations between the USA and the Soviet Union. Exiled 
Anti-Fascist Resistance Fighters Committee and Victims of Fascism of the Soviet Union.”  
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What accomplishments can be attributed to these grandiloquently-titled entities? 
Apparently none. The basis for seemingly all of the information Zirnis ever furnished West 
German investigators in fact came from two Soviet books that were published in the mid-
1960s: Daugavas Vanagi – Who Are They? and “Political Refugees” – Unmasked, both 
described in the preceding chapter.205 These books were known to prosecutors in West 
Germany and did contain some factual information and useful reproductions of key wartime 
documents in Soviet possession. Photographs in both books were even used for identification 
purposes in West German courtrooms. All the same, these works were mistrusted as devices 
of Soviet propagandists. In the first instance, the timing of their release aroused suspicion in 
that it coincided with a series of highly publicized trials in the Latvian SSR also discussed in 
the preceding chapter that had, notably, accused and condemned several Latvians who were 
beyond Soviet reach and living in the West at the time.206 Secondly, both books contained 
information that simply did not conform to the facts established as proven over the years by 
West German investigations. In view of this and the hyperbole that the works contained, in 
the Hamburg Court’s verdict the books are described as “propaganda brochures.”207 
  Therefore, as far as can be ascertained, the absurd figure of Zirnis was of no value 
whatsoever to any of the investigations to which he sought to contribute. This assessment 
was shared by virtually all of the police and prosecuting authorities in West Germany who 
had occasion to examine him over the course of the 1960s and 1970s in connection with a 
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variety of cases involving war crimes in Latvia. Beginning very early on in his dealings with 
the authorities as a self-made Nazi-hunter, Zirnis was privately considered “a rather flimsy 
[“durchsichtiger”] witness.”208 A different annoyed investigator working for the Zentrale 
Stelle went across town in Ludwigsburg to interview Zirnis and afterwards pronounced that 
“His affectation of mysteriousness [“Geheimnistuerei”] could easily be seen through. He 
hardly knows anything about the crimes,” and that “His information is to be treated with 
caution, since he has an exaggerated idea of his accomplishments as a detective.”209 Another 
said of him: “In light of these personal characteristics, I would consider the credibility of the 
witness Zirnis to be very low. Asked to speak concretely of the details of the case, Zirnis 
knows very little.”210 Yet another, when the case broke as will be explained below, remained 
very skeptical, saying that Zirnis had given him “the impression of a psychopath” and 
someone “who has been made confused and strongly emotional by past experiences.”211 Such 
characterizations of Zirnis were basically uniform across the years. 
 State prosecutors were also warned by reputable organizations not to take him 
seriously, and certainly not to associate him with them. The League of Democratic Resistance 
Fighters and the Persecuted of Schleswig Holstein, for example, sent an eight-point 
“Warning” to the prosecutor’s office in Hamburg cautioning them about Zirnis and his 
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history. They explained that he had, in 1965, applied for membership in their group. 
Presumably to bolster his chances of gaining admittance, Zirnis went so far as to boast that 
he had actually worked underground during the Nazi period with Willy Brandt, who was the 
Chancellor of West Germany at the time of his application. When the application was 
dismissed, Zirnis replied petulantly, saying “I get the impression that you don’t entirely trust 
me.” “His impression,” the League’s warning to the prosecutor’s office exclaimed, “was 
correct!” The warning of the League concluded in saying that “Such a man does incalculable 
damage to our circle. His behavior borders on fraud [“Hochstapelei”].”212 
So it is a great irony that, for all of his unproductive efforts to catch Latvian war 
criminals and assist in their prosecution and the disruptions to the Latvian community these 
activities caused – whatever his motivations may have been, and it is interesting to speculate 
– he would, entirely by accident, be the key to nabbing the biggest Latvian war criminal of 
them all.  
 One day in the summer of 1973, a Mr. Leonhard Manfred Schwarz, whose name 
appears in the records of the Arājs trial only this once, wrote to the state prosecutor in 
Stuttgart about some secondhand information he had received from his Latvian acquaintance, 
Zirnis. It was information about a murder. He contacted the police because the law, then as 
now, threatened with imprisonment anyone who failed to report information pertaining to a 
crime to the authorities. And this was information from an unknown party, through Zirnis, 
who wrote in two separate letters that Viktors Arājs had been assassinated in West Germany 
by a Soviet hit-squad. The two relevant excerpts from these mysterious letters which 
Schwarz quoted for the police were:  
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First I would like to disclose to you that the SD chief, Sturmbannführer Viktors Arājs, 
was executed by Soviet security officers in the area of Nordrhein-Westfalia on 19 
January 1973.213 
 
And: 
One need have no more fear of the mass-murderer, Viktors Arājs. He was in South 
America for a long time, but came back to West Germany under a false name, and as 
an English agent. But the English got fed up with him [“haben ihn satt gehabt”] and 
gave us a tip. On 19 January 1973, he was executed by our Special Team 
[“Sonderkommando”]. No one will ever find him. He certainly wasn’t the first, and 
he won’t be the last. Our list of war criminals is long. We have also actually brought 
some back to Rīga.214 
 
 When taken in for questioning on the matter, Zirnis produced the two handwritten 
Latvian-language letters to prove that it was not just a fantasy of his, but he refused to 
divulge the name of their author. He strongly implied that to do so would be to jeopardize his 
own personal safety, telling the police in his apartment that “I’m no traitor. If I give up this 
name, I’ll be even more condemned.”215 The identity of Zirnis’s correspondent will probably 
never be known.  
 One person it may have been, however, is Žanis Unāms, another Latvian living in the 
Federal Republic of Germany at the time, who certainly knew of Zirnis and admitted as much 
to police. Before the war, Mr. Unāms had been a prominent Latvian author and publicist and 
only very narrowly escaped deportation to Siberia by the Soviets in 1940-41. Continuing 
with his old profession, after a fashion, he worked for German press and propaganda 
agencies in Latvia during the war and also served as Director for Cultural and Social Affairs 
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of the Nazi-organized and controlled Latvian “Land Self-Administration” beginning in 
January 1943, and was thus a prominent figure in Latvian public life during the war. In West 
Germany after the war, he continued writing and was particularly preoccupied, on the 
strength of his firsthand experiences, with his critiques – from a nationalist perspective – of 
those Latvians who had collaborated with the Nazi occupiers and whom he considered as 
having carried arms for the enemy.216 Nevertheless, despite his Latvian chauvinism and 
parochialism, as the Soviets would have seen it, his strong postwar anti-Nazi stance still 
occasionally earned him favor in Soviet publications, including two separate approving 
references in “Political Refugees” – Unmasked, rather surprisingly.217 Zirnis was certainly 
aware of this and may, on the strength of these favorable Soviet mentions, have been 
encouraged to reach out to Unāms. 
 Whatever the truth, with the sliver of interesting information revealed to authorities 
inadvertently by Zirnis about the supposed fate of Arājs, the case was reopened – almost 
certainly only because it involved an alleged murder – the understandable personal 
skepticism of the dutiful investigating authorities notwithstanding. For it can easily be 
imagined that without the allegation of murder, especially one in the form of a contemporary 
Cold War assassination, the issue would have been dismissed as another case of Zirnis 
wasting police time on another already published, known, and doubtful Soviet claim 
unworthy of serious attention. However, despite the fact that the documents produced by 
Zirnis put forward little more than the boilerplate speculation about Arājs, including both his 
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supposed flight to South America and imaginary service with British intelligence, ironically, 
authorities ostensibly charged with investigating the very real murder of millions of Jews 
were obligated to do due diligence in investigating this single alleged murder, that of the 
murderer Arājs himself. The implication of Cold War espionage likely also played a role. In 
any case, investigators had no discretion over the matter; follow-up was mandatory.  
The investigation became the responsibility of the authorities in Hamburg. The basis 
for the Hamburg’s jurisdiction was two-fold. In the first instance, jurisdiction had been 
lawfully assigned to the Hamburg Court by the British Commission, from which it had 
seamlessly taken over in 1949, that was investigating the “Riga Ghetto case.” Two other 
important related cases, those of Kurt Maywald and Rudolph Lange (the latter in absentia) 
had also already been adjudicated there, firmly establishing Hamburg as the appropriate 
venue.218 Secondly, despite the fact that Arājs was a Latvian and committed his crimes in 
Latvia, the Court ruled that German law could be applied to him as an accomplice of Hitler, 
Himmler, and Jeckeln. In the sense of the West German Criminal Code, because the crimes 
had been ordered from Germany, Germany was also the scene of the crime – and hence the 
crimes could be tried in Germany.219 
 First, of course, standard inquiries were made to morgues. No bodies had been 
discovered.  
The man who finally cracked the mystery of Arājs’s whereabouts was Mr. Lothar Klemm, 
the public prosecutor in Hamburg now running the reopened case. He was a relatively young 
man, a Hamburg native born in 1936. By the age of 40, he already had a decade of 
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experience prosecuting Nazi criminals. The break came when, poring through volumes of 
decade-old testimony for any possible clues, Klemm came across a deposition of Žanis 
Unāms from another war crimes case, back in 1963. In it, Unāms had told police that 
The wife of this Arājs fellow lives in Oldenburg today. It has been said that Arājs 
supposedly lived under his wife’s maiden name in Frankfurt after the war. Later he 
supposedly emigrated to America. I pass this information along, admittedly, with 
some circumspection [“allerdings mit gewisser Vorsicht weitergeben”]. 
 
Drawing an exclamation point in red ink beside the passage, Klemm underlined the name: 
“Zeibots”; and the place: Frankfurt. He also drew an enormous red exclamation point beside 
the annotation left by one Detective Superintendant [“Kriminal Oberkommissar”] Seth, who 
had taken this deposition ten years earlier, which read: 
The personal details of the husband are not with the EMA [Resident Registration 
Office], nor are they with the Latvian colony. I have refrained from making further 
inquiries about the husband.220 
 
 Because of the naked investigative negligence indicated in that single remark, Arājs 
gained an additional ten-year reprieve. 
 Could Žanis Unāms, who somehow clearly knew some details about Arājs and his 
chosen camouflage, had published books denouncing Latvian collaborators with the Nazis, 
and knew of Zirnis and his reputation, have deliberately fed a false but juicily irresistible 
story to the latter, guessing that it would only be a matter of time before the irrepressible and 
self-promoting Zirnis managed to get the attention of the police? Might Unāms have been 
frustrated and dismayed that Arājs still walked free, but was unwilling to directly involve 
himself in exposing him, perhaps even fearing that Arājs might have dangerous allies in the 
Latvian community in West Germany – allies such as Eichelis and his group, for example, 
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with whom we now have every reason to believe that Arājs did indeed consort after the war? 
At least the police thought so, remarking that “In his fundamental attitude [“Grundhaltung”], 
he is gravely hostile to Nazism, but his fear of the Latvian nationalist circles may influence 
his orientation [with regard to cooperation with the police].”221 Admittedly, this is only 
speculation; we will likely never know. The police never established a solid connection. It 
may be equally probable that Unāms was not involved at all. At least, when questioned 
directly on the matter by police in October 1974, he denied all knowledge of the affair.222 
 Either way, at the public prosecutor Klemm’s request, police in Frankfurt am Main 
easily confirmed the residency of a Viktor Zeibots in their city. An old man, he had been 
working a menial job in a printing firm for the past twenty or so years.223 And so, at last, on 
19 June 1974, the District Court in Hamburg re-issued the warrant for Arājs’s arrest.224 
Exhaustive examinations were then confidentially made to ensure that this man Zeibots was 
indeed the accused Arājs.225 Witnesses were sought, and evidence and charges were 
compiled. More than a full year later, on Thursday, 10 July 1975, at 21.15, the unsuspecting 
Viktors Arājs was finally arrested in his residence in Frankfurt am Main.226 The officers who 
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took him into custody reported that Arājs had been “living in an old, tumbledown 
[“verkommenden”] little attic apartment with a 74 year-old German roommate.”227 
 From all of this, one inescapable conclusion must be drawn: The reason that Arājs 
was not found earlier is simply that no one had bothered to look for him since 1955. And 
when he finally was caught by German authorities, it was because of a total fluke, even 
though the information that directly led to his location and unmasked his feeble alias had 
already been in the possession of the West German police for more than a decade. 
Furthermore, the information had been furnished to them by none other than a Latvian, one 
of those suspicious “stateless foreigners” they so frequently pestered. Klemm merely picked 
up the ball that Detective Superintendant Seth had fatefully dropped in 1963. He ran with it. 
 
The Warrant 
 After Arājs was taken from his apartment and conveyed to a police station, the full, 
two-page warrant was read to him: 
Warrant against Arajs (alias Zeibots/Zeibot/Zeiboth/Zeibold or Artur 
Abols/Abel/Abele), Bernhard Viktor.  
 
... 
 
Strongly suspected, in Riga, Latvia, and its environs, during the German occupation 
from July 1941 until 1943, as leader of a Latvian police unit (“Sonderkommando 
Arajs” of the Latvian Security Police) in a yet-to-be-established number of cases 
sometimes singly and sometimes in conjunction with others, deliberately and with 
premeditation and out of low purposes (racial hatred), of having killed people 
maliciously and cruelly as he: 
 
1. himself directly after the occupation of Riga on 1 July 1941, as one of the leaders 
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of the Latvian National Socialist group “Perkonkrust,” took part in riots against the 
Jewish population in the course of which at least 400 Jews were slain, tortured to 
death, thrown in burning synagogues, or were shot in the area surrounding Riga by 
Latvian Sonderkommandos under the command of Arajs; 
 
2. himself as the leader of a Latvian Kommando, upon the order of the German 
Security Police, at the time of July/August 1941 took part in the shooting of at least 
10,000 Jews over the course of multiple mass-shooting actions in the area 
surrounding Riga; 
 
3. took part in the clearing of the Riga Ghetto ordered by the Higher SS- and Police 
Leader Jeckeln in the course of which, between 30 November and 9 December 1941, 
during three days of operations [“Einsatztagen”] at least 24,000 Latvian and 1,000 
German Jews (men, women, and children) were shot in the Rumbula Forest 
approximately eight kilometers outside of Riga on the street towards Dünaburg 
[Daugavpils]; 
 
4. shot, on 5 December 1941 in the Riga Ghetto, Nachman Shapiro and two 
additional Jews of a sanitation Kommando, who in order to quiet their hunger had 
concealed foodstuffs; 
 
5. shot six Jews, among whom were two children, who had hidden themselves in 
houses, and gave a ‘mercy’ shot to a wounded 12-year-old Jewish boy on 9 December 
1941 in the Riga Ghetto cemetery together with unknown Latvians; 
 
6. ordered Latvian Kommandos subordinate to him to shoot, in multiple cases, in the 
forests in the vicinity of Riga (Bickernicker Forest), Jews sick and unable to work 
(men, women, and children), from December 1941 to 1943, on the orders of the 
Commander of the Security Police and SD Latvia, Dr. Lange.  
... 
Pretrial custody is to be imposed as the accused has been a fugitive since 1949.228 
 
 It was already past midnight. This was followed by police questioning. Arājs’s last 
words to his interrogators late that night were: “This stuff, which was just read out to me, I 
don’t believe it, this is fantasy. I don’t believe any of it, I’m sorry, I can’t help you. I have 
nothing to do with this business. I am who I am, and not this Arājs person.”229 The 
interrogation was concluded at 01.30.  
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 Arājs caved the following day. 
 The warrant is reproduced here substantively in full in order to help demonstrate one 
concrete example of the West German system’s genuine interest in the truth and its flexibility 
and fairness in the face of contradictory or, even more importantly, unwelcome evidence. 
The warrant – as it were, the first draft in a legal process that would eventually produce an 
actual indictment and finally an official verdict on the crimes of the accused – contains two 
non-trivial errors.  
Most importantly, the assertion that the Rumbula shootings occurred on three separate 
days rather than two is a major mistake on a quite elementary point. As was described in the 
first chapter of the present study, the Rumbula shootings occurred on two separate days: 30 
November and 8 December 1941. The significance of this error is only underscored by the 
fact that Arājs’s conviction would ultimately rest upon his participation specifically on the 
second day of the Action. 
Also significantly, the very first charge in the warrant identified Arājs as a member of 
Pērkonkrusts, or “Thundercross.” It also characterized that organization with a term West 
Germans could readily understand: a “Latvian National Socialist group.” Both of these 
claims were as untrue as they are frequently asserted across witness testimony and the 
literature at large and merit close attention here. The second claim, about the nature of 
Pērkonkrusts, is explained and refuted in Chapter One of this study. The first claim, 
regarding Arājs’s membership, is very easily refuted. 
Because he belonged to the police force during the Kārlis Ulmanis dictatorship under 
which Pērkonkrusts was a banned organization, Viktors Arājs incontrovertibly could not 
have been a member, at least not as of 1934. It was also banned under the successive Soviet 
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and, very quickly, German occupations. This can prove nothing about whether or not he was 
sympathetic to Pērkonkrusts, although he probably was in many respects. Still, no hard 
evidence has even been uncovered linking him to the organization during any period. And for 
what it may be worth, prominent figures within Pērkonkrusts repeatedly denied any 
association between Arājs and their organization during the investigation.230  
Regardless, to allege that Arājs had been a member of Pērkonkrusts would have been 
very tempting for any prosecutor: the membership of the accused in an officially – among 
other things – anti-Semitic organization would have gone far in establishing base motives for 
his participation in criminal acts against Jews. Their shared anti-Semitism may also help 
explain the persistent equation of Pērkonkrusts with the Nazi Party.231 
The oft-repeated claim of Arājs’s membership has come from a variety of quarters. 
Most conspicuously, it is heard in Jewish survivors’ testimony, which – on this as on many 
other points – is virtually unanimous.232 This phenomenon extends beyond Latvian Jewish 
survivors to include Western and Central European Jews deported to Rīga as well. It is also 
echoed and repeated in Soviet literature. Certainly the Soviets had no love of Pērkonkrusts 
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and persecuted its members heavily whenever given the chance, both in 1940-1941 and in the 
years following the war, as intractable opponents of Communism and of Latvia’s 
incorporation into the Soviet Union.  
But if the Hamburg prosecution desired for convenience to place Arājs in the 
organization and thereby make him guilty by association of racism and fascist tendencies – 
and hence: harboring base motives for murder – then the Soviets wished to do the same not 
to prove something about Arājs himself, but to project his guilt onto Pērkonkrusts, the 
reactionary bourgeois-imperialist crime syndicate. After the war, bonafide Nazis were also 
only too happy to blame Pērkonkrusts members for the crimes instigated and implemented by 
Einsatzkommando 2. After all, they presented a handy group of savage natives to serve as an 
alibi. Apart from anecdotal evidence of individual members of the organization participating 
in crimes, however, the origin of this widely-held misconception is probably to be found in 
the fact that during the two months or so into the occupation before the Germans banned it, 
Pērkonkrusts had an office within the same building as headquartered the Arajs 
Kommando.233 Also, they were among the groups specifically tapped in the infamous 4 July 
1941 recruitment call for what turned out to be the Arajs Kommando.234 
No matter the confluence of interests determined to place Arājs in Pērkonkrusts, the 
allegation is simply false.235 If Arājs had been a member of the organization before 1934 – 
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and there is no evidence that he was – then he was obviously not so committed to it that he 
was willing to allow his police career to suffer on its behalf. And if he was somehow secretly 
a member of an illegal group deemed by the Germans to be hostile to their interests, it seems 
incredible that this information was known by the distant and somewhat preoccupied NKVD 
but eluded the highest German police authorities during the war – authorities that instead 
entrusted Arājs with a great deal of responsibility and knowledge of their dirty deeds. At the 
maximum, his worldview accorded in part with that of Pērkonkrusts, even as he served the 
German occupation. 
Ultimately, the purpose of the warrant was to secure Arājs while the pretrial 
investigation by the prosecution could proceed in earnest. In this, it was successful. And as 
the prosecution became more informed through its investigation, it would later remedy these 
errors in the course of preparing the public indictment. 
 
THE TRIAL 
 Several blocks from the enormous and indestructible hulk of a derelict Flak Tower, 
immediately beside the Messehallen U-Bahn station, and overlooking a wide open plaza, sits 
the Criminal Justice Building of the State Court of the Free Hanseatic City of Hamburg. 
Facing the plaza, which is ringed by buildings housing the judicial bureaucracy of the 
humming West German city-state is a matte steel slab upon which was written in raised 
letters: 
We commemorate the victims [“Opfer”] who were disenfranchised, violated, 
afflicted, robbed of their freedom, and put to death between 1933 and 1945 by the 
judges and prosecutors of the Hamburg judiciary.  
 Their suffering is an admonishment to us. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
B 162/3076. “Anklageschrift.” Hamburg, 10 May 1976, pp. 41-45. For its part, the Court’s understanding was 
completely correct. 
 161 
 
 
The Nazis had also brought upon Hamburg the horrific wrath, particularly owing to 
its proximity to the British Isles, of year upon year of Royal Air Force and, eventually, 
American saturation-bombing. These destructive Allied efforts peaked in the July 1943 
firestorm that killed about 40,000 people in a single gigantic raid. Nearly every building in 
the city center today bears a plaque stating that the structure was destroyed in 1943, and then 
rebuilt at some point in the 1950s or 1960s. As a Hamburger born in 1936, Lothar Klemm 
may have remembered the bombings from his childhood, or perhaps he remembered an 
evacuation to the countryside. And certainly he was aware of the impact of the Nazis’ 
hideous misrule on Hamburg’s judiciary estate. These two considerations must have 
somehow informed his motives and mindset throughout his career as a prosecutor. 
 The courthouse itself was very large, occupying an entire city block. Up a wrap-
around set of stone steps were three heavy sets of iron-studded wooden double-doors. Once 
inside the building, visitors and personnel were confronted with a two-story-tall chamber 
roofed with glass around which was wrapped all of the offices, lounges, record repositories 
and so forth required for the administration of justice.  
However, the courtroom in which the Arājs trial took place itself was no grand affair. 
The walls were beige. On one side of the room was the judges’ bench: a long table elevated 
several steps above the rest of the room behind which were three chairs. On the other side: a 
narrow, glassed-in gallery for the public and media observers.236 And in the center: a table 
with two chairs for the defendant and his counsel, as well as a desk and chairs for the 
prosecution. Fluorescent ceiling-mounted lights lit the room. Two large, arched windows 
were set in the wall opposite the entry.  
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The windows looked out on brick, bars, and barbed-wire above which only a small 
patch of sky was visible – and that only from certain vantage points in the room. That 
building, which was connected to the court building, was a jail. Since he was an obvious 
flight-risk, the jail was Viktors Arājs’s home while in remand during the pre-trial 
investigation and throughout the trial itself. He seems to have been made fairly comfortable. 
Through his lawyers, Arājs requested and received from the Court, with the assent of the 
prison administrators who had their security considerations: a radio, a television, a travel-
sized typewriter, and a chess set. Arājs was observed to play chess almost daily with various 
fellow inmates.237 In addition, Arājs requested and received a daily subscription to 
Frankfurt’s conservative daily newspaper of record, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.238 
While Arājs had physically eluded authorities for over twenty years, the wheels of 
justice had never stopped turning since the 1958 Ulm Tilsit Kommando trial and the 
founding of the Zentrale Stelle in Ludwigsburg. A massive research effort had been 
conducted and a concomitant mountain of evidence already assembled during the 1960s, over 
the course of prosecuting dozens of other men accused of committing National Socialist 
violent crimes in Latvia during the Second World War.239 In the Federal Republic of 
Germany, there were three major complexes of such cases, involving multiple jurisdictions. 
They were arranged geographically: the largest, in terms of the numbers of defendants, was 
the Riga-Komplex in Hamburg against Gerhard Maywald and others (including now also 
Viktors Arājs); the Libau-, Windau-, und Mitau-Komplex (i.e. Liepāja, Ventpils, and 
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Jelgava) in Hanover against Erhard Grauel and others; and finally the Dünaburg-Komplex 
(i.e. Daugavpils) in Dortmund against Günther Tabbert and others. Thus, by the time of the 
Arājs trial, the general facts of the Holocaust in Latvia were already known and the West 
German judicial infrastructure for handling this type of case well-established. It also bears 
pointing out again that most of our current knowledge of the Nazi crimes that took place in 
Latvia during the Second World War were revealed in the investigations attendant to these 
trials – a process that finally culminated in the prosecution of Viktors Arājs himself. The 
facts regarding his personal participation, however, were still to be legally established. 
The legal machinery existed and was well-oiled. For their part, both the intrepid 
investigator and State Prosecutor of Hamburg, Lothar Klemm, and Arājs’s principal defense 
lawyer, Mr. Georg Bürger, had long experience in trials of Nazi crimes. Georg Bürger, the 
chief defense attorney, spoke of his qualifications thusly: “Since 1963, I have been retained 
as a defense counsel in numerous Nazi war crimes cases and therefore possess the relevant 
expertise as well as the confidence of the accused.”240 He was assisted principally by the 
attorneys Hannelore Czermak-Schwanen and Drs. Jost Heinemann and Reiner Eggert, all 
based in Hamburg, along with Horst Loebe, and Fritz Steinacker, based in Frankfurt, the 
latter of whom was, in Georg Bürger’s estimate, one of the few defense attorneys in the 
Federal Republic who was “familiar, owing to his decades-long historical occupation with 
these cases, with the circumstances of the time [“damaligen Zeitumständen”], particularly 
also those in Latvia.” For Klemm, this was to be his last such case after thirteen years of such 
heavy responsibilities, before he transferred to another department within the Office of the 
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State Prosecutor of Hamburg at the end of 1979.241 
 
The Soviet Contribution 
In his omnivorous hunger for evidence, Klemm cast his nets very wide and did not 
balk at asking for the assistance of the Soviet Union, as well as the many expert, archival, 
academic, and professional organizations that had been researching the subjects in question 
for some time. Indeed, by far the largest and most significant foreign contributions to the 
investigation came from the USSR 242 This fact should not be construed, as Arājs’s defense 
would have had it, as undue or unsolicited Soviet meddling or politicking in a Western court. 
Rather, the Soviet Union, simply by virtue of controlling the territory on which the relevant 
events had occurred, and being the place of residence of most of the surviving witnesses to 
the crimes, was placed in a position by default to substantially aid or hinder the West German 
prosecution as it chose. In the event, the Soviet Union aided the prosecution and the cause of 
justice in West Germany greatly. 
 Possible political tampering could have taken the form of instructing a witness of the 
‘correct’ testimony he or she was expected to give; coaching a witness on the probable 
stratagems of the defense; contaminating a witness through providing useful background 
information to seemingly bolster his or her credibility in the eyes of the Court; and, of course, 
intimidating a witnesses into cooperating – particularly if the witness had previously been 
tried and convicted of similar crimes of his own. However, the evidence, or conspicuous lack 
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thereof, indicates that little if any such meddling actually took place in the case against Arājs. 
The testimony of witnesses who were Soviet citizens and were giving their testimony 
on Soviet territory in the presence of Soviet officials was vigorously contested on its very 
face by the defense, which complained, for example, that the Soviet witnesses were not under 
oath during the testimony – the Soviet Union having abolished oaths from their procedure as 
a perverse bourgeois-religious anachronism. The defense also argued that some of the 
witnesses could have been coached or coerced or could even have been completely phony. 
Mistrustful of the Soviet Union as it was, the defense not only claimed that in principle all 
evidence of Soviet provenance was contaminated, but also tried to portray the prosecution’s 
reliance on the Soviets as a shameful act unbecoming of agents of a member state of the 
NATO alliance since 1955.  
Actually, despite itself having parried the objections of the defense to the use of any 
Soviet-provided evidence in principle, the prosecution itself chose to omit much of such 
Soviet testimony for its own reasons. The prosecution required scarcely any of it for a 
conviction in the end, and some of it was seen by them to represent more a liability than an 
asset if the case were appealed. That is to say that the West German system functioned on a 
structural level in such a way as to force the prosecution to treat its own evidence with 
caution verging on suspicion – a most salutary component of a healthy legal process. 
The fears of the defense, in the judgment of the Court, were baseless; the handling of 
potentially problematic Soviet evidence by the prosecution was deemed basically correct. 
Forensic analysis of the archival documents provided by the Soviet authorities gave no 
reason to doubt their authenticity. The evidence provided by the witnesses generally 
conformed to known facts. When there were reasonable grounds to contest the validity of a 
 166 
 
witness’s testimony, as a rule the testimony of that witness was removed, in whole or in part, 
from consideration. Finally, the Court took very seriously the idea that the Soviets might 
have coached or in any case intimidated witnesses.243 Among other reasons that the Court 
ultimately accepted most of the Soviet witness testimony is that the claims that they were 
under duress were refuted by the official West German translator, Dr. Günther Kratzel, who 
had been sent to the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic from West Germany. He “stated that 
one or another witness had indeed made an inhibited impression at the beginning of his 
testimony, but then that soon subsided.”244 He also testified that one witness began his 
statement saying “‘When the Germans liberated us...’”245 Furthermore, Dr. Kratzel did not 
feel that any Soviet official asked leading questions of the witnesses.246 The Court itself 
noted that the testimonies from the USSR were not uniform, often contradicted themselves, 
and frequently seemed designed to absolve, rather than to incriminate, Viktors Arājs.247 
In the end, the only significant Soviet intrusion, if it could even be called such, on the 
investigatory process and trial was the refusal to issue travel visas to those Soviet citizens 
who wished to testify before the Hamburg Court. Specious health reasons were concocted to 
justify this refusal and were correctly perceived as such by the judges in Hamburg. Rather 
than appearing in Hamburg, those who were still alive remained, as a rule, in the Soviet 
Union during the trial. In many cases, the Hamburg Court came to them and took their 
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depositions in a Soviet courtroom in Rīga. After returning from one such visit to Rīga via 
Moscow, the Klemm remarked that his party’s Intourist handlers’ service was “attentive and 
courteous.”248 
 
The Documentary Evidence 
A surprisingly small amount of actual documentary evidence was entered into the 
record of the Court for the trial of Viktors Arājs. The most important primary source 
documents which were relied upon by the prosecution in formulating the indictment and by 
the Court in its deliberations were mainly the well-known documents surviving from 
Einsatzgruppe A and Einsatzkommando 2. These included the various Situation Reports and 
the famous comprehensive reports of Dr. Walter Stahlecker, as well as several orders from 
Reinhard Heydrich’s RSHA going in the other direction. The paucity of actual surviving 
Latvian Auxiliary Security Police records necessitated this reliance on EG A and EK 2 
documents; more specific information pertaining to the Kommando itself could only be 
arrived at by inference. This was not an accident. Presumably, a deliberate destruction of the 
documents had place before the Kommando members’ possible capture by the Red Army as 
the war in Latvia came to a close in chaos. There was likely also an effort during the war not 
to commit orders and after-action reports to paper in the first place, preferring instead to rely 
on oral communication to premptorily cover everyone’s tracks and obscure the appalling 
truth. In addition to this document group, some contemporary newspaper articles in which 
Arājs or members of his group were mentioned or photographed were also consulted over the 
course of the investigation and trial. Lastly, the Soviets provided Arājs’s university 
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matriculation documents and identification papers from the 1930s, a miscellany of other 
school-files, and old Curricula Vitae from the Latvian State Historical Archives.249 They also 
supplied current photographs of the various killings sites and other areas of interest, such as 
the Valdemar Street headquarters building and the neighborhood that was once the Rīga 
Ghetto. 
 Besides the investigative records and court documents generated after the war – the 
importance of which has already been explained and will be emphasized again shortly – the 
secondary sources used in the Arājs case were, if anything, in even shorter supply than the 
wartime documentation. The principal source for basic historical information with which to 
provide the background and the context for the alleged actions of the accused was Professor 
Georg von Rauch’s History of the Baltic States, which, conveniently published in 1977 at the 
outset of the trial proper, represented the cutting edge of scholarly historical understanding of 
Latvia during the war and the Holocaust in Latvia.250 Additionally, Soviet works such as 
Daugavas Vanagi – Who Are They? were also introduced. Unfortunately, the classic study of 
the Einsatzgruppen, with special attention to EG A, Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges, 
by Helmut Krausnick and Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, was only published in 1981, several years 
too late to be used in Hamburg.251 Although their manuscript presumably existed in draft at 
that time, the records indicate that it was not consulted by any party connected to the 
investigation. 
A third source, which has already been alluded to, was Court findings against a host 
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of previous defendants who had been convicted of crimes related to those of which Arājs 
stood accused. This set of cases not only laid the groundwork for future criminal inquiries, 
including that into the wartime activities of Arājs, but also helped to frame all subsequent 
academic discussion of the events in question. Principally, the judgments of West German 
courts were relied upon, as they provided a rich and fairly comprehensive understanding of 
Nazi crimes in Latvia. However, a number of important Soviet rulings, such as the ruling 
against Friedrich Jeckeln in Rīga in 1946 and the testimony of lower-level witnesses 
provided by the Soviets, were also used. Israeli witnesses were also sometimes consulted. 
 The upshot of this relative shortage of primary documentary evidence was not only 
that it necessitated a heavy reliance upon postwar secondary sources and the findings of 
others courts, but that it was really the eye-witnesses who provided the evidence most crucial 
to the outcome of the Arājs trial. 
 
The Witnesses 
The character of the witness pool, composed of approximately 130 individuals, was 
quite heterogeneous. The witnesses themselves can be categorized in several different ways: 
national origin; status as victim, perpetrator, bystander, or expert (medical, for example); 
citizenship at the time of testifying; and whether their statements were introduced as 
evidence.252 Most crucial was the witness’s relationship to the defendant – whether, as was 
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the case for the vast majority, it was only indirect or, as in a few special cases, it was 
personal.  
The witness testimonies were assessed by the Court by uniform standards of internal 
coherence and consistency, the bearing and presentation of the witness, and the impression 
concerning mental capacity and reliability of memory that he or she left on the Court. The 
Court was very careful in handling the testimony of witnesses. For a variety of reasons, the 
Court frequently determined a given witness’s testimony, in whole or in part, to be unreliable 
and therefore did not base any conclusions on it. This happened to both Jewish survivor 
witness testimony and to German and Latvian perpetrator testimony alike, and included 
witnesses living in Israel, West Germany, and the Soviet Union. The most common reasons 
for excluding testimony were because the witness was transparently attempting to protect the 
accused, they had nothing pertinent to say about the accused himself, or – often owing to age 
– their memories had faded or they appeared sick or disoriented to the Court.253 
The intervening decades of Arājs’s liberty likely reduced the pool of survivor 
witnesses. Still, most of the more than forty Jewish survivor witnesses did not have to be 
sought out but rather had introduced themselves to the prosecutors after hearing about the 
capture of Viktors Arājs. Word of mouth travelled quickly through the community of 
survivors of the Holocaust in Latvia. In perhaps half or more of the cases, these Jewish 
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survivors came from Israel, where their depositions were recorded by Israeli justice officials 
in Tel Aviv or Haifa and sent along to Hamburg for study. A few survivors of the Holocaust 
in Latvia were even living in the United States. Also, Jewish witnesses living in the Soviet 
Union were approached by their government and agreed to offer their testimony as well.254 
However, of all of the damning evidence and testimony this important group was able 
to provide, two individuals in particular greatly impressed the prosecution and Court and 
were crucial to undermining the Arājs defense. These two alone could speak directly about 
Arājs and his attitude towards Jews during the war. Here, the prosecution was very lucky in 
that they were able to produce two eye-witnesses who had been among the intended victims 
of the accused and were prepared to testify on this question. It was exceptionally good 
fortune for Klemm and his prosecution that both had a vantage point from which to testify 
credibly about Arājs’s specific individual behavior, given that he had operated at the 
command level and thus generally at some remove from the victims themselves, rather than 
the level of an ordinary triggerman. 
The first, Ella Medalje, was born Ella Gutman in 1913 in the medium-sized 
provincial Latvian town of Tukums. By the time of the German invasion, she was living in 
Rīga. She was forced to work in the Jewish hospital. Within days, her husband, Pinchas 
Medalje, was taken from their apartment, and she never saw him again. Before long, she 
found herself under arrest and held with about 100 other people, including her mother, at 
Valdemar Street 19 – the first headquarters of the Arajs Kommando. After registering and 
surrendering their property, they were detained in the cellar. Later, once the majority had 
been trucked away to locations unknown, including her mother, the remaining prisoners – 
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comprising Ella Medalje and about twenty other young women – were set to work for three 
weeks doing domestic chores for the Kommando under constant watch. This is how she came 
to recognize Arājs. Protected by one of the guards, she observed other prisoners being chosen 
by drunken Kommando members and taken upstairs, ostensibly for the purpose of raping 
them. Soon, she found herself incarcerated in the ghetto.255 
One David Silberman helped Ella Medalje to write up an account of her experiences 
in a 1966 memoir, translated into German (apparently from Russian) for the court as Recht 
auf Leben: Ein Dokumentarbericht. David Silberman was born in Latvia in 1934. He and his 
nuclear family evacuated to the USSR at the outset of the German invasion. He returned to 
Latvia after the war to find that the rest of the family on both his mother’s and his father’s 
side had been killed. He began doing what he could to chronicle the Holocaust in Latvia, 
apparently with little official help. Mr. Silberman emigrated from the USSR to Israel in 1971, 
where he gave his accumulated research over to Yad Vashem, including the account of Ella 
Medalje. He was actually the first person ever to approach her for her story. He would not be 
the last interested in listening to her, however.256 
Upon the request of Lothar Klemm, Ella Medalje’s testimony was taken almost half a 
dozen times in the Soviet Union. One day, with Soviet officials and a photographer in tow, 
Ella Medalje even toured various locations in the former Rīga Ghetto and the environs of the 
Rumbula shooting site, describing what she remembered, trying courageously to place 
herself – as horrifying and painful as this experience must have been for her – once more in 
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the terrible days of winter 1941-1942.257  
Finally, her testimony was read in the Court in Hamburg on 14 February 1979.258 It 
contained her account of a personal encounter with Viktors Arājs on 8 December 1941 – the 
second day of the Rumbula Action. She was one of only several survivors of the Rumbula 
massacre. She testified that at the killing site she had pleaded for her life with a member of 
the Kommando who was part of the cordon. He may have recognized her from July and 
August when she was being held and working for the Kommando, and he referred her to 
Arājs.259 When she came before him claiming to be an Aryan only married to a Jew, he 
answered “There are only Jews here. Today, Jewish blood must flow.”260 This evidence was 
believed by the Court and went far in showing his intention to kill Jews as Jews.261 She 
turned back to the first guard to whom she had begged for her life, and he referred her to a 
German who allowed her to live pending confirmation of her story. Afterwards, Latvian 
friends quickly supplied her with papers that convinced the Germans she was Aryan. 
The defense, eager to discredit Mrs. Medalje given the threat her testimony posed to 
their case, seized upon a comment she once made before Soviet questioners in Rīga: “I am 
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afraid.”262 However, the Court judged that this remark was made as she relived, from the 
witness stand, the events of the second day of Rumbula, and did not refer to Soviet 
pressure.263 
For his own defense, Arājs would once claim that he had, out of sympathy for the 
Jews, seen to the rescue of the man who worked in the garage of the Kommando, as well as 
this man’s wife.264 This man, whose name was Matis LutriĦš, however, told a different story 
in his testimony.  
“To speak of my relationship with Arājs makes no sense, because at the time, he was 
the big boss [“der groβe Chef”], but I was just a person who had been robbed of all rights.”265 
Within days of the entry of German troops, he and his father were arrested, stripped of their 
valuables, and interned at the Valdemar Street headquarters. There, for the next two weeks, 
they were held incommunicado and forced to perform menial tasks such as cleaning toilets. 
When a group of prisoners was released, Matis LutriĦš was allowed to leave, but also 
instructed to return daily. His skills as a mechanic would be required. Even after he moved 
into the Rīga Ghetto with his family, he continued to report each morning to the headquarters 
for work. Therefore, on 8 December during the Rumbula Action, several members of Arājs 
Kommando recognized him and allowed LutriĦš, together with his wife, to hide under a pile 
of clothing that had been stripped from the victims and placed beside their vehicle. Later, 
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when Arājs learned of this, he went into the garage where LutriĦš was again working and, as 
he chuckled, said of him: “This is one who has escaped his fate.”266 This showed the Court 
that Arājs had nothing to do with the survival of LutriĦš, at best passively acquiescing to it 
after the fact. All of LutriĦš’s testimony, especially as pertained to the mechanics of the 
Rumbula Action, was correct in every particular detail.267 
On the other side of the coin were a variety of witnesses who directly participated in 
or were accomplices to the crimes committed against those such as Ella Medalje and Matis 
LutriĦš. A number of convicted members of the Kommando were supplied by the Soviet 
Union, although they were anything but eager to testify. The depositions of deceased 
convicts, some of whom had been executed, were also provided by the Soviets. 
 A third group of witnesses were Latvians who were prominent during the Nazi 
occupation but were not members of the Arajs Kommando. Two former Latvian General 
Directors of the Nazi-sponsored “Land Self-Administration,” Dr. Julius Bračs and Žanis 
Unāms, were witnesses, as well as the prominent author and right-wing intellectual and 
actual Pērkonkrusts member Adolfs Šilde. 
 
The Indictment 
With the conclusion of the pretrial investigation, the prosecutor, Lothar Klemm, 
issued the official indictment on 10 May 1976. 
The indictment contained only four charges, paraphrased here: 
1.) Taking part in at least 19 mass shootings, primarily of Jews, but also of political 
opponents and invalids, during which perished at least 1,670 people between July and 
December 1941 in the Biėernieki Forest in the service of the head of Einsatzgruppe 
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A, Dr. Stahlecker, and the head of Einsatzkommando 2, Dr. Lange, following the 
establishment of the Latvian Auxiliary Security Police; 
 
2.) The shooting of at least 5,000 Western European Jews who were unable to work and 
had been deported to Rīga between the end of January and the beginning of February 
1942; 
 
3.) Participating in the planning and carrying out of the Rumbula Action, during which at 
least 24,000 Jewish men, women, and children were murdered under the orders of 
Friedrich Jeckeln, including the clearing of the Ghetto and specific individual 
killings; and  
 
4.) Personally organizing the shooting of at least 100 Jewish men in Liepaja in the 
summer of 1941 accompanied by Dr. Lange and a detachment of the Kommando.268 
 
Perhaps oddly – in any case likely merely a question of the unavailability of suitable 
witnesses – no charge was even brought against Viktors Arājs with respect to the 
involvement of his Kommando in anti-partisan and reprisal actions in Belarus in the last 
phase of its existence. It might be added here parenthetically that of all the manifold crimes 
of the Kommando, these might have been among the foremost in the minds of the Soviets. 
The omission of the crimes committed in Belarus seems to further demonstrate the 
independence of the West German prosecution from Soviet influence in its decision-making 
process. 
Just a glance shows that some of the charges contained in the original warrant of 19 
June 1974 – after very nearly two years of further investigation – were dropped, while other 
charges were substantially revised, elaborated, or freshly appended. The allegation that Arājs 
was a member of Pērkonkrusts and as such participated in wild violent acts against the 
Jewish population of Rīga was dropped entirely. Neither the very specific claim that Arājs 
had personally shot the named Nachman Shapiro and two others in the Ghetto for smuggling 
food on 5 December 1941, nor the claim that he personally shot six Jews – including two 
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children – in the Ghetto on 9 December 1941, appeared in the indictment’s final version. 
However, a fresh charge involving the command of a detachment of the Kommando during a 
mass-shooting in Liepaja was added. 
As to the Biėernieki Forest shootings, the number of victims whose deaths Arājs was 
alleged to have participated in was reduced to about one sixth of those contained in the 
original charge (from 10,000 to the more precise 1,670) – and this was supposed to reflect the 
killings for the entire second half of 1941, rather than just for July and August 1941 as was 
set down in the warrant. Here, however, “multiple” shootings are replaced by the more 
specific figure of “at least 19.” Dropped were the charges that Arājs had continued to order 
shootings in that forest into 1943. 
 On the key charge of his involvement in the Rumbula Action, the idea that it had 
taken place over three, rather than the actual two, days was amended. To the charges of 
participation in the Rīga Ghetto clearing had been added participation in the planning, as well 
as several specific murders. 
The final indictment – as distinct from the enumerated charges – came to 167 pages. 
The document contains no outright, obviously erroneous historical claims. However, some of 
its representations, interpretations, generalizations, and extrapolations were, and remain, 
open to some slight objection. Several other aspects of the background onto which Arājs and 
his wartime story were projected by the prosecution are open to complaint by historians. To 
begin with two minor examples briefly: the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, a crucial piece of 
background to understanding wartime attitudes in Latvia, is wholly omitted, while the absurd 
idea that the non-Jewish population of Rīga spontaneously turned out onto the streets in 
traditional national costumes on 1 July 1941 to greet the Wehrmacht is credited at face value 
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rather than regarded properly as a propaganda event carefully staged for German cameras.269 
The historical background, as set down in the indictment, reveals some key 
presuppositions of the prosecution as well as some of its biases. The picture of pre-war and 
wartime Latvia – necessary to establish the proper context for Arājs’s actions – was painted 
by the prosecution in such a way as to have the maximum possible incriminating effect on 
the image of the accused, including portraying Latvians other than Arājs in such a way as to 
make his alleged anti-Semitism commonplace in Latvian culture and thus the alleged “base 
motives” of his brutal crimes seemingly more plausible. 
Klemm and his team were, understandably, receptive to claims of basically complete 
Latvian autonomy in the commission of the early crimes, at least those committed in the first 
two weeks of July 1941.270 However, this willingness to believe such testimony, even when 
the witnesses claiming it were former personnel of Einsatzkommando 2 or the office of the 
Kommandeur der Sicherheitspolizei Lettland with an obvious self-interest in shifting blame, 
is open to criticism. By mid-July, according to the version in the indictment, the RSHA was 
forced to reign in the Latvian bands and impose tighter control with “strengthened 
oversight.”271 This was the classic exonerating claim of a brief interregnum between the two 
occupation regimes, during which Latvian savagery was supposedly unleashed against the 
Jews in the absence of the positive restraining influence of the Nazis. The defense was able 
to turn the falsity of this trope somewhat to its advantage and the claim of initial German 
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non-involvement was disbelieved, correctly, by the Court. The Einsatzgruppen in fact had 
specific orders which have survived in the documentary record to make the killings appear 
before posterity as a righteous uprising of the locals against their former Judeo-Bolshevik 
oppressors and to leave no traces of German instigation.272 
According to the indictment, there then took place a seamless transition from 
indigenous self-organized nationalist “fanatics” and “right-wing extremists” to German-
organized units which subsequently continued to do exactly what they had already been 
doing, albeit in a more organized manner.273 The prosecution admitted somewhat 
schizophrenically elsewhere in the indictment, however, that the crimes all took place “after 
the [German] invasion” and that it was the desire of the German police forces to portray the 
killings as native “cleansing actions.”274 And further, the prosecution conceded that in every 
known, documented, and multiply-attested instance that a shooting action occurred, its 
instigation or order, central organization, and supervision was provided by Germans.275 The 
Wehrmacht, meanwhile, is portrayed in the indictment as a rescuer of Jews, although largely 
only by dint of its demand for labor.276 Apart from these questionable points, however, the 
story told in the indictment, again, was an excellent summary of the relevant portions of 
Latvian history and the history of the Holocaust in Latvia. 
The actual opening of the Main Proceedings occurred at 10 AM on a Thursday: 7 July 
1977.  Ultimately the Court’s final verdict would differ from the prosecution’s indictment in 
                                                           
272
 NARA II. Nuremberg Document L-180. “Einsatzgruppe A Gesamtbericht bis zum 15. October 1941.”  
 
273
 Ibid., pp. 74-76. 
 
274
 Ibid., pp. 78. 
 
275
 Ibid., pp. 79-83. 
 
276
 Ibid., p. 83. 
 180 
 
important ways. Over the course of the trial the Court rejected or modified many of the 
claims made by Klemm and his team, when it deemed the corresponding evidence that had 
been marshaled in support to be insufficient. The Court’s conclusions were, in other words, 
by no means identical to the allegations of the prosecution. Indeed, the Court rigorously 
reviewed the evidence before it and revised and narrowed the scope of the prosecution’s 
indictment in its verdict. The Court was not necessarily wedded to any particular outcome for 
the trial for political or ideological reasons. In other words, the judges of the District Court of 
Hamburg were certainly more than fair to Arājs. 
If anything, the Court was overly cautious and indifferent to the outraged victims. It 
probably went too far in dismissing testimonies, for example. Unlike many other more 
infamous West German trials, however, Judge Wagner and the rest of his bench did not 
invoke ridiculous technicalities or stretch the law in such a way as to acquit an obviously 
guilty defendant or justify an absurdly light sentence. Therefore, it may be said that in this 
way the Court in Hamburg behaved better than many other West German courts handling 
similar cases. Unfortunately, an in-depth comparative study of West German authorities’ 
respective attitudes toward foreign, as opposed to German, war crimes suspects cannot be 
encompassed in the present study, although the subject is an important one. Interestingly, 
some Jewish survivors of the Holocaust in Latvia thought that Judge Wagner, the presiding 
Judge in the trial of Viktors Arājs, was an anti-Semite, or at least was prejudiced against non-
Germans. He also served as judge in the Scherwitz case in which the maximum penalty (life 
imprisonment) was handed down to the accused Scherwitz, Kommandant of the “Lenta” 
slave labor factory who was actually secretly a Jew and attempted to ameliorate the hellish 
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conditions of the Jewish prisoners in his charge.277 
 
The Defense 
 Briefly summarized, the defense followed two successive strategies, both of which 
the Court – in the persons of the Presiding State Court Judge and Chairman Dr. Klaus 
Wagner, and State Court Judges Dr. Jürgen Raecke, and Tilman Görtz – found unpersuasive. 
The first was to have the case dismissed on medical grounds, as the defense attempted 
initially to demonstrate that Arājs was mentally too unfit because of old age to stand trial, 
and later that standing trial would place his very life in jeopardy because his health was so 
poor. The second strategy attempted to explain away the actual wartime actions of Arājs. 
Arājs’s opening defense gambit, from the first day of the proceedings, was to portray 
himself as a “physically and mentally dissipated and decrepit person,” who sat trembling in a 
wheelchair, eyes lolling, sometimes seeming to be hard of hearing, and intermittently 
suffering massive spasms.278 Neurological and psychiatric experts were called and uniformly 
voiced strong skepticism to the Court and offered a diagnosis instead of “pseudo-dementia 
[emphasis added].” This confirmed the Court’s observation of “the discrepancy between the 
grotesque / idiotic behavior in expression, gestures, and speech [of Arājs] on the one hand, 
and [his] business-oriented and well-organized statements on the other.” His weakness for 
playing chess with his fellow inmates when he believed he was not being observed also gave 
the lie to his feigned condition of being a mentally doddering and enfeebled old man. During 
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the course of the trial, Arājs’s behavior gradually returned to normal, and the defense was 
eventually forced to admit that “his condition had gotten better.”279  
 The medical defense of physical frailty was taken more seriously by the Court, which 
sought expert opinions from a large number of professionals. Arājs did have 
cardiopulmonary sclerosis and was not a well man. Indeed, he experienced two relatively 
small cardiac infarcts while in custody in 1976, although the second was so minor as to be 
asymptomatic. In the end, on the strength of the opinion of its many medical experts, the 
Court concluded that conducting the trial would not increase the risk to Arājs’s life and 
should therefore proceed. To be absolutely safe, however, the Court determined that the 
proceedings would take place only two or three days each week, and only in ninety-minute 
increments. Physicians were also almost always present in the courtroom to monitor Arājs’s 
health. Over the course of the entire trial, proceedings were only twice briefly interrupted 
upon the cautious advice of the medical doctors.280 Only a single medical expert, one Dr. 
Naeve, ever once considered Arājs to be a possible suicide risk.281 
 After these health-based motions for dismissal failed, a series of more substantive 
defense arguments were submitted to the Court. To begin with, Arājs tried to maintain, 
spuriously of course, that he had been acquitted by the British at the conclusion of the “Riga 
Ghetto Case” in the late 1940s – a clear impossibility because that case was never concluded, 
but instead handed over to the very Court before which he was sitting. This claim, while 
frequently reiterated by Arājs, was perfunctorily rejected by the Court.282 
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In response to the more substantive lines of defense – after the opening strategems 
had been categorically rejected – the Court took each argument seriously but ultimately was 
not persuaded. Among the theses variously advanced to exonerate the wartime figure and 
actions of Viktors Arājs, the following three were the most interesting. 
The defense attempted to portray Arājs as a mere figurehead during the war, a 
powerless conduit through which German orders passed, in sympathy with or at the very 
worst indifferent to the disaster befalling the Jews, and certainly less zealous than many of 
his putative subordinates. Here they were not entirely without evidence, as some of the 
deposed former Kommando members testified to the impotence of Viktors Arājs before his 
German superiors. The Kommando’s activities were in any case supposed to have been 
controlled by the Germans and thus could not be considered his responsibility. And 
irrespective of Viktor Arājs’s actual role, as a volunteer, each man in the Kommando 
individually bore responsibility for his own actions. A claim, entirely without evidence, was 
even advanced that Arājs had submitted a “protest letter” to Dr. Lange.283 
 The defense also asserted that, from the start, Arājs had worked to establish the unit 
with the understanding that it would be a frontline formation composed of volunteers. In 
other words, he had formed – or initially intended to form – a purely combat unit, not the 
paramilitary death-squad it turned out to be. This dovetailed with the claim that he exerted no 
control over the unit; once he had put the men together, they were controlled altogether by 
the Germans. With transparently ahistorical reasoning, the defense tried to show that the anti-
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partisan operations of the later stages of the war were the original and only purpose of the 
Kommando. 
As a last ditch defense, Arājs also tried to deflect the blame for the murder of the 
Latvian Jews to other German-organized Latvian police formations and agencies, particularly 
the Rīga Police Prefecture and the Order Police, with which the Kommando had cooperated. 
Though these units were hardly themselves without blame, the attempted whitewash of the 
Arajs Kommando was thrown out by the Court with the rest of the excuses.  
Especially pivotal was the argument made by the defense that Arājs was not and had 
never been an anti-Semite. This issue was of critical importance because of the emphasis on 
intent and motive in West German legal deliberations. While the term “war crimes trial” has 
often been used informally in Germany, defendants like Arājs were not in fact charged with 
“war crimes” as established under international conventions. Neither were they charged with 
“crimes against humanity.” Unlike their East German counterparts, the West German 
authorities considered the accusation of crimes against humanity to be an ex post facto, or 
retroactive, charge.  
Instead, defendants such as Arājs were charged with murder and accessory to murder 
under German law as it existed in the penal code of 1940. Hence, the so-called “subjective 
side” of the crimes was the lynchpin of any conviction. In order to prove the charge of 
murder, as opposed to manslaughter for which the statute of limitations had run out, the 
prosecution needed to establish that the killing was carried out with a “base motive” – in this 
case, racial hatred – or with unnecessary or excessive cruelty or duplicity, which would speak 
to the defendant’s frame of mind when committing the crimes.  
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The Verdict 
 The truth did not set Viktors Arājs free. 
On 21 December 1979, after a four-and-a-half year investigation and trial involving 
approximately 130 witnesses – perpetrators and survivors alike, together with bystanders and 
experts – living in West Germany, the United States, the Soviet Union, Israel, and elsewhere, 
the Court declared its verdict: “The accused Viktor Bernhard Arajs is sentenced to life 
imprisonment for participating in the murders of at least 13,000 people.”  
With regard to the first charge – the Biėernieki Forest shootings – “The Court was not 
able to determine whether the accused and his unit conducted mass shootings on his own 
volition, that is to say, without instructions from the German Security Police, as the 
prosecution maintained.”284 Arājs’s establishment of the Kommando and the chain-of-
command from Hitler through Himmler, to the officers of EG A and EK 2 and finally to 
Arājs were beyond doubt. However, details even at the level of the number of shootings that 
were conducted, much less the personal actions of Viktors Arājs himself during such 
shootings, could no longer be determined with certainty. The prosecution itself realized as 
much and successfully petitioned that the charge be dropped.285 Likewise, it was impossible 
to reconstruct the activities of Arājs and his Kommando outside of Rīga; the charges related 
to the Liepaja shooting, among many others, were dismissed. 
The Court could not determine whether Arājs was directly involved in the planning of 
the Rumbula Action, or if he participated in the planning only through his officers.286 It was 
also not possible to determine, to the Court’s satisfaction, the participation of Arājs or his 
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Kommando on the first day of the Rumbula Action. The Court likewise ruled as unproven the 
charges that Arājs participated in the sweep of the Ghetto on 9 December 1941 following the 
massacre, as well as that he personally shot a woman during this operation.287 However, it 
was proven that his unit played an indispensable role during the second day of Rumbula, and 
that as an accomplice to the murders committed that day, Arājs “manifested his callous, 
pitiless mental attitude, stamped with hatred for Jews...”288 The national origin of the victims 
– that is, whether they were local Latvian Jews or had been deported to Rīga as specified in 
the indictment – was not an issue for the Court because the 1,000 German Jews were killed 
on the first day of the Rumbula Action. Arājs was convicted only on his participation on the 
second day – a day on which an estimated 13,000 victims were killed. 
As pertained to the guilt of the accused Arājs, the determinations and legal 
elaborations of the Court hinged above all on the so-called “subjective side” of the crimes. 
The Court concluded that Arājs had in fact not voiced anti-Semitic views prior to the German 
invasion, nor had he undertaken anti-Jewish actions until the arrival of Einsatzgruppe A’s 
commander, Dr. Walter Stahlecker, and that these were conducted upon German orders. 
However, once active, he was an enthusiastic organizer and participant. 
Thus it is not strictly correct to call the verdict very conservative in its estimation of 
the number of Arājs’s victims, because it does not claim to be a comprehensive tally. As the 
text of this verdict shows, Arājs was actually only convicted for his participation in murder 
during the second day of the Rumbula action – perhaps unsurprisingly given the unique 
concentration of eye-witness accounts placing him personally, as well as his Kommando, at 
the scene. That is not to say, by any means, that acquittal for lack of definitive evidence on 
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the other charges should be regarded as proof of innocence – especially not given the 
prerogatives of the historian to reach non-legal conclusions based on probability. In essence, 
however, as far as the prosecution and the judges were concerned, the other crimes in which 
Arājs could be accused of having participated were immaterial. The ruling on the second day 
of the Rumbula Action alone was sufficient for the most severe punishment available under 
West German law and held against all subsequent appeals by the defense, which continued to 
be made and rejected throughout the year 1980.289 
It was hardly the most glorious moment in the annals of jurisprudence. But it was 
enough. 
 
SUMMARY 
The End of Viktors Arājs 
In 1980, Viktors Arājs was sent to serve his sentence at the Justizvollzugsanstalt 
Kassel I, in the Federal State of Hesse. The Justizvollzugsanstalt (literally “Justice 
Enforcement Institution;” henceforward JVA Kassel I or simply “prison”) was situated in the 
small German city of Kassel, which more closely resembled a very large town. In a quiet, 
wooded valley ringed by large, distant hillsides, stood the prison. It had been built in the 
nineteenth century and resembled a fortress, although as the urban center of the city 
expanded, the prison found itself in the middle of a wooded and park-filled suburb. At a 
distance, the blocky steeple of the prison chapel rose above its surroundings. Its most 
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distinguishing feature was its four clock faces.290 
  Asked to speculate on why Arājs was sent to serve his sentence in Kassel, rather than 
simply remaining in Hamburg, which after all had perfectly adequate facilities, the chief 
operating officer of the Kassel prison in 2010, Director Jörg-Uwe Meister, did not think it 
unlikely that this decision was reached in order to put Arājs in closer proximity to the only 
human being on the planet Earth who had evinced any fondness for him or personal concern 
over his fate during the trial. Arājs’s wife from before the war and to whom he was still 
technically married, Mrs. Zelma Zeibots, apparently did not, although she was deposed 
several times for the purposes of the trial. Arājs’s mother, Berta, who was then living in 
Rochester, New York, did little more than supply the dates of birth of some of some family 
members for the Court in order to ensure the completeness of its records.291 It is possible that 
she refused to testify under Section 52 of the West German Criminal Code, which privileged 
various family members of a defendant in this regard. Indeed, to Arājs was left only the ill-
starred and anonymous Ms. Irmtraud Oedingen, ten years his junior – ill-starred for having 
had the cosmic misfortune of falling in love with a Holocaust perpetrator, and anonymous 
because no statements from her are known to exist, as far as this author is aware, making her 
unknowable to history. 
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 In prison, at least in 1987 and into 1988 – the period for which documents are 
available, though almost certainly in the preceding years as well – every few months, Arājs 
was allowed unsupervised, week-long visits to Frankfurt am Main to visit his only known 
friend, Ms. Oedingen.292 According to the recollections of two JVA Kassel I personnel who 
were serving during Arājs’s incarceration, Arājs collapsed dead in the barbican of the prison 
immediately upon his return from one such visit. His body was thence conveyed to nearby 
Burgfelder hospital where he was officially pronounced dead on 21 January 1988, at 08.45, 
of heart failure.293 
 So ended the life of Viktors Arājs at the age of 78 – eight years and one month to the 
day after his sentence had been pronounced. Excluding the years immediately following the 
end of the war which he spent in the hands of the British, but including his pre-trial custody 
by West German authorities in the mid- and late-1970s after he had been arrested, Arājs had 
spent a total of thirteen and a half years behind bars. This means that Arājs was jailed for 
about one year per 1,000 murders of which he was convicted – to say nothing of the greater 
number of murders in which the participation of Arājs is certain but which were considered 
by the Court as juridically unproven. 
 
The Latvians in West Germany 
 Although many distinct groups of Latvians living in different places and different 
historical contexts can be referred to – the Latvians before and during the war, the postwar 
Latvians in various Western countries and those who stayed behind in the Latvian SSR, and 
                                                           
292
 Undated and untitled document tendered to this author by the Leitender Regierungsdirektor JVA Kassel I, 
Herr Jörg-Uwe Meister, on 28 April 2010, headed “Der Leiter der Justizvollzugsanstalt Kassel I.”  
 
293
 Ibid. The guards remembered Viktors Arājs as a quiet prisoner who kept to himself and was left alone by the 
other inmates. 
 190 
 
the Latvians now living in independent Latvia and abroad – the story told in this chapter has 
mainly focused on those Latvians who were in Germany at the end of the Second World War 
and lived in West Germany during the 1960s and 1970s – that is, during the Cold War. 
What is to be said about them? We know that Arājs was once aided and twice 
‘betrayed’ by Latvians in prisoner-of-war camps; that at least one Latvian knowingly assisted 
him in obtaining a false identity and that the existence of a second may safely be presumed; 
that on one of the occasions on which he is believed to have been seen in public by Latvians, 
he felt anxious, became spooked, and left quickly, and in the other, it is uncertain how many 
at the gathering knew his identity, although at least one and probably many did and kept the 
secret; that the actual location and alias of Arājs was given to – and for ten years ignored by 
– the West German police by a Latvian; that the key individual ultimately responsible for his 
capture was a Latvian who seemed to welcome news of Arājs’s supposed assassination; and 
finally that similarly implicated Latvians hopelessly attempted to defend him during the court 
proceedings against overwhelming evidence, at least in part to assist their own cases.  
While the story told in this chapter hardly redounds to the great credit of the Latvians 
in West Germany, it is also not totally condemnatory. The understandable tendency toward 
in-group solidarity, especially under the circumstances of exile, appears not to have extended 
to the person of Viktors Arājs, as a rule. He was afraid to be seen by Latvians other than 
those he knew to have similar criminal pasts of their own. There is no known evidence 
proving that any member of the Latvian community in West Germany – with the specific 
exceptions of the aforementioned Alberts Spunde and Alberts Eichelis – at any time 
knowingly offered succor to the fugitive Arājs. Quite the opposite, in fact, seems to have 
been true. To the extent that his name meant anything and that he was on anyone’s mind – 
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with the advised exceptions of Žanis Unāms, Jānis Zirnis, and the latter’s mysterious pen pal 
who may have been identical with Unāms – Arājs seemed to have been considered an 
embarrassment best forgotten.  
 The duty of the prosecutors was to ensure Arājs’s conviction and punishment. They 
succeeded, however belatedly, to the maximum extent allowed within the framework of West 
German law, whatever its excessive restrictions and restraint – even if based only on a single 
count of the indictment. The duty of the historians now is to ensure that the successful efforts 
of the prosecutors are not wasted and that Viktors Arājs and his condemnation are not 
forgotten. Here, the prosecutors of Hamburg have given historians a trove of treasure, 
including volumes of testimony that might never otherwise have been generated – including 
those of Ella Medalje and Matis LutriĦš without which Arājs could conceivably had been 
freed. 
 
The Štāmers Reports 
While United States government participation in the investigation and trial of Arājs 
was minimal, some Americans were nonetheless very interested indeed in the Hamburg 
Court’s proceedings. Watching every single day from the cramped, glass-enclosed gallery in 
the rear of the courtroom was one Mr. Štāmers with his notebook.294 Over the course of the 
trial, this veteran of the Latvian Legion and informal permanent observer of the Court would 
eventually compose hundreds of pages of reports. Edited and condensed versions of some of 
these courtroom reports appeared in the New York-based Latvian periodical Laiks, or Time, 
and were regarded with some interest by at least certain individuals among the Latvia exile 
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community in the United States. Štāmers told anyone who asked – including public 
prosecutor Lothar Klemm who eventually became curious – that he was writing a book about 
the proceedings against Viktors Arājs. Štāmers also let Klemm know that he was particularly 
interested in the espionage allegations of the defense against certain Soviet-supplied 
witnesses, and that he himself had reservations regarding the use of Soviet evidence and 
testimony. Klemm quickly identified him as sympathetic to the defense and thenceforward 
avoided him.295 
Štāmers’s real purpose, however, was to serve as the eyes and ears in Hamburg of the 
American Latvian attorney, Mr. Ivars BērziĦš, who was paying him for the job. This 
partnership and the role of BērziĦš in the trials of accused members of the Arajs Kommando, 
among other defendants, living in the United States will be treated in a later chapter. In the 
meantime, though, our attention will turn to a kindred case that was gestating in West 
Germany’s eastern sister. 
 
The East German Connection 
 
Between 1977 and 1979, concurrent with the case against Arājs in Hamburg, another 
investigation of a suspected former member of the Arajs Kommando was proceeding in East 
Germany, although this case was hardly as subject to public view. On 3 August 1979, the 
Hamburg Court held a brief session. A rare request for aid had arrived on 8 July 1979 from 
the East German Attorney General’s Department of International Relations.296 It asked that 
the accused Viktors Arājs be questioned by the West German public prosecutor on his 
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wartime relationship with one Stanislavs Šteins. This man, Stanislavs Šteins, and through 
him, the East German system for prosecuting suspected criminals against humanity in 
general, is the subject of the next chapter.
  
CHAPTER 5 
EAST GERMANY: 
AN ELABORATELY SQUANDERED OPPORTUNITY 
OVERVIEW 
The case presented in this chapter was brought in the late 1970s against an ethnic 
Latvian named Stanislavs Šteins who lived in the German Democratic Republic. His captors, 
interrogators, prosecutors, judges, and jailors were part of the Ministerium für 
Staatssicherheit (MfS) or “Ministry for State Security,” more popularly known as the Stasi. 
The case has never been studied or cited in any scholarship until now. In fact, no one to 
whom this author spoke who was involved in the roughly contemporaneous Arajs 
Kommando-related proceedings elsewhere had even been aware that it had taken place.  
 A study of the case reveals two surprises. First, contrary to the popular image of the 
Stasi, its initial investigation was handled in such a way as to show a certain respect for the 
accused Šteins. While the procedure remained a far cry from real due process, the accused 
was not overtly coached, coerced, threatened, or even insulted – much less actually tortured. 
Neither was the investigation itself seriously marred by political interference or limited by 
ideological blinders. In fact, the investigation seems to have been genuinely concerned with 
establishing the facts – albeit quite ineptly, as it turned out. In the end, however, East German 
prosecutors and courts, likely for political reasons connected to the imperative of competing 
with West Germany in the zealous punishment of fascists, disregarded the meager and 
contradictory results obtained by the initial investigators and arrived at a resounding 
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conviction nevertheless. 
 Secondly, Šteins himself proved to be a remarkably adroit defender in this context. 
The fact that he was permitted to conduct anything like a competent defense (even if it was to 
have no effect on the ultimate outcome) itself shows something about the Stasi system. The 
character of this defense makes the case even more interesting: during his first year in 
custody, Šteins did his best to confess to all of the charges and to agree with the witnesses 
who testified against him about his membership in the Arajs Kommando. Then, suddenly, he 
reversed himself, and throughout his second period of questioning comprehensively 
withdrew his prior admissions. The unusual twists and turns of this confusing investigation 
and trial are the focus of this chapter. 
Although Šteins was convicted, the evidence when objectively viewed is 
inconclusive. Was he really a member of the Kommando? If so, what is the historical and 
evidentiary value of this investigation and trial to scholars of the Holocaust in Latvia?  And 
why did the East German regime not exploit it for its own didactic purposes?  If not, how did 
the East German Court reach the conclusion erroneously and what does that reveal about the 
nature of the system in which it functioned? What is to be learned from this case, and what 
more might have been learned had it been better handled? 
After a brief explanation of the overall extent of East German prosecutions of Nazi 
criminals and their collaborators, the chapter will introduce Stanislavs Šteins himself.  It will 
then enumerate the charges he faced, examine his two serial strategies in confronting them, 
and seek an answer to what may have lay behind them. After a look at the court’s verdict, the 
evidence will be reappraised. Conclusions will then be drawn about the case itself and its 
implications when considering the wider context of GDR prosecution of Nazi crimes. 
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The Statistics 
A group associated with the University of Amsterdam has published a register of 
those cases in the German Democratic Republic that dealt specifically with the murders 
committed by the Nazis. The group found that a total of 932 cases were investigated by the 
East Germans that were concerned specifically and exclusively with killings carried out by 
the Nazis [“NS-Tötungsverbrechen”], as distinct from other crimes.297 Unfortunately, it 
cannot readily be determined exactly how many of these crimes were, in fact, part of the 
Holocaust. Setting aside the 91 defendants in the sensational “Waldheim Trials,” East 
German authorities prosecuted 841 “regular” cases involving a total of 1,550 accused 
persons.298 Of these, cases, the sentencing breakdown was as follows: 
Death: 94 (8%)299 
Life imprisonment: 123 (8%) 
Lesser prison term: 1070 (69%) 
Other sanctions not including imprisonment (fines; loss of rights, property): 20 (1%) 
Acquitted / proceedings suspended: 241 (15%) 
 
Finally, in two cases, the outcome of the trial could not be determined by the compilers of the 
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study.300 
According to this compendium of data, scattered among these cases were a few 
involving accused people of foreign origin: three ethnic Germans of Yugoslavian citizenship; 
three Soviet citizens (one of whom was of ethnic German extraction); three ethnic German 
Czechs; one ethnic German Hungarian; twelve Poles (ten of whom were ethnic Germans); 
one stateless person; and two Latvians, one of whom was ethnic German.301 
That single ethnic Latvian was Stanislavs Šteins. Unlike in West Germany, where he 
would have faced the charge of murder, in 1977 in East Germany, he was charged with 
Crimes Against Humanity – as he would have been in the Soviet Union.   
There are easily understandable reasons why only one Latvian ever found his way 
into a courtroom in the German Democratic Republic on suspicion of having committed 
violent Nazi crimes. In the final months of the war, together with many Latvians innocent of 
collaboration fleeing the re-imposition of Communist rule, war criminals too sought to 
escape the returning Soviets. Latvians who found themselves in the Soviet occupation zone 
of Germany when hostilities ceased were more-or-less free to return to Latvia after a longer-
or-shorter stay in a filtration camp while they were evaluated as to their history and probable 
political reliability. In fact, repatriation to Latvia was officially encouraged for those who 
were released. However, any among their number who failed to satisfy the Soviets as to their 
innocence were dealt with directly by the Soviet occupation authorities, as a rule, well before 
the legal establishment of the East German state in 1949. Apparently uniquely, then, Šteins 
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avoided the initial Soviet options of either repatriation or punishment, and was only caught 
by the German Soviet satellite state decades later. 
A glaring question must be raised: just what is the relationship between Viktors 
Arājs’s arrest, investigation, and trial – which took place between 1975 and 1979 – and the 
virtually contemporaneous arrest, investigation, and trial of Stanislavs Šteins?  
Reasonably assuming that it was not a complete coincidence, one obvious theory 
presents itself: the East Germans put up their guard for political reasons once the Arajs 
Kommando resurfaced in the public eye in the West. It is known that Šteins travelled to the 
USSR without any difficulty in 1974 as part of his professional duties. However, preparing 
for an identical repeat trip in 1977, he was unmasked while his visa request was being 
processed. Perhaps the juridical hullaballoo and press coverage of the opening of the Arājs 
trial in West Germany had prompted the East Germans increase their vigilance and 
scrutinize, more than usual, people who had been of military age in Latvia during the war. 
Given the East German regime’s persistent criticism of West German laxity in prosecuting 
Nazis, it would have been very embarrassing if the latter’s investigation of Arājs turned up 
the names of former Kommando members who were then found to be living in the GDR. 
Once Šteins applied for his visa the second time, it was therefore probably not merely 
fortuitous that this time he was noticed, investigated, and arrested.  It was most likely a 
prophylactic measure against potential embarrassing revelations emerging from the Arājs 
trial and perhaps also a preparatory measure for a contrasting trial to be exploited 
propagandistically if Arājs were scandalously acquitted in the West.302 
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The Sources 
The source of this chapter’s information is the BStU: the Bundesbeauftragte für die 
Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutsche Demokratische Republik, 
or “The Federal Mandatory for the Records of the State Security Service of the Former 
German Democratic Republic.” As part of the process of German reunification, this entity 
was established in 1990 to preserve and control the records of the old East German Ministry 
for State Security – the official name for the Stasi. More specifically, the files upon which 
this chapter is based originated with the East German ZUV: the Zentraler 
Untersuchungsvorgang zur Untersuchung von NS- und Kriegsverbrechen, or “Central 
Investigative Body for the Investigation of National Socialist and War Crimes.” Established 
in 1965, it is fair to suggest that this body, the ZUV, was the East German counterpart to the 
Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen zur Aufklärungen nationalsozialistischer 
Gewaltverbrechen, or “Central Office of the State Ministries of Justice for the Investigation 
of National Socialist Violent Crimes” in Ludwigsburg, West Germany, which was 
encountered in the previous chapter. Here again, it appears that the GDR wanted to mirror 
the developments in West Germany to retain its self-proclaimed moral high ground and the 
mantel of being the more anti-fascist of the two postwar Germanys.  
It also needs to be stressed at the outset that unlike the records of the Arājs 
investigation and trial, here there are only the key court documents such as the indictment, 
the closing argument, the verdict, and a mass of raw depositions coming to around 8,000 
pages. There is nothing like the tremendous volume of interstitial documentation likes 
memos bouncing between offices, personal letters, and other background-level 
communications that were so helpful in fleshing out the story told in the previous chapter. 
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Thus, the behind-the-scenes aspects of this trial cannot be satisfactorily documented, leaving 
much to circumstantial conjecture and speculation. 
 
THE CASE 
Who was Stanislavs Šteins?  
Apart from the period of the second half of 1941 that ultimately formed the core 
controversy of the investigation, the multiple accounts of his biography and background are 
internally coherent, stable, and reliable. 
He was born in the hamlet of Rogali, near Daugavpils, in the eastern part of Latvia, 
on 27 January 1916 into a large peasant family. His educational upbringing was Catholic and 
quite abstemious. Under the influence of this upbringing, he never smoked and only made 
use of alcohol after the war.303 As can easily be inferred from his name – a combination of 
Latvianized Slavic and Germanic names – Šteins came from one of those places in Eastern 
Europe that was culturally, ethnically, and linguistically mixed. Born a subject of Tsar 
Nicholas II, he duly became a Latvian citizen with the advent of the independent state. Šteins 
was able to speak both standard Latvian and the Lattgallian dialect, in addition to Russian 
and the German that he usually spoke at home with his family.304 He would also have 
doubtlessly grown up well aware of Latvian Jews, as they made up a quarter of the 
population of Daugavpils at the time – the nearest real city and the second most important 
center of Latvian Jewish life after Rīga.305 However, no concrete details of any interactions 
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between Šteins and any Jews are established in the record. He never mentioned learning any 
Yiddish or Hebrew, in any case.306 
Both of his parents had died of natural causes by the time of his 22nd birthday in 1938. 
His two brothers, Jānis and Nikolai, remained on the family farm while Stanislavs decided to 
move to Rīga and get a professional education. Perhaps because of his multi-lingual 
environment while growing up, Šteins had aspirations to study philology and becoming an 
academic. He had, however, first to complete his compulsory military service. This he did 
between 14 May 1939 and 6 September 1940 – a crucial period in Latvian history. Šteins 
began his service with the Third Jelgava Infantry Regiment and received training as a 
machine-gunner. A few months later, in October, the “Mutual Assistance Treaty” was signed 
between the Ulmanis government and the USSR, whereby naval facilities, air stations, and 
army bases in Latvia were leased to the Soviet military. In his postwar interrogations, Šteins 
refrained from commenting on this development or on any encounters he may have had 
during this period with Red Army personnel. Despite the outright takeover and annexation of 
Latvia during his period of service, Šteins’s military status was not affected. He remained in 
the army until duly discharged with the rank of Corporal in September 1940.  
While serving, he apparently had also been preparing his application for enrollment in 
the University in Rīga.307 The new Soviet Latvian authorities did not interfere with these 
plans and allowed him to embark on a course of study in philology on 1 October 1940, taken 
along with mandatory classes in Marxism-Leninism and dialectical materialism. He also 
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began working as an editor of a Communist student newspaper at the University. However, 
within a relatively short period of time, he was to change his course of study several times. 
His willingness to shift his field of study as, under successive regimes he switched first from 
his original interest in Classical philology to Slavic under the Soviets and then, under the 
subsequent German occupation, to Germanic philology suggests someone eager – or at least 
willing – to tack his career to accord with the prevailing political winds. For his part, Šteins 
thought that descriptions of him as a “careerist and political animal of circumstance 
[“Konjunktur-politiker”]” based on actions such as these “seem to me a bit overly harsh 
[“überspitzt”].”308 But he obviously understood how it looked. 
Even though it worked against his own personal interests, Šteins was later willing to 
admit to investigating Communist East German authorities that he had been negatively 
disposed to the Soviets and Soviet rule in Latvia at that time and was actually 
nationalistically inclined.309 In one particular deposition, investigators noted with heavy 
bracketing on the transcript the following:  
Thus it was that we welcomed the German aggression against [Überfall auf] the 
Soviet Union with the hope that national [meaning bourgeois] Latvia would be 
resurrected [“wiedererrichtet”] as an independent state. I can recall in this connection 
that even before the invasion of the German troops, students would burn pictures of 
Stalin in the courtyard of the dormitory.310 
 
What happened next, that is, from July 1941 until the end of that year, was the core 
controversy of the investigation and trial. Leaving that key period to one side for the 
moment, the following was disputed neither by Šteins nor the East German state: Stanislavs 
Šteins spent 1942 and 1943 successively in the 27th and 23rd Latvian Schutzmannschaft 
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battalions in Ukraine and Belarus. While Šteins contended that his duties were relatively 
innocuous and relegated to guarding prisoners and occasionally hunting partisans, in fact 
much of such rear-echelon duty often involved “Jew hunts,” indiscriminate reprisal actions, 
and generally wonton acts of destruction. These activities were largely aimed at subduing the 
local population and protecting the German supply routes to the front, but much of the 
Holocaust in the Soviet Union – the “Holocaust by bullets” – was also conducted under the 
specious cover of “anti-partisan operations.” However, the GDR prosecution did not choose 
to follow up at all on what these battalions did outside of Latvia, especially as they related to 
the Final Solution. Instead, it focused, as will this chapter therefore, on Šteins’s activities 
during the second half of 1941. However, this was the largest opportunity missed by the East 
German investigators not only to convict Šteins on solid evidence but also to learn something 
useful about an important part of the Holocaust.  
Dangerously ill with paratyphus in 1944, Šteins was rotated back to Rīga, where a 
friend and former roommate of his who was working in a police office used his access to the 
machines there to produce false papers that identified Stanislavs Šteins as ‘Alexander 
Schrams.’ Šteins the linguist, for convenience, chose a false family name that also began 
with the same sibilant as his own: Schrams. The new birthday, 12 December 1918, was easy 
enough to remember and, perhaps as a vanity bonus, also made him two years younger.311 
Šteins kept the papers for the precarious future day that he apparently anticipated, but 
remained ‘himself’ for the time being. Once he had recovered his health, he was assigned to 
the Latvian Legion and evacuated to what was still called Gotenhafen as an officer in a 
sapper unit retreating westward. 
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In the final weeks of the war, Šteins’s unit disintegrated with the rest of the German 
and German-organized fighting formations. He destroyed his papers, burned the Waffen-SS 
uniform with which members of the Latvian Legion were attired, and threw his sidearm in a 
creek. The ‘Alexander Schrams’ who emerged became a sort of surrogate husband and 
protector to a German refugee woman three years his junior, together with her mother and 
two children, in the chaos of the spring and summer of 1945.312 “He was a sort of male 
guardian for me,” this woman, Irmgard Blosat, who had pretended to be his wife, would tell 
East German investigators decades later.313 As the few remaining troops nominally under his 
command peeled off in ones and twos to try their luck escaping the Soviets, Stanislavs Šteins 
stuck by this helpless family. Why he was unwilling or unable to exit the Soviet occupation 
zone is never clarified in the documents. Perhaps he had grown too attached to Mrs. Blosat. 
Whatever the reason, it is true that Irmgard Blosat, née Teifke, and her mother Ida Teifke, 
agreed to vouch for the identity of ‘Schrams,’ being in fact unaware at the time that it was a 
fictitious one. In exchange, he agreed to do whatever he could to prevent them from being 
harassed or assaulted by Red Army soldiers and to provide for Irmgard’s two infant children, 
Ingelore and Hans. By the time Irmgard’s real husband – whose civilian clothing ‘Schrams’ 
borrowed – returned from a British prisoner-of-war camp many months after the end of the 
war, ‘Alexander Schrams’ had satisfied the Soviet occupation authorities that he was 
legitimate and nonthreatening. ‘Schrams’ and Mrs. Blosat and her family remained friendly, 
if somewhat distant from one another, in the years after the war. Irmgard Blosat records that 
their separation was amicable, and her tone in the depositions – perhaps somewhat defiantly 
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– held unmistakable fondness for the man long after the mutual protection agreement of 
extreme circumstance that they forged had lost its purpose.314 
 Over the thirty or so years that followed the war, Šteins married, had two sons, and 
enjoyed respectable if modest professional success in the German Democratic Republic. 
Things were indeed going very well for him until 23 September 1977, when he was taken 
into investigative custody by the MfS.315 At that time, he was age 61. 
According to East German law, a Rechtsanwalt, sometimes one Mr. Langer and 
others one Mr. Horn to be specific, acted as defense counsel to Stanislavs Šteins.316 However, 
the input of these two people into the process is impossible to measure because it is 
conspicuously absent from the documents. One or both of them seem to have advised Šteins 
as to some of the laws of the Democratic Republic of Germany, because they are obliquely 
mentioned on very rare occasions. In contrast, the state prosecutor is omnipresent in the 
record. 
 
The Charges 
After two years of interrogation of the accused himself, the collection of documentary 
evidence supplied mainly by the Soviet Union, and the examination of 95 deponents other 
than the accused in the form of both contemporary recorded conversations and the 
consultation of older interviews conducted for prior cases, the two prosecutors, Mr. Busse 
and Mr. Krüger, concluded that Šteins had answered the German fascist counterrevolutionary 
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call, opposed Soviet power and the world’s first socialist state, and instead colluded in the 
fulfillment of imperialist war aims to exterminate millions of people and to enslave the 
survivors.317 More precisely, Šteins was ultimately charged with a series of criminal counts, 
which, when expanded, consisted of the following particular offenses:  
- Denouncing five Communist students, two of whom were captured and killed.  
 
According to the prosecutor: “After this dastardly betrayal, which by itself reveals the moral 
qualities of the accused, he sank step-by-step [“sank er von Stufe zu Stufe”].”318 He was also 
accused of: 
 
- becoming a member of both counterrevolutionary organizations: the Latvian 
Auxiliary Security Police (that is, the Arajs Kommando) and the Order Police (that is, 
the Schutzmannschaft); and during his membership, of: 
- arresting betrayed Communists in their apartments and taking twelve of them to 
fascist torture chambers, which was tantamount to their murder;319 
- confiscating and occupying a Jewish family’s apartment; 
- guarding 144 forced laborers who were Soviet citizens of Jewish nationality at the 
command of the occupiers; 
- taking part in the shootings in Biėernieki forest of 7,000 Soviet patriots and Soviet 
citizens of Jewish nationality, killing 54 of them himself; 
- escorting 6,000 victims over two days to their deaths in Rumbula; 
- shooting at least ten of these people personally on the way to Rumbula; 
- oppressing Ukrainian civilians as a lieutenant in a Schutzmannschaft battalion; 
- waging war of pillage [“Raubkrieg”] against the Soviet order; 
- exulting in the fascist war of pillage; 
- being an SS officer; 
 
and 
- registering under a false identity. 
 
Prosecutors added that 
[i]t would be unbearable – and those belonging to the millions of victims of fascism 
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could never comprehend [“begreifen”] it, that the murderer be allowed to live among 
us unpunished simply because he was successful in camouflaging himself from 
justice with a chain of lies and criminal dealings.320 
 
The word “anti-Semitism” literally does not appear in the prosecution’s closing argument. 
Jews are mentioned only as victims and as Soviet citizens and even then without a great deal 
of emphasis.321  
The inspiration for Šteins’s alleged crimes was “anti-communism, was hatred of 
Soviet power.”322 No man could abide Stanislavs Šteins walking free – “No man – unless he 
has the morals of a fascist,” that is.323 The punishment of life imprisonment demanded for the 
accused was, to the minds of the prosecutors, Mr. Busse and his second, Mr. Krüger, “a 
guarantee to forevermore prevent humanity’s return to fascist tyranny and horror.”324 
Furthermore, the application of the penalty of life imprisonment would make a salutary 
commemoration to the 30th anniversary of the founding of the East German state and its 
“consistent stance on the eradication of fascism.”325  
 The bombastic rhetoric contained in this document raises the question of whom the 
prosecutor was trying to impress. Most likely, the prosecutor adopted this type of language 
because it was simply the pro forma way of describing the crimes of the Nazis and their 
collaborators. The trial was technically “open,” but there is nothing to suggest that the case 
                                                           
320
 BStU ZUV 63 Band 27, pp. 315-316, 325. “Hoher Senat! Die Beweisaufnahme in der Strafsache gegen 
Stanislavs Steins ist angeschlossen.” Berlin, ca. September 1979. 
 
321
 For more information about the charges, also see : Also see: BStU ZUV 63 Band 27, pp. 8-18. Der 
Generalstaatsanwalt der deutschen demokratischen Republik. “Anklageschrift.” Berlin, 5 June 1979. 
 
322
 Ibid., p. 314. 
 
323
 Ibid. 
 
324
 BStU ZUV 63 Band 27, p. 331. “Hoher Senat! Die Beweisaufnahme in der Strafsache gegen Stanislavs 
Steins ist angeschlossen.” Berlin, ca. September 1979. 
 
325
 Ibid., p. 330. 
 208 
 
was intended to be a public spectacle in the grand theatrical tradition of the Soviet “show 
trials” re-established in the 1960s and 1970s in the USSR  
Extrapolating from the likely trigger that led to Šteins’s arrest – the imperative not to 
be one-upped or caught flat-footed in the competition to be perceived as the more 
uncompromisingly anti-Nazi Germany – it may be that his elaborate prosecution was a 
political insurance policy. If required, East Germany would be prepared to show that it, too, 
had taken a hard line against Latvian fascists. 
 
The Documentary Evidence 
 For documentary evidence furnishing the historical backdrop against which the 
alleged crimes of Stanislav Šteins took place and wartime documents pertaining specifically 
to the person of Šteins, the functionaries of the Ministry appealed very nearly exclusively to 
the Soviet Union’s experts in Moscow and Rīga.  
The background documents of greatest importance were a variety of excerpts from 
the findings of the Soviet Extraordinary State Commission that investigated German fascist 
crimes in the territory of Latvia.326 In addition to these, certified copies of internal documents 
generated by and captured from various Nazi German occupation authorities were 
supplied.327 German translations of Russian translations of select articles from the Latvian-
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language daily newspaper of record in wartime Latvia, Tēvija, or Fatherland, were also used 
to provide background, along with others from the official German-language daily, the 
Deutsche Zeitung im Osten.328 Like some of the witnesses, in many cases, these sources were 
identical to those offered to the Hamburg Court, as seen in the previous chapter, as well as to 
American authorities, as will be shown in the next chapter. 
  As for wartime documentation pertaining personally to Stanislavs Šteins, several – as 
it turned out, crucial – items were located by the Director of the Latvian SSR’s State 
Historical Archives and reproduced for the East German authorities. Chronologically, the 
first of these was the registry of an apartment building, showing that he moved in on 7 
August 1941, two days after the departure of a Jewish family.329 The second was a certificate 
from 29 November 1941 bearing his name and plainly indicating his membership in the Rīga 
Schutzmannschaft (Ordnungspolizei or “Order Police”) under the Latvian Lieutenant Colonel 
Osis.330 Lastly, there was his Waffen-SS certificate of service [“Dienstzeitbescheinigung”] 
sent to RuSHA, that is, Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt, or “Race and Settlement Main 
Office,” on 20 January 1944.331 Lastly, an SS- Freiwillige pay schedule [“Gebührniskarte”] 
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dated 21 March 1945 was recovered from the archive.332 
Several secondary source works were also given to the East Germans by the Soviets. 
Notably among these was Daugavas Vanagi – Who Are They? Whereas the West German 
legal system occasionally drew upon this work and others like it for hints but in general 
viewed this source very critically – that is, regarded it as something compiled and published 
for Cold War political purposes by the USSR – their opposite numbers in East Germany 
regarded it as utterly trustworthy and historically accurate on its face.333 
In sum: most of the documentary evidence unsurprisingly came from the Soviet 
Union. However, not all of the evidence came from Soviet sources. There were two curious 
exceptions. The first is that of the detailed and workmanlike study of the Order Police done 
by the West German Federal Archive which, incidentally, appears to have been largely 
ignored by the prosecutor and the Court.334 Secondly, the indispensable and complete 
collection of the “Situation Reports” from the USSR generated by the Einsatzgruppen was 
gathered as evidence, but from a most peculiar source: the National Archives in the United 
States, which had microfilmed the captured originals before returning them to the West 
German Federal Archives. This was probably done as a matter of convenience, obviating the 
diplomatic negotiations that would have been required to obtain the originals.335 
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The Witness Pool 
Most striking among the 94 individuals besides Šteins who were questioned (or who 
were deceased but whose prior testimony was consulted) in the course of the investigation 
was the assembled rogues’ gallery of convicted former Kommando members. The most 
important of these, for the investigators’ purposes, were deposed in Rīga, their 10 to 25 year 
sentences having already been served. As mentioned at the end of the previous chapter, 
Viktors Arājs himself was also questioned in West Germany at the behest of the East German 
prosecutors. In addition, there were a number of Holocaust survivors. A couple of former 
Schutzmannschaft and Legion veterans who had known Šteins during the war were 
questioned, but their testimonies never contained anything incriminating about the accused. 
In total, depositions from 23 witnesses, including Šteins – who alone, incidentally, provided 
more than 2,000 pages of statements over the course of the investigation – were presented 
with the indictment by the prosecutor.336 Three times as many had been consulted but, for 
various reasons, many deponents’ statements were not submitted to the Court with the 
indictment or presented in evidence. Not all, but a far greater proportion of witnesses than 
was the case for the parallel proceedings in West Germany against Arājs, were allowed to 
leave the Soviet Union to give their testimony at the trial of Šteins in East Germany: twelve 
ultimately appeared in person in the courtroom.337 
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 Statements from close to a score of convicted former Kommando members were 
supplied by the Soviet Union for the purposes of the East German investigation. Some of 
these were of mid- to late-1940s vintage, and their authors could not testify because they 
were dead – both by way of execution and of natural causes. These were meant to educate the 
East German investigators about the unit’s background in general and the character of its 
personnel generally, not to mention the gravity of its offences. Of much greater potential use, 
of course, were the testimonies of living former Kommando members who could actually be 
asked questions. Of these, three were prepared to testify against Šteins personally: the driver 
Jānis Bedelis and two regular troopers, Aleksejs Proškovičs and Jānis Vanders.338 The first 
two of these eventually became the most important witnesses in the case besides, as will be 
shown, Šteins himself. 
Testimony from Jewish witnesses including Matis LutriĦš and Ella Medalje – all of 
whom, like the former Kommando members, were residing in the Soviet Union – was of far 
less importance to the case the prosecution constructed. In the first place, none of the Jewish 
witnesses claimed any direct, personal knowledge of Šteins himself, unlike the 
aforementioned Kommando members. Copies of various pre-existing depositions were also 
provided by the Soviets but these were used by the prosecutors only to provide needed 
background. None of these old testimonies even identified Stanislavs Šteins by name, much 
less said anything specific about him personally. Therefore, these statements will not be 
considered further  here as they have little probative value into the questions involved in this 
chapter. Nor did they, because the trial was held out of the public eye, serve any larger 
didactic function to East German society. 
 Other categories of witnesses who could speak about Šteins specifically, such as 
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family members and various other acquaintances, were likewise of little importance to the 
prosecutors, Busse and Krüger, in terms of obtaining a conviction. However, some of them 
did in fact make important contributions to fleshing out the story of Stanislavs Šteins and 
thus are of historical interest. 
 
The Most Important Witnesses 
Of the three still-living former Kommando members who testified that Stanislavs 
Šteins had also been a member of the unit, two emerged as the prosecution’s most important 
witnesses. Their willingness to personally identify Šteins as a member during some of the 
wildest and bloodiest days of the Kommando’s rampancy was irresistible to the prosecution. 
Of all the witnesses, those from the Arajs Kommando placed Šteins closest to the killing – 
much closer than the several who had been acquainted with Šteins from the 
Schutzmannschaft or the Legion but who disappointed the prosecution in failing to connect 
him, however tangentially, to any specific crimes. However, while neither the East German 
prosecutors nor the Courts in Potsdam and Berlin thought so, there are serious grounds to 
doubt these testimonies and hence, to doubt Šteins’s membership in the Arajs Kommando. 
Jānis Bedelis was one of the three convicted former Kommando members who 
claimed to recognize Šteins from his service in that unit, and was likely the most important 
witness in the case besides Šteins himself. Bedelis was one of the Arajs Kommando’s 
dedicated drivers during the first bloody year of its existence and claimed to have personally 
driven Arājs himself to as many as thirty individual mass shootings. Giving testimony in 
Rīga in April of 1978, Bedelis identified Šteins as a former Kommando member. 
Immediately after saying that he could not remember the names of any of the shooters in the 
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Biėernieki Forest, he was asked specifically whether he knew “Steins, Stanislaw.” He replied 
that Šteins was of some importance in the office on Valdemars Street. In fact, he said he had 
driven a car with both Šteins and Arājs as passengers together: 
I knew a Šteins from our mutual service in the Latvian Auxiliary Security Police. 
When I took up service in the aforesaid police at the end of July 1941, this Šteins was 
already there. At the time, he was about 25 to 30 years old. He was shorter than me, 
although my height adds up to [beträgt] approximately 160 centimeters. He was of 
average bodily figure. I can no longer remember his hair color. I find it difficult to 
recall concretely his facial features. The overall impression of his face does stick in 
my memory, therefore I think that I could recognize him from a photograph. What job 
[“Dienststellung”] Šteins had in the Kommando, I don’t know, but I do remember 
that he was no simple soldier in the Kommando. I don’t know what rank he was. In 
the summer of 1941 I drove him downtown two or three times. Once, I remember, he 
purchased paper from a store and brought it to the Kommando. Where I drove him the 
other times, I don’t know. But it seems to me it was to some shops [“Laufläden” sic.]. 
His family name, therefore, stayed in my memory, because each time, on the way 
back to the Arajs Kommando, Šteins signed for the trip. Also, the other drivers turned 
to me when I drove away with him and asked ‘Are you driving again with Šteins?’ 
How long Šteins served in the Kommando, I cannot exactly say. But I do remember 
that when I relocated from the Latvian Auxiliary Security Police to the building of the 
former War College on Krischjans Barons Street around May or June 1942, Šteins 
was still in the Arajs Kommando.339 
 
He knew no one else in the Kommando with the last name of Šteins. It should be noted that 
basically every particular fact in these depositions of his conforms to the overall accepted 
understanding of the Kommando; there does not appear to be any false or mistaken general 
information. This knowledge extended to such details as the staff in the Headquarters canteen 
and the building’s general layout, addresses of sites of significance to the Kommando’s 
bureaucratic and administrative operations which he knew as Arājs’s driver, the 
Kommando’s uniforms and armament, the names of a number of confirmed Kommando 
personnel, the differences in escort procedures between Jewish and political detainees, and so 
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on.340  
While he also chanced to mention that the man he was describing never cursed – 
Šteins had, indeed, been brought up in a strict religious household – he also did not think the 
man in question spoke any language other than Latvian.341 When questioned again several 
months later, he could no longer remember the name of the person he had described, 
although this second description of the person’s role and activities was identical.342  
Aleksejs Proškovičs, a regular man in the Arajs Kommando, also claimed to visually 
recognize Šteins from the Kommando, although he could not name him and did not 
remember his name when given it.343 Nevertheless, he said that the person he recognized was 
already working in the Kommando when he joined sometime in the first half of July 1941.344 
However, he explained, he did not recall seeing him around for very long. He supposed that 
he left the Kommando before the onset of fall that same year. He added that he did not know 
what this person’s role in the Kommando was, but that at some point that summer, every 
member of the Kommando was obligated to participate in the shootings.345 This testimony 
was quite strong for the prosecutor in that it showed that Šteins had, indeed, been virtually a 
founding member of the Kommando and that every member at some point was required to 
take part in killing. This was probably the strongest and best testimony the prosecution ever 
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managed to produce. Later, however, after the case had been referred from the District Court 
of Potsdam up to the Supreme Court of the German Democratic Republic to confirm the 
ruling, Proškovičs stated that he could not “categorically” assert that he recognized Šteins.346  
The third and final of the Arajs Kommando witnesses who claimed to recognize 
Šteins was Jānis “The Tiger” Vanders.347 He claimed that Šteins looked familiar, although he 
likewise could not name him.348 According to his testimony, he recalled seeing the person 
identified for him as Šteins at a shirts-and-skins pickup basketball game between two teams 
of Kommando members in the summer of 1944.349 This purported game would have taken 
place, in reality, at about the time of Šteins’s transfer from a Schutzmannschaft battalion to 
the Latvian Legion – 26 September 1944, to be precise – and a year or more after the Arajs 
Kommando was completely dissolved.350 While misremembered dates are a commonplace in 
testimonies, especially those taken at a remove of thirty years, the magnitude of this temporal 
discrepancy and the vastly changed historical circumstances of those two summers offers 
some grounds to doubt the accuracy of Vanders’ memory. Indeed, at the level of East 
Germany’s Supreme Court, his testimony was dismissed. 
 Even more important than these three witnesses to the course of the investigation and 
the prosecution’s fixation on the question of Stanislavs Šteins’s relationship to the Arajs 
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Kommando was the accused as witness against himself. 
  
The First Defense Strategy 
 In view of the testimonies of these problematic witnesses, as well as later 
developments in the investigation as related below, the real question is whether or not the 
case of Stanislavs Šteins can properly be regarded as Arajs Kommando-related at all. Was he 
a member of the Arajs Kommando before transferring to the Schutzmannschaft in August 
1941, or was the Schuztmannschaft the first unit he joined and the only one he served in 
before his induction to the Latvian Legion? Certainly, the prosecutors insisted that he was an 
Arajs Kommando member first, and the East German courts confirmed it. However, 
reexamination of the evidence, including the voluminous testimony of Šteins himself, 
suggests that he may not have been. To resolve the issue, it is necessary to test his own words 
to his interrogators for their significance and discover the implications of the errors, 
discrepancies, and accurate claims that they contain. Even if it is true that he was not a 
member of the Arajs Kommando, however, it would not change the fact that the 
circumstantial evidence all but proves his participation in the atrocities against Latvian Jewry 
in the second half of 1941. But the finding of the Ministry for State Security and the path 
taken to arrive at it does illuminate interesting facets of the operations of the East German 
authorities in any case.  
There were two successive tracks to Šteins’s strategy when confronting the charges as 
they steadily accrued over the course of the investigation – not, of course, counting his 
unremarkable initial attempt to simply deny everything. Like Arājs, he admitted his true 
identity after having spent one night in a cell. But thereafter Šteins’s strategy could not have 
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deviated from that of Arājs more sharply.  
During approximately his first year in custody, Šteins set out to prove that his 
cooperation with his East German investigators was full and complete. He reasoned that if he 
was forthcoming, the Stasi would not have reason to extradite him, as he feared, to the Soviet 
Union. For with his true identity exposed, it was clear that he was really a Soviet citizen as of 
1940 and therefore, technically, a traitor. He logically presumed that he would be executed if 
given over to the USSR Also, he thought that creating the appearance of willing cooperation 
might have an ameliorating effect on his ultimate sentence. Also, he seems to have simply 
assumed that an acquittal was impossible. 
 To underscore his willingness to fully cooperate, Šteins almost never missed an 
opportunity to point it out when witness testimony or wartime documents corresponded to 
information contained in his own statements and thus seemingly corroborated the truth of his 
previous testimony. Importantly, however, in the narrowest sense, his cooperation with 
investigators cannot be called “active” because he did not generate new leads or volunteer 
more than he was being asked about, on a given topic. On the other hand, his attitude was 
clearly far more than “grudging.” Perhaps the best description of Šteins’s first, roughly 
yearlong, response would be “solicitous and eager to ingratiate, but not without some 
circumspection.” 
 It was first on 11 November 1977, less than three months into his questioning, that 
Šteins said that Viktors Arājs, leader of the Latvian Auxiliary Security Police, had been his 
commanding officer during the war. By the following summer, after reading the redacted 
statements of the above-mentioned former Kommando members, Šteins was prepared to 
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concede that he was in fact “a type of personal secretary to Arajs.”351 And circumstantially, it 
should be pointed out, his language skill-set and quasi-German background would have made 
him an attractive choice to Einsatzkommando 2 for work on the staff of the Arajs 
Kommando. Indeed, any collaborationist agency would have been happy to employ someone 
with his profile. 
Over time, Šteins began admitting to a lot of things and providing a lot of details. In 
fact, his testimony during this first year is striking in its seeming forthrightness and openness. 
The tone is quite different from that found in either Soviet or Western interrogations as well. 
Compared to the former, the protocols are much less rigid or formulaic; compared to the 
latter, the statements are much less guarded, grudging, and tight-lipped. The words 
exchanged between Šteins and his primary case officer, a Captain Muregger, had an almost 
conversational quality to their tone. 
Šteins seemed to simply know too much not to have been there. For example:  
- He knew the number of victims that would fit on a truck. 
- He knew about the armaments used by the Kommando. 
- He could explain in broad strokes the organizational evolution of the Arajs 
Kommando from a rag-tag band of freebooting gunmen with uneven training to a 
quasi-military outfit comprising several companies with a dedicated motor pool. 
- He was able to produce sketches of various killing sites, including Rumbula, with 
varying degrees of accuracy and detail.  
 
Šteins was also able to present a detailed description of his responsibilities in the first 
Headquarters of the Kommando. He was concerned not with the shootings, he said, but was 
occupied instead with office management and some liaison duties owing to his proficiency in 
both German and Latvian. He claimed to have explained personally to Arājs his 
qualifications, telling him that this sort of work had always suited him in the “bourgeois” 
Latvian army – he told his Stasi interrogators – better than “tactical exercises in the field 
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[“Gelände”].”352 Šteins said to the interrogators that “I was indeed in principle in agreement 
that the opponents of the occupation and also Jews would be shot, but wanted to leave this 
work to others.”353 
As he became more comfortable, Šteins also seemed to fall back into the wartime 
mode of speech, which fact also went far to convince the investigators of his participation in 
crimes against humanity.354 One telling sign was his casual use of the German word 
“Erledigung” and its grammatical variations, which are difficult to translate into English. In 
common usage across the armed forces of Nazi Germany, as well as sometimes in its press 
and propaganda, to make someone “erledigt” was to make them “done for.” Someone who 
had been “erledigt” was “finished,” was “a goner,” was “toast,” was “polished off,” or 
perhaps in the parlance of today “got wasted” or perhaps “got smoked.” 
QUESTION: What does “Erledigung” mean? 
ANSWER: I ask you to excuse the use of this word. Back then, in the service lingo 
[“dienstliche Sprachgebrauch”] we said this or that person got wasted [“erledigt”], 
which meant killed. The more dignified official terminology [“dienstliche 
Sprachbezeichnung”] for the killing of these people was “liquidation.”355 
 
While Šteins was being investigated for membership in Latvian (and therefore Latvian-
speaking) criminal units, he himself was a German speaker from childhood. At the very least, 
he heard Germans using the word. It is also quite plausible that the word was so current that 
it was learned by Latvian perpetrators during their interaction with their German 
counterparts, commonly adopted as their own slang, and not restricted to bi-lingual speakers 
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like Šteins. 
Indeed: Šteins got a lot of things right.  
But he also got a lot of things wrong about the key period in question when 
determining if he had ever been in the Arajs Kommando, that is, from July through 
December 1941. There were also some elements in Šteins’s stories that do not seem to 
correspond to known facts about the crimes committed, but which were accepted – and, 
eventually, insisted upon as true – by the East German prosecution. 
Here is one small example. In the summer of 1978, Šteins claimed that barrels of 
bleach were loaded onto the trucks carrying Arajs Kommando personnel to shooting actions 
in the Biėernieki Forest to be used for corpse disposal.356 While not totally impossible, this 
seems to have been an innovation on the part of Šteins, since this detail rarely if ever appears 
in the testimony of other convicted Kommando members – although it is known that lime (as 
distinct from bleach) was occasionally tossed into the pits before they were closed.357 
The frequent clumsiness of Šteins’s attempts to impress or placate his interrogators 
with emphatic statements of self-condemnation seeded with specific details is particularly 
naked in the following exchange:  
ANSWER: ...Based on these considerations, which I first made with this kind of 
precision only in the last few weeks, I would like to correct my previous statements 
and once and for all name the 20th of July 1941 as my entry date into the Latvian 
Auxiliary Security Police. 
QUESTION: According to the perennial [“immerwährenden”] calendar, the 20th of 
July 1941 falls on a Sunday. 
ANSWER: The 20th of July isn’t my exact entry date. Since it did indeed happen to 
be a Sunday, I would like to say that I joined the Auxiliary Security Police one or two 
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days before or after.358 
 
Šteins also seemed very confused as to the organizational relationships between or 
actual identities of the Arajs Kommando, Einsatzkommando 2, the Order Police, the Rīga 
Prefectural Police, the Schutzmannschaften, the actual “Gestapo,” – which term he initially 
used promiscuously – the distinction between the SS and the SD, and the key figures locally 
in command of each. Even accounting for the fact that the various police institutions of 
German-occupied Latvia were, indeed, confusing at the time, not to mention with the 
distance of about thirty-five years, Šteins’s recollections were rather exceptionally flawed. 
For a time, he was convinced that Arājs was a subordinate of Veiss and Osis: “With respect 
to personnel or also pro forma, the Arajs Kommando was subordinate to the Leader of the 
Latvian Schutzmannschaft (Rīga Order Service) with Veiss and Osis at the top.”359 He 
furthermore was confused over the nomenclature of the organization or organizations he was 
supposed to have been a member of, believing occasionally in the identity of “the 
Selbstschutz and the Auxiliary Security Police.”360 
Šteins’s descriptions of buildings and sites in Rīga that were significant for the 
Kommando were often vague in general and wrong in particulars. His description of his own 
recruitment initially bore little resemblance to that which members of the Kommando 
experienced, although it basically matched one possible method of induction into the Order 
Police. He claimed that he had registered on Merkel Street in the Rīga Old Town near the 
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famous Powder Tower, one of the city’s unmistakable downtown landmarks.361 Arajs 
Kommando recruits reported, according to the notices published in Tēvija and all accounts, to 
Valdemar Street 19. Later, Šteins would “correct” his memory and place himself at the 
proper locale.  
However, on that count, some of Šteins’s information – by no means always on the 
level of trivial detail – like the physical situation and general description of the first 
headquarters of the Kommando in which he purportedly worked he described wrongly and, 
in fact, quite backwards. He said, for example, that the headquarters building, if one was 
approaching from Old Rīga, sat on the right side of Valdemar Street on the other side of 
Elizabeth Street when in fact, from that vantage, the building would be on the left side of 
Valdemar Street before crossing Elizabeth Street. When immediately shown his error on a 
map and told that his description of the location did not comport with those of several 
witnesses, Šteins again immediately apologized, explaining that “Obviously I am in error.”362 
Of course, it is to be expected that an ordinary trooper might not have known or cared much 
about these things, but Šteins was, by his own admission and the testimony of two of the 
three convicted former Kommando members testifying against him, supposed to have been 
on the staff of the Arajs Kommando. 
Whenever it was pointed out to him by an investigator that his statements were 
inconsistent with the known facts, or in conflict with the statements of any of the witnesses 
(which were, it bears mentioning, redacted before Šteins was allowed to see them), Šteins 
almost always accepted the corrections and revised his statements to conform, usually citing 
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a “lapse of memory” or unexplained “errors.” In this manner, over the course of the 
interrogations, Šteins was gradually able to fill in the blanks and correct his mistakes – 
almost always with the input of the witnesses and with the help of the investigators. His 
statements about his wartime activities after January 1942 and his life after the war were 
marred by no such “errors” or “lapses of memory.” 
 
The Guilty Conscience of Stanislavs Šteins? 
During his closing argument at the trial itself, Busse, the chief prosecutor, told the 
Court that “I do not rule out that his confessions at that time [the early, pliant phase of the 
Šteins’s attitude] were the beginnings of regret and that he was prepared to cooperate in the 
illumination [“Aufklärung”] of the crimes.”363 And indeed, many of the interviews during 
that period read as though he was using the investigators, not at all to rescue himself, but 
rather to work with them, to help him better remember and relate to his captors the very truth 
that would condemn him.  
The background of all of this apparent helpfulness was the fact that, unlike Viktors 
Arājs, Stanislavs Šteins had actually created a real life after the war and to all appearances 
had been a productive, well-integrated member of GDR society. He was a law-abiding 
working-class family man: “My work served the strengthening of the defense-readiness of 
the socialist camp [“Lager”] and therefore also the construction of socialism in the GDR; it 
served the understanding and the deepening of the friendship between the GDR and the 
USSR”364 Relying on some concrete affiliations, awards, and accomplishments as evidence, 
                                                           
363
 BStU ZUV 63 Band 27, p. 322. “Hoher Senat! Die Beweisaufnahme in der Strafsache gegen Stanislavs 
Steins is abgeschlossen.” Undated. 
 
364
 BStU ZUV 63 Band 2, p. 104. Stanislavs Šteins. “Persönliches Niederschrift.” Berlin, 7 January 1978. 
 225 
 
Šteins tried to portray his post-1945-self as a diligent worker, a believer in German-Soviet 
friendship, and a committed socialist.  
 As already stated above, immediately after the war, Šteins, alias ‘Schrams,’ was 
questioned by the Red Army. With his fake papers and in part, at least, on the strength of the 
support of Irmgard Blosat and her mother, Ida Teifke, who pretended to be his wife and 
mother-in-law, respectively, and for whom he was acting as guard and escort, he was judged 
harmless enough and left alone.365 By November 1946, he was working as a translator and 
interpreter for a Soviet military engineer unit.  
The course of this unit’s operations brought Šteins to the defeated Nazis’ romantic 
coastal V-2 rocket facility of Peenmünde on the shores of the Baltic Sea, where he met Frau 
Herta Zemke. After she got pregnant, the two married on 23 December 1950. He later said 
that he “came to know and admire her as an honorable, hard-working, and sincere girl.”366 
On 3 June 1951, Stanislavs and Herta Šteins’s first son, Edgar, was born.  
Because he feared the unit commander’s suspicions of him and his patchy story 
regarding his wartime activities, he was greatly relieved to be released upon his own request 
from service with the Soviet military engineers. Šteins then began a yearlong stint as a 
teacher of the Russian language from 1954 to 1955.367 Thereafter, he picked up a job as a 
manager [“Disponent”] at a commissary [“Gemischtwaren-Verkaufstelle”] at a Soviet 
“military object” in Elstal in Brandenburg for a year, until he finally landed a permanent job 
in January 1956.368 He settled in as a worker at an industrial plant – a VEB, a Volkseigener 
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Betrieb or “People’s Enterprise” – in Potsdam, just outside Berlin. This professional security 
must have surely been welcome to both members of the couple, albeit for more than slightly 
different reasons. On 21 March 1956, the two had their second son, Axel.369 While they had 
been married in a religious ceremony six years earlier – Šteins recording before his 
interrogators how silly it was to have felt so scandalized at getting married as “a Catholic in 
an Evangelical church!” – their children grew up as “modern young people” with the 
“socialist consecration of youth [“mit sozialistischer Jugendweihe”].”370 
His wife, Herta, seems never to have been deposed for the purposes of the 
investigation or trial. Šteins said that his wife knew that his name was false, but the issue was 
only discussed on the occasion that he revealed it, and never again.371 Edgar and Axel, again 
according to Šteins, were completely in the dark about his wartime past.372 They do not seem 
to have been questioned, either, so it is possible that some legal protection against compelling 
testimony from the accused’s immediate family members was being observed. Interestingly, 
neither of his boys’ names were in the least bit Latvian – an external, but possibly internal 
way as well – for Šteins to put distance between himself and his past. After his arrest, 
however, Šteins told investigators that he did still consider himself a Latvian. Šteins also 
always signed his name on the depositions using the Latvian diacritic above the first letter of 
his name to signal the “sh,” rather than the “s” sound – a mark unknown in German 
grammar. Thus, he was writing his real name, in the correct Latvian way, for the first time in 
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more than thirty years. 
Soon after obtaining his good and steady factory job, in 1957 Šteins became a 
member of the FDGB, Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund or “Free German Trade Union 
Federation.” This was the officially-sanctioned overarching trade union federation in East 
Germany. Membership was hardly a noteworthy distinction, enjoyed as it was by the vast 
majority of the labor force. To have climbed even to his modest position, it was in fact 
probably a prerequisite. Still, he would remain a member in good standing until his troubles 
with the Ministry for State Security began. Not long after beginning this good job, in 1958, 
Šteins began spending his free time doing work for the DSF, the Gesellschaft für Deutsch-
Sowjetische Freundschaft or “Society for German-Soviet Friendship.” Over the years at the 
VEB, he was thrice given the award for “Activist,” and also earned a Medal for Outstanding 
Achievement.373 
Despite all of this, Stanislavs Šteins abstained from applying for membership in the 
SED, the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands or “Socialist Unity Party of Germany.” 
It was East Germany’s Communist Party. At the time, though, a substantial percentage of 
East German adults were members. This was not to be interpreted as disapproval of the Party 
or its ideology, as he carefully explained to Captain Muregger, his main interrogator. Rather, 
as much as he wanted to, he could not apply for candidacy because of the fear that heavy 
political scrutiny might become police scrutiny. He was “a Communist without a party” 
because of his “inglorious history that lay far behind.”374 Šteins said everything he could to 
the investigators to convince them of his contrition. 
On top of his decent career and modest accolades, Šteins also went as far as to try to 
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cast himself as a quasi-martyr for standing up to his wife and West German in-laws with 
respect to politics: 
Among the many relatives of my wife whom I met in West Berlin were her sister and 
brother-in-law – the Rosenberg family. We visited one another in Schmachthagen, 
they came to our wedding in Rügen, and we also travelled with them later, when we 
lived in Brieseland or Rehbrücke. As his father did in his time, so also Hans 
Rosenberg worked from the very start at Siemens. The conversations during our visits 
mostly had to do with harmless family matters. The Rosenberg family did not want to 
listen to politics. During one conversation about Hitler Germany, they began to praise 
‘the merits of the Führer.’ Upon my counterarguments, we got into a fight; owing to 
the mediation of the women, I had to give it up as a hopeless case. Perplexed, I 
followed the harmful impact of the open border to West Berlin: encroachment 
[“Vorschub”] of profiteers and [their] blackleg scams, commodity and currency 
manipulation, headhunting of labor and the intelligentsia as well as many others. The 
logical countermeasures of the GDR – the closure of the border on 13 August 1961 – 
took our family with divided feelings. My wife mourned the lost possibility to meet 
with her sister. [But] Apart from the advantages for the Republic, this situation was 
personally better for me as well: so many unpleasant confrontations were thereby 
spared me. At the beginning of the 1970s, familial visits from the West were again 
allowed. We even invited the Rosenberg family to visit us a couple of times. The 
family’s joy was tremendous, but not of long duration. The factory suggested to me 
that, as a holder of secrets, I give up these visits. To me, this was understandable, but 
hardly to my wife and her sister. My wife wanted to divorce me for this reason. Only 
with difficulty, I managed to coax my wife to the right choice: to forego visits with 
her sister in favor of me.375 
 
Mrs. Zemke, like Ms. Oedingen in the previous chapter, cuts a tragic figure. 
Šteins tried to convince the investigators that he had the zeal of the convert in his 
breast. He voiced the approved government line: the West tried to sabotage the East with 
their corrosive and exploitative economic system. He had therefore approved of the necessity 
of the construction of the Wall. The Federal Republic of Germany was the successor of Nazi 
Germany, and he had personally taken a stand for socialism at the cost of familial comity 
twice: first when confronting an unreconstructed fascist brother-in-law, and again when his 
wife threatened to leave him because his security clearance voided the possibility of cross-
border familial visits. He also stressed his trustworthiness: he had been deemed responsible 
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enough to possess information sensitive to the GDR and was willing to protect it even at the 
potential cost of his marriage. 
An interesting question arises. Is there any chance that Stanislavs Šteins was a 
genuine convert to Communism? The question is of interest because it bears on the ex post 
facto attitudes of a possible war criminal towards his misdeeds. The reasons behind Šteins’s 
supposed conversion may only be guessed at. Three ideas spring to mind. 
First, as will be explained more fully below, both Šteins’s uncontested membership in 
the Schutzmannschaft and possible prior membership in the Arajs Kommando, mean that he 
at least witnessed, if not personally committed, war-crimes as a matter of practical certainty. 
Possibly, Šteins recoiled after the war at what he had once been a part of, and what he knew 
from personal experience was hardly a mere artifact of Soviet propaganda. Could he have 
thrown himself into the Communist project, attempted to reform his own thinking, to redeem 
himself of the horrors of the atrocities – those of others and, perhaps, his own? There is no 
telling. 
 A second theory recommends itself as well. Might the psychological phenomena 
surrounding cognitive dissonance play a role? As an inhabitant of an inescapable, officially 
Communist country, might Šteins have simply, over the course of his thirty years of life 
there, conformed to Communism first only because there was no choice, and gradually 
because there was not even the idea of a choice? He may have simply become a Communist 
by default; while acting like a Communist, any secretly held Latvian nationalist or perhaps 
even fascist views would presumably erode over time. It would be a matter of psychological, 
no less than physical, self-defense. Indeed, by the time of his arrest in 1977, he had spent – of 
his 61 years – 28 in the GDR, and an additional four in the Soviet occupation zone before 
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that state’s foundation, plus a further year under Soviet occupation in his homeland: 33 years, 
or more than half of his life and the large majority of his adult life. On the other side of the 
ledger, his first couple of years were under Tsardom and the chaotic detritus of its collapse, 
another 15 in a parliamentary democracy, six under the Ulmanis dictatorship, and four under 
the Nazis: a total of 28 years, albeit the most formative ones. 
Finally, the conversion itself is subject to real doubt. There is every possibility, 
perhaps even likelihood, that it was opportunistically feigned: a simple tactical smokescreen. 
As to his original family in eastern Latvia, the only two left at the end of the war were 
his brothers, Jānis and Nikolai. Šteins had been afraid to contact them, believing that doing 
so would put himself in danger.376 He had seen neither since 1944. According to Šteins, these 
two had always been deliberately kept in the dark about his activities during the war.377 After 
1944, Šteins could learn nothing of their fortunes, and they nothing of his. Unbeknownst to 
him, his eldest brother Jānis, had died in 1948, apparently in circumstances connected with 
his epilepsy. His widow and Stanislav’s acquaintance in the mid-1930s, Nadezhda Petrovna, 
thereafter married his other brother, Nikolai. All of this Šteins learned of only during the 
pretrial investigation.  
The documents, even Šteins’s own depositions themselves, indicate nothing about his 
reaction to the sudden news of his brother’s death, nor the seemingly unseemly marriage that 
it precipitated.378 Did Šteins, after his capture, actively ask after his old – one almost 
spontaneously says “former” – family? Had he simply long-since written them off? How 
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much did it seem to him, with the passage of years, like someone else’s family? This cannot 
be known, although outwardly he seems to have made a clean break. His visit to the USSR in 
1974 did not have Latvia on the itinerary. 
 For their part, both Nikolai Šteins and Nadezhda Petrovna Šteins were expeditiously 
deposed in connection with the Šteins case in mid-1978. Investigators quickly realized that 
neither had anything useful to add. Their statements about the life of the accused prior to the 
war conformed to Šteins’s own, and neither had anything of interest to add about the war 
years. They added nothing to the case of the prosecution nor, for that matter, did they offer 
much to the accused by way be being beneficial character witnesses.379  
Their feelings, like those of Stanislavs himself, are impossible to discern in the 
documents. It is not clear what, if any, personal contact was allowed between the prisoner 
and these surviving relatives, or if either party even desired any personal contact, during or 
after the investigation. They were not called to testify at the trial, and presumably did not 
attend. 
This was the postwar life of Stanislavs Šteins’s right up to his arrest on 23 September 
1977, when he was taken into investigative custody.380 As has also been related above, his 
initial response to his investigators from the Ministry for State Security – once past the brief 
phase of reflexive denial – was, to all appearances, to be as helpful to them as possible, even 
at the cost of doing detrimental damage to his own defense. This level of cooperation from 
the accused, along with his at least pretended identification with his accusers (as just 
described) and apparent repudiation of his ‘old’ self and all connected to it, is striking enough 
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to make this an interesting case study. But what Šteins did next and how the investigators 
responded, made the case even more unusual and perplexing. 
 
The Last Defense Strategy 
After several months of tentatively experimenting with a new strategy on minor 
matters, on 12 January 1979 Stanislavs Šteins dropped the bombshell: full-scale, blanket 
retraction of all self-incriminating statements material to establishing the crimes he was 
alleged to have committed during the period of the second half of 1941. While denying 
nothing in his previous statements regarding his service with the Schutzmannschaft and the 
Latvian Legion nor his prewar and postwar biographies, Šteins very specifically limited his 
disavowals and retractions to the second half of 1941. In other words, his drastic amendments 
to his story were confined to the core of the case the prosecution had been building especially 
with the aid of the three former Kommando members highlighted above. This new strategy – 
beginning on that day in January 1979 and lasting straight through the trial and the 
confirmation of the Potsdam Court’s ruling by the Supreme Court of the German Democratic 
Republic at the end of that year – was a 180-degree reversal from his prior posture of 
cooperation and acceptance. Šteins attempted to nullify, comprehensively and point by point, 
his prior admissions of guilt by a variety of ingenious – and taken individually, usually quite 
plausible – rationalizations. In effect, Šteins was, bizarrely, trying to convince his 
interrogators that he was ‘coming clean’ by asserting (since “admitting” hardly seems to be 
the right word) his innocence.  
The investigators seem to have been genuinely stunned by this sudden reversal. 
Although the investigators noticed that Šteins had begun making apparently tactical denials 
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contradicting prior self-incriminating statements precisely on 29 August 1978, these were 
regarded by Captain Muregger and Major Engelhart, his superior and supervisor, as probes to 
determine how much real evidence was really in the possession of the prosecutor.381 This 
assumption was obvious, for there was no legal obligation incumbent on the prosecution in 
the GDR comparable to discovery in an American court (even if not always respected).382 
This type of behavior on the part of the accused was one of the results that could be 
anticipated and parried as a matter of routine by the questioners. And had they taken these 
probes more seriously, they may not have been caught as unprepared as they were in the 
actual event of Šteins’s full-blown retraction. Instead, quite unexpectedly, a brick wall had 
been placed before them after what had been a long period of remarkably fruitful ‘progress,’ 
with interrogations occurring weekly or bi-weekly as Šteins’s admissions and revelations 
steadily flowed and Captain Muregger tried to keep up with them. 
After first conducting a snap psychiatric evaluation of the accused, a new tactic was 
developed by the questioners. 383 Attention to the dates of the protocols shows that the sudden 
change of course was immediately followed by an unprecedentedly intense barrage of rapid-
fire interrogations and follow-up interrogations. They would confront Šteins with very 
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specific pieces of information, one after the other, that he had supplied in an attempt to prove 
that the knowledge was indeed his own. Sometimes, the information had been covered a year 
or more prior to the test. In effect, these were what Captain Muregger and Major Engelhart 
hoped would prove to be ‘gotcha’ questions. Šteins correspondingly either accurately 
articulated or, depending on one’s interpretation, craftily fabricated an intricate series of 
methods by which he had been able to make statements and supply information that he 
believed would please the interrogators, even though, he now claimed, he actually knew 
nothing incriminating from firsthand experience. 
To do this, Šteins adduced a complicated series of educated guesses, logical 
deductions, extrapolation from ordinary background knowledge commonly available, 
information suggested by fellow inmates, or based on cues he received from the investigating 
officers. He attempted to show that his “seeming” familiarity with details of the organization 
of, and various crimes committed by, the Arajs Kommando came not from personal memory, 
but from a whole series of relatively innocent or innocuous sources. He announced that: “All 
of the statements about that [the second half of 1941] are based on some information from 
the investigating officers and on thought-out compositions [“ausgedachten Kombinationen”] 
I developed on my own.”384 
In a number of instances, Šteins claimed that the investigators themselves directly 
related certain pieces of information to him, which he was later to regurgitate and present as 
his own knowledge or memory. For example, Šteins explained away one bit of his apparently 
detailed knowledge of killing operations at the level of the ordinary trigger-puller this way: 
ANSWER: You had asked me what sound is produced by the impact of a bullet with 
a head. Because I didn’t know that, you said to me that it is a muffled, splashy 
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[“dumpf klatschendes”] sound. Thereupon, I said ‘yes, so it was,’ even though I had 
really never heard something like that. I cannot offer anything else in answer to this 
question.385 
 
Because the prosecution gradually allowed its case to become so reliant on the self-
condemnation of the accused, leading their star witness (the accused himself) was a 
potentially debilitating Achille’s Heel for the entire mission of the prosecution when the 
witness turned from cooperation to denial.  
However, not all such contamination was as blunt as putting words in Šteins’s mouth 
outright, as he claimed. Beyond leading questions, the investigators, also according to Šteins, 
revealed satisfaction or dissatisfaction with his statements through body language. Šteins 
contended that the investigators’ leading questions as well as other behavior helped him to 
“construct” his narrative of the war years as the whole process wore on: 
ANSWER: Captain sir! By way of dubious or quizzical follow-up questions 
[“zweifelnde Rückfragen”], facial expressions, and the like, you gave certain 
indications to me, out of which I could extract hints as to whether my answers to a 
given question were correct or incorrect.386 
 
According to the new defense strategy of Šteins, he had also brought to bear 
deductive reasoning to render acceptable statements to the investigators: 
ANSWER: Based on the allowance dropped by the investigator 
[“Untersuchungsorgan”] that two marksmen always fired upon each victim, I came up 
with how it may have been. I rationally arrived at the conclusion [“erriet praktisch”] 
that in each case there were twenty men in the firing squad and ten victims were shot 
at a time.387 
 
He could have added that the idea of the Biėernieki victims being shot in groups of ten is 
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found in the deposition of Jānis Bedelis, one of the three convicted Kommando members 
who, by the lights of the East German prosecution, credibly testified against Šteins 
personally.388 In addition to substantiating the claim that these victims were shot in groups of 
ten, one of Alexei Proškovičs’s depositions also says that the firing squad consisted of twenty 
shooters who divided themselves into two groups and alternated with one another.389 
Šteins offered many examples of simply employing logical guesswork to reach his 
conjectures, which he had then presented to the investigators as firsthand memories, such as: 
ANSWER: From the size of the [Rumbula] Action, I have concluded [“kombiniert”] 
that it must have begun very early. The columns of victims must have also been very 
large and brought to the shooting by the shortest path. The shooting site therefore 
must not have been at the opposite end of the street relative to the position of the 
Ghetto, but rather in its nearer environs. Otherwise I could not correctly have 
guessed, given the size of the Action, that multiple transport teams [conveying the 
columns] were active which, for reasons of time, were brought back to the city by 
truck [to receive their next column for escort].390 
 
Somehow, Šteins had also apparently been routinely allowed by his captors to chat 
with his fellow inmates. Incredible as it sounds, he appears to have been incarcerated along 
with a population of more than one Ukrainian convicted of committing fascist crimes with 
whom he was evidently allowed to communicate during the investigation. From these 
persons, Šteins claimed to have learned a great deal about the details and logistics of killing 
operations, at least as they occurred in similar killings conducted in Ukraine:  
ANSWER: If the location of the collection points – 40 meters removed from the pits 
– was made known to me via suggestions [“Andeutungen”] from you [Captain 
Muregger] I don’t know anymore, but it’s possible. That the victims at the collection 
points were forced to sit before their murders, I know from my fellow inmates 
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[“Zellennachbarn”], with whom I have often consulted.391 
 
The record offers no indication that Captain Muregger or Major Engelhardt attempted to 
discover the identity of these “fellow inmates.” Perhaps they already knew to whom Šteins 
was referring, or their efforts in this direction were simply omitted from this record group. 
Furthermore, enough general information was floating around in the ordinary press 
and in literature, Šteins maintained, not only to provide a general framework upon which to 
build his descriptions of the crimes, but also to allow him to offer seemingly intimate details: 
ANSWER: It was likewise given me to know from post-1945 literature that before a 
dangerous assault, alcohol would be distributed to the soldiers. Since the [mass-
]shooting of people is also not an everyday affair, I thought to myself that the 
marksmen of the firing squads, in order to suppress their inner impulses, also received 
alcohol. That this was actually the case is purely coincidental.392 
 
This is also how he claimed to have correctly told investigators about the distance between 
the perpetrators and their victims during the actual moment of shooting.393 
Also, like basically all men of his generation and from that part of the world, Šteins 
had a certain knowledge base regarding military hierarchies, equipment, administrative 
procedures, and the like – not only from his experiences in German-organized formations, 
but his prewar military training in independent Latvia, as well. 
ANSWER: I took from my knowledge of the military from my term of service with 
the bourgeois Latvian army – about the structure of military units of the period – and 
thought to myself that such a thrown together [“zusammengewürfeltes”] Kommando 
at first could only have had a ramshackle [“lockere”] structure that was modeled after 
standard units like platoons and companies... I would have had to have understood 
absolutely nothing about military units not to have ‘accidentally’ guessed this [“um 
                                                           
391
 Ibid., p. 19. Also see: Stanislavs Šteins. “Vernehmungsprotokoll.” Berlin, 25 January 1979. These were 
Ukrainians convicted by the German Democratic Republic of Nazi crimes. These are also the same fellow 
prisoners Šteins alleged to have told him about how many victims would fit in a truck from the period, among 
other advices. See: BStU ZUV 63 Band 25, p. 14. Stanislavs Šteins. “Vernehmungsprotokoll.” Berlin, 25 
January 1979. 
392
 BStU ZUV 63 Band 25, p. 19. Stanislavs Šteins. “Vernehmungsprotokoll.” Berlin, 25 January 1979. 
 
393
 Ibid. 
 
 238 
 
nicht so einen Zufall zu treffen”].394 
 
Šteins simply adduced general recollections from the war. He said that he his statements had 
also been informed by recollections of wartime conversations, rumors, general impressions, 
and the overall Zeitgeist. Furthermore, Šteins claimed, the lies he was telling investigators 
about the wartime events he was supposed to have taken part in snowballed over time. One 
lie, once established as correct, naturally led to the need to fashion a new series of lies which 
were the logical corollaries to the first. Once begun, there was no way to apply the brakes. 
For example: 
These statements are based on the fiction already set forth by me about the instruction 
to shoot weak Jews who remained behind [during the Ghetto clearing that was the 
first phase of the Rumbula Action]. Since during such large transports there are 
always some who hang back, I couldn’t suddenly just say that none were shot in our 
transport. That would have been completely illogical. So I had to make up that during 
the transport that I was allegedly with, Jews were shot on the roadside. I went on to 
preempt the question and straight away, as self-condemnation, said that I too had shot 
some on the side of the street.395 
 
Cobbled together, all of these things, asserted Šteins, enabled him to create what only 
seemed like a credible firsthand account of the atrocities of the Arajs Kommando and his 
supposed participation in them. 
At the same time he was making these retractions, Šteins also stood by his prior 
admission, perhaps truthfully or perhaps tactically, of having committed lesser offences 
during that critical six-month period in 1941, such as the denunciation of pro-Communist 
students with whom he had been acquainted during the preceding year of Soviet rule, or the 
overseeing of Jewish forced labor. The effect, he must have hoped, would be to enhance the 
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seeming credibility of his other denials, even though the evidence for these other charges (in 
contrast to his proven membership in the Schutzmannschaft battalion) were even flimsier, 
lacking even witnesses such as the three Arajs Kommando men and were instead based only 
upon his own prior confessions. 
As to his false postwar identity, Šteins claimed that he had feared for his life as an 
officer in the fascist armed forces first and foremost. In particular, this status made him 
subject to capricious abuse or revenge punishment or even summary execution by any 
member of the Red Army who felt inclined to mete it out, telling his questioners that “I used 
this document to save my skin: if someone, namely from the Red Army, had discovered me 
as a years-long opposing officer, the least that I had to fear was that someone in the first 
understandable [moment of] fury would mercilessly beat me up.”396 This generic reason is 
not, as his first original defense strategy would have had it, because he feared that his specific 
deeds from 1941 might be uncovered and that he would, as a result, face specific charges and 
possible execution. Now, he offered instead the story that he had gotten stuck with the false 
name after adopting it simply because of his status as an ordinary officer fearful of grassroots 
proletarian vengeance. Even when the danger had passed, after having built his new identity 
in the years following the war, he said he realized that there was no way to simply resume 
using his real name. 
Now there was no going back, I had to stay with this saving name. In the course of 
the following years, when it was necessary on various occasions to make specific 
statements on the period 1941-1945, I was forced to make these statements up. I had 
to stand by these statements as long as the Schrams name retained validity. This is the 
explanation for my persistent lies.397 
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In other words, he had become irreversibly trapped in what had begun as simply an expedient 
for personally avoiding collective punishment at the hands of the Red Army. Yet, this hardly 
explained his foresight in 1944 in procuring the false documents which he would only use 
much later. Few Legionnaires, including officers, would have taken pains to adopt a false 
identity unless compromised by their past before joining the Legion. 
As for his remarkable sketches produced during his cooperative phase, Šteins 
explained, for example: 
On the basis of instructions from you, Captain sir, I made a sketch of the locations of 
the shooting positions in the Biėernieki Forest. Bearing in mind theoretical 
considerations [“gedanklicher Berücksichtigung”], I correctly identified [“richtig 
getroffen”] the location of graves 4, 5, and 12, as the sites of mass shootings in the 
summer of 1941 on the Soviet sketch provided for me with more than 30 graves [on 
it]. Thereupon I was additionally given [to understand], that at that time [summer 
1941], shootings were conducted close to the street [“an der Strasse beginnend”] and 
thence ever deeper into the forest, and deduced from that the graves numbered 4, 5, 
and 12 on the Soviet sketch, which lay closest to the street. [The fact] [t]hat these 
logical considerations accord with the actual findings does not lie with me.398 
 
As the investigators doggedly did their duty trying to deconstruct the denials in detail, 
the tone of Šteins’s replies gradually took on a repetitive and weary – or perhaps even 
impatient – tone. More and more frequently, rote declarations begin to appear in the 
transcripts that this or that statement was not based on personal experience but rather a 
fiction and that he could, therefore, not offer any factual enhancement.399  Šteins’s 
increasingly bold attitude as he flaunted his cleverness for months on end obviously shows 
that he was not subjected to physical coercion and felt safe from immediate repercussions. 
Reading the questions of the interrogators during these months, it takes little imagination to 
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detect marked frustration on the part of Captain Muregger and Major Engelhart regarding 
their by-then quite familiar and previously compliant captive.   
On 22 February 1979, close to two months after his total embrace of the new strategy, 
Šteins decided that he had had enough. “I am of the opinion that I have been sufficiently 
[“genügend”] deposed on [the subject of] my actions in the second half of 1941 and on my 
retractions in connection with these. I will not answer further questions in connection with 
this.”400 If the terror of his investigators and the extradition to the USSR that he first 
presumed awaited him had ever been real, it had clearly vanished by early 1979. These are 
not the words of someone afraid of his interrogators.  
Indeed, at that point the interrogations of Šteins largely ceased.401 The investigators 
gave up on the idea that he had anything else useful to say. While Šteins awaited his fate over 
the following months, they concentrated their efforts instead on deposing other witnesses in 
preparation for the trial.  
To the very last, Šteins denied having ever shot anyone. 
 
The Reasoning of Stanislavs Šteins 
What had changed? Why did Stanislavs Šteins suddenly turn his entire previous cost-
benefit analysis – such as it was – upside-down and abandon the strategy he had been using 
for well over a year? Attempts to mentally reverse-engineer the reasoning behind his change 
in strategy must necessarily remain speculative, but some hypotheses do recommend 
themselves by way of explanation. First, Šteins himself put forward a multi-layered 
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accounting of his sudden change of heart. However, there is a more persuasive explanation. 
To begin with, he does not seem to have chosen his timing based on any specific 
objective. For example, he could have tried to maximize the disruption caused to the 
prosecution’s case by unveiling his new strategy right before, or perhaps even during, the 
Main Proceedings, once the dates were set. Instead, he seems to have simply plunged into 
full-scale denial randomly one day, after some months of extending more-or-less cautious 
feelers to determine what his opponents actually knew beyond what he had been telling them.  
On ordinary days, Captain Muregger alone handled Šteins’s interrogations. Evidently, 
with the turmoil Šteins’s abrupt reversal was causing to the investigation, his superior, Major 
Engelhart, began to take an ever more active and hands-on role. His signature on the bottom 
of the depositions, very rare when the case was being smoothly constructed with the 
cooperation of the accused, appears more and more frequently at this terminal stage. Many 
times, he asked Šteins why he had been so eager to falsely incriminate himself. And many 
times, the same reply would be made: 
When I was arrested, I knew that I was living under a false name and was actually a 
Soviet citizen. I told myself that if I made no statements, I would be evaluated as 
stubborn [“als verstockt eingeschätzt”] and extradited to the Soviet Union for treason 
[“Vaterlandsverrat”]. I could not do that to my family. My wife wouldn’t have 
survived it. I was afraid that witnesses would possibly testify about things that I have 
forgotten and that it would be easier for me to pre-empt you with confessions [“ich 
ihnen mit Geständnissen zuvorkomme”]... I know that I am in a Catch-22 [“daβ ich in 
der Zwickmühle sitze”]. The Captain has already put that very same question to 
me.402 
 
To the bewildered and fearful mind of a suddenly arrested Stanislavs Šteins in 1977, if 
perhaps not in actual reality, the Soviet Union implicitly served as a giant ‘Bad Cop’ to the 
East German ‘Good Cop.’ His initial fear of extradition and possible execution in the USSR 
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can probably be taken at face value. Although the record nowhere shows that it was ever 
actually explicitly threatened by the authorities, Šteins frequently adduced his fear that he 
would be sent to the Soviet Union as punishment if the investigators were not satisfied with 
his level of cooperation. 
 As his fear of extradition to the USSR had gradually abated, Šteins explained, he felt 
more confident that he could tell the actual, self-exculpatory truth: 
Today I have so much trust in the investigating officials that I no longer fear 
extradition to the Soviet organs. Were this trust to be disappointed, it would be very 
tragic for me and for my family. To have extenuating circumstances be considered 
[“mildernde Umstaende zugerechtnet zu bekommen”] is, in my opinion, only possible 
if one tells the truth without reservation. I did not think this way in 1977.403 
 
In giving his explanation for his dramatic reversal, Šteins apparently did not find it beneath 
himself to flatter his interrogators and appeal to their mercy. For that matter, Šteins also 
admitted that he was never actually told what to say, nor physically abused by the East 
German agents of justice, and that he was never even called a liar.404 But nevertheless, he 
said that he felt intimidated at first.  
 With his fear of extradition apparently assuaged, Šteins felt secure enough to further 
elaborate on his original reasoning: “In addition [to attempting to avoid extradition to the 
USSR], I also believed that I would be sentenced more mildly by the Court if I spoke about 
participating in crimes against humanity.”405 By this, he meant that he at first anticipated a 
negative reaction – with correspondingly negative consequences for him – unless he was 
willing to indict himself, so great had been his fear of being dealt with by Soviet justice. 
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Evidently, his increasing familiarity with his assigned East German interrogators over the 
course of his first year in custody gradually diminished his terror. As he acclimated to his 
new situation, he became more and more comfortable. 
 Šteins also self-servingly and rather audaciously cast his retractions thusly in an 
attempt even to lay claim to the moral high-ground: 
Out of pure love for truth and because of the thought that these false statements of 
mine could give a false picture of my reality before the Court, as I made clear to the 
prosecutor on 12 January 1979, I have withdrawn my statements about the eviction 
[“Vertreibung”] of Jewish business owners, the arrest of Communists, all of the 
circumstances of the actions related to the Biėernieki Forest, as well as the liquidation 
of the Rīga Ghetto [emphasis added].406 
 
Lastly, he also said that he had been thinking about his family and possibly his own 
legacy: “Were the answer for my family to remain ‘guilty,’ I cannot reconcile 
[“vereinbaren”] this with myself: then why didn’t you later recant?”407 
 There is of course another, more likely, explanation. Realizing how little actual 
evidence the prosecution possessed, while all along becoming increasingly familiar with and 
less fearful of his prosecutors, Stanislavs Šteins decided to roll the dice. Deciding that he had 
nothing to lose, rather than go down as a self-convicted patsy, Šteins tried to see if he could 
get away with a clever but contrived recantation.  
 
The Verdict and the Penalty 
No doubt chagrinned, but apparently undeterred by Šteins’s radical, comprehensive, 
and consistent disavowal of the most damning of his previous admissions, the prosecutors 
stubbornly stuck with their indictment, which remained completely unchanged despite the 
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shifting evidentiary ground. The prosecution refused to be persuaded by Šteins’s 
representations that he had falsified his testimony in order to ensure that the authorities were 
satisfied by his cooperation, saying that these were “insufficient [“untauglich”] to 
compromise [“beeinträchtigen”] the evidence.”408 
 The prosecution’s counterargument to Šteins’s retractions mentioned only four 
examples of things that Šteins would never have been able to guess had he not been a 
member of the Arajs Kommando: the location of Arājs’s office and the sleeping quarters 
within the Valdemar Street headquarters; that the Kommando initially wore civilian clothes 
with, eventually, two different types of armband; what those armbands looked like; and that 
initially, Arājs’s exact rank was ambiguous and therefore he was simply referred to as “the 
Chief.”409 Mention of any of the rest of the examples was simply omitted from his statement 
to the Court. Unfortunately, the closing argument for the defense, if one took place, does not 
appear in the records.  
After a two-year investigation, the two-week trial of Stanislavs Šteins lasted from 
Tuesday, 18 September 1979 until Monday, 1 October 1979, meeting in seven sessions.410 Of 
the main charges for the period July through December 1941: denouncing four Communists; 
confiscating and occupying a Jewish family’s apartment; being a member of the Order 
Police; taking part in shootings in Biėernieki; guarding the columns in the Rumbula Action – 
and, most significantly for our purposes, being a member of the Arajs Kommando for an 
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unspecified period of time, Šteins was found guilty at the Bezirksgericht, or District Court, at 
Potsdam and sentenced to life imprisonment, the seizure of some of his property by way of 
paying the court’s expenses, and the forfeiture of his rights as a citizen of the German 
Democratic Republic, such as they were. 411 The Obersten Gericht, the Supreme Court of the 
GDR, upheld the sentence, with some insubstantial adjustments regarding the justifications.  
 
The Probable Truth 
What can be said to have been most provably established over the course of this East 
German process? Are the claims that Šteins had ever been a member of the Arajs Kommando 
convincing? What actually happened? 
If one sets aside the self-incriminating and subsequently recanted testimony of the 
defendant, the remaining evidence is inconclusive. The documents prove his membership in 
the Order Service in the autumn of 1941 and sufficient connections with or services rendered 
to some kind of collaborating police unit to have received a Jewish apartment quite early in 
the German occupation, but not membership in the Arajs Kommando or personal 
participation in killing Jews at Biėernieki and Rumbula. The only evidence that he was ever a 
member of the Latvian Auxiliary Security Police was two problematic testimonies and three 
documents. These will be evaluated in detail below. The point is that the evidence can neither 
confirm nor deny Šteins’s membership, the prosecution’s insistence notwithstanding. No 
piece of evidence or witness testimony was ever produced that proved directly his 
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participation in any specific crime, for that matter, although the volume of circumstantial 
evidence makes it extremely probable that he did. 
 Of the two convicted former Kommando members who claimed to recognize him 
from the unit and whose statements were considered valid by the Court in Potsdam, Bedelis 
wildly contradicted the documentary evidence regarding Šteins’s supposed exit date. He 
placed Štein’s discharge in the summer of 1942 at the earliest, a date which the documents 
clearly refute as incorrect by at least ten months. While errors in dating are common, if not 
practically universal, in such testimonies, Bedelis’s testimony also offers more serious 
reasons to treat it with extreme skepticism. For instance, he himself did not generate the 
name “Šteins” during his questioning: it was given to him. Nor did he recall one of Šteins’s 
most important features: his multi-linguism. For his part, the only other key witness, 
Proškovičs, could not remember Šteins’s name even after it was supplied to him and, as we 
have seen, eventually conceded that he might not actually even recognize the man. Besides 
these flawed and problematic perpetrator-witness testimonies, no documents tie Šteins to the 
Kommando. It might be mentioned here that the name also never appears in Professor 
Andrew Ezergailis’s exhaustive investigation into the Latvian SD – a one-man investigation 
seemingly superior to that of the entire Stasi effort, it may also be said.412 Also, although 
meaningless on many obvious levels, it might also be mentioned here that Viktors Arājs 
himself, when asked, denied knowing Šteins. Upon request, the Hamburg Court asked Arājs 
about Šteins on behalf of their East German colleagues, to which Arājs simply replied: 
I do not know this man. I neither met him as a student at the University of Rīga [sic.] 
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before the German invasion, nor do I remember him as a member of the Latvian 
Auxiliary Security Police unit in Rīga as of July 1941.413 
 
Perhaps thinking of his own fate, with his own trial in its final months, Arājs was not willing 
to say anything more. Virtually on the eve of the passing of their respective judgments – on 1 
November 1979 – Steins issued one last eleventh-hour appeal “for the clarification of my 
activities in the second half of 1941 in Rīga” to call Arājs once more to the stand.414 This 
second request was denied. 
Turning to the three documents: the first is the July 1941 entry in the house book of 
Šteins’s formerly Jewish-owned apartment where his occupation is listed as “policijas 
palīgdienests,” literally: “police auxiliary service.”415 According to the registry dutifully 
maintained by the superintendent of the apartment building, Rebeka Gurevičs, age 54, and 
Mozus and Urijs Gurevičs, ages 29 and 27, had moved into apartment 30 at Brīvības iela 
(“Freedom Street,” later successively “Adolf Hitler Street” and “Lenin Street”) Number 35 
on 29 November 1939. Together, this group would tenant the apartment until 7 August 1941, 
at the latest, on which date Alberts Pūdniks, Vladislavs SiĦiĦš, and Stanislavs Šteins took up 
residence there. When he was asked by his East German investigators about his knowledge 
of the fates of the previous residents of the apartment, Šteins told them that “I can only 
explain this such that these persons had either left Rīga before the occupation or were 
deported [“verschleppt”] somewhere in the first days of July 1941. I myself had nothing to do 
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with it.”416  
Listing their occupations, all three of the new residents, Pūdniks, SiniĦš, and Šteins 
wrote “police auxiliary service.”417 Šteins’s potentially criminal wartime activities are 
concealed behind that enigmatic phrase, translated by the East Germans as “Polizei 
Hilfsdienst.” Certainly it could be applied to the Latvian Auxiliary Security Police, but it 
could equally have applied to the Order Police. The probable criminal wartime activities of 
Stanislavs Šteins, as well as those of his roommates, are strongly suggested but also 
effectively concealed as to any of their specifics behind that imprecise phrase, which is broad 
enough to encompass the widest possible array of German-organized police and paramilitary 
units that proliferated in the period immediately following the switch in occupation regimes. 
In short, Šteins’s employment as a police collaborator from the earliest days of the German 
occupation is documented, even if the exact nature of the unit and any particular crimes he 
may have committed are not. However, to get a Jewish apartment that quickly at least 
strongly suggests deep involvement and prominent standing in a unit dealing with the killing 
of Jews at a very early date. For such a quick transfer of the spoils, the deal most probably 
had to have been lined up even before the apartment became “available” by those who knew 
that and when it would become available. In other words, this document is damning, 
irrespective of his possible membership in the Kommando. 
Secondly, there is the January 1945 Waffen-SS document sent to the Rasse- und 
Siedlungshauptamt, or “Race and Settlement Main Office,” where it is written that Šteins 
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was a member of “the Schutzmannschaft” – specifically not the Arajs Kommando – 
beginning on 5 August 1941.418 When first asked about it in the earlier months of the 
investigation, Šteins actually tried to explain away this evidence, even though it was 
extremely favorable to him in terms of proving that he had not been a member of the Arajs 
Kommando.419 This document was shown to Šteins on 18 April 1978 and should have settled 
that part of the case which concerned his membership in the Arajs Kommando.420 If he had 
indeed joined the Arajs Kommando on day one, as it were, Šteins still could not have been a 
member for more than 36 days, or five weeks. The totality of the records on the subject of the 
Arajs Kommando gives no reason whatsoever to believe that one could be a member of the 
Arajs Kommando and another police or paramilitary unit simultaneously. Therefore, this 
Waffen-SS document alone proves that as of 7 August 1941, Šteins was in the 
Schutzmannschaft, not the Arajs Kommando. Moreover, it lists no service prior to that date. 
The fact is that the document sent to the Race and Settlement Main Office puts 
Šteins’s enlistment in the Schutztmannschaft – 5 August 1941 – two days before his move-in 
date at a freshly confiscated Jewish apartment, proving that at least some Schutzmänner were 
generously compensated with the poisoned fruits of the persecution of their countrymen, the 
Latvian Jews. Since Himmler only approved the creation of the Schutzmannschaften in late 
July 1941, Šteins must have been in the very first wave of official recruits. The exact 
mechanism by which apartments and other booty were doled out to the perpetrators in Latvia 
– whether it was controlled centrally by the Germans or on a micro-level by Latvians – 
remains to be established by historians. Either way, given the time needed to process such 
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things, it is at the very least possible that Šteins was already in some collaborator unit before 
joining the Schutzmannschaft in early August. If Šteins was already in the Arajs Kommando 
as he initially confessed, the transfer of an experienced volunteer of proven reliability to help 
form the cadres of a new Schutzmannschaft unit would have been neither an implausible 
career path nor inconsistent with the existing evidence. 
Thirdly, a certificate was obtained from the archives in Rīga proving that Šteins was 
in the service of German security forces dated 29 November 1941. It was signed not by Arājs 
but by Osis, the Latvian Order Police commander. That is, he received his documents not 
from the “chief” of the Latvian Auxiliary Security Police, but instead from the commander of 
the Rīga Schutzmannschaft – right in the middle of the period between the first and second 
Rumbula shootings, no less. Asked how this could be so, Šteins himself waffled during his 
“cooperative” phase, but proposed that at the time, acknowledgment of membership in the 
Kommando may not have been permitted for security reasons. Confronted immediately by 
the investigators with a document reproduced in Daugavas Vanagi – Who Are They? of 
precisely such a document, this one issued to Jānis Zegners by the  Latvian Auxiliary 
Security Police on 18 December 1941, Šteins was unable to answer.421 
These several most important pieces of evidence point to this conclusion: if Šteins 
actually belonged to the Kommando prior to signing up with the Schutzmannschaft, then he 
can be said to have voluntarily abetted and almost certainly personally committed terrible 
crimes. This was, of course, one reason the prosecutor insisted that he had been. But he could 
only have belonged to the Kommando for a maximum of 36 days. In the Arajs Kommando, 
between 1 July and 5 August 1941, however, an eager man could certainly have made his 
mark in the annals of atrocity. Perhaps the apartment was even a bounty for especially 
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gratuitous participation in the crimes, which compensated for his possibly ‘losing his nerve’ 
and requesting transfer to a less blood-soaked outfit, if that is what happened. Likewise, even 
if Šteins had never been a member of the Kommando, he could very easily still have 
committed like crimes of equal gravity. As an example: the Order Police were as instrumental 
in the commission of the sweeping of the Rīga Ghetto and the Rumbula Action as the Arajs 
Kommando – possibly more so, in view of their greater numbers. And the false identity that 
he adopted after the war virtually underwrites his guilt in some capacity.  
Puzzling in particular is the insistence of Busse and Krüger, the East German 
prosecutors, upon Šteins’s membership in the Arajs Kommando given the evidence that 
nearly contradicted and certainly failed to corroborate the claim. Yet this alleged affiliation 
ranked as the very first charge in the indictment before the Court, although it was, as this 
chapter has shown, flimsy in the extreme – especially compared with his provable 
membership in the Schutzmannschaft and the proven rewards he gained at the expense of 
Jews. Probably, the East German prosecutors did not want to get into the business of 
selectively accepting Šteins’s retractions. Why risk their credibility by respecting his claim 
not to have been in the Kommando but ignoring his claim, for example, not to have 
participated in the shootings in Biėernieki and Rumbula? At the same time, in Hamburg, the 
prosecutor dropped far-and-away the greater number of possible charges against his 
defendant that were more difficult to prove than his participation on the second day of 
Rumbula because the maximum penalty could be still obtained without them, rendering them 
superfluous from a punitive – while not, of course, an historical – standpoint. The same 
penalty was sought by both prosecutors in East- and West-Germany. It seems incredible 
given Soviet efforts to establish the Schutzmannschaften as roughly equivalent criminal units 
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to the Arajs Kommando as in, for example, the 1965 Rīga Trial and attendant promotional 
media that have already been discussed, that the East German prosecutor did not behave 
similarly.  
The insistent fixation on Šteins’s supposed membership in the Arajs Kommando 
beyond the earliest weeks – ostensibly because the two best, though still dubious, witnesses 
claimed Šteins was with them in the Kommando long thereafter – caused the investigators 
and the prosecution to miss other potentially valuable avenues. For instance, the case could at 
least have provided a highly valuable window into the Schutzmannschaften – a controversial 
subject – if the red herring of Šteins’s possible (but at most very brief) involvement with the 
Arajs Kommando had not fruitlessly and to no purpose consumed so much energy and 
attention. 
 
SUMMARY 
The mishandling of the case and the unsubstantiated conclusion of the verdict on the 
question of his membership in the Latvian Auxiliary Security Police in no sense exonerates 
Stanislavs Šteins.  
The evidence virtually assures that Šteins was at least present at criminal events in 
Rīga in the second half of 1941, although the form and extent of his personal participation 
and in which particular collaborating killing unit is now indeterminable. Nevertheless, that he 
somehow took part, probably in an exceptional way, can be practically regarded as proven by 
dint of the fact that he was installed in an apartment from which a Jewish family had been 
forcibly ejected barely a month into the German occupation. He also felt compelled to 
change his identity at the war’s end, indicating strongly that he was guilty of something. 
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Ordinary legionnaires, even officers like him, were not preparing false identities in 1944 as 
cover in case of Soviet victory.  
However, the East Germans simply tried to prove too much, and when they could not 
prove everything, they proceeded with the whole list of charges anyway and still obtained the 
desired conviction. This is all the more disappointing because there was enough 
circumstantial evidence on specific points to justify a conviction without insisting on the 
inviolability of a needlessly inflated indictment. The inflexibility of the investigators 
combined with Šteins’s bizarre ‘defense’ strategy of enthusiastically admitting to everything 
and more, in effect trying to convince his investigators of his own guilt and, premeditatedly 
or not, stringing them along – only to pull the rug out from under them – ultimately renders 
the verdict of the East German Courts and their various findings almost useless for the 
purposes of historians trying to learn about the Holocaust in Latvia.  
Some surprising insights can, however, be gained from the Ministry for State 
Security’s treatment of this one suspected Nazi criminal in the 1970s. The Stasi’s general 
odiousness has been well-documented.422 While it must be remembered that the Stasi 
personnel who investigated, prosecuted, and convicted Stanislavs Šteins were themselves 
members of a notorious secret police apparatus, this case reveals a quite different glimpse of 
that larger picture.423 For one thing, Šteins received far more prolonged investigation than he 
would have in a Soviet summary trial immediately after the war. Indeed, he was accorded an 
extraordinarily painstaking, years’ long process of investigation that was taken very 
seriously, even if handled badly, by the authorities. Secondly, Šteins was not physically 
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coerced, and the threat of death or extradition, even if it existed at one point in his own mind, 
was never insinuated or actually threatened by the interrogators. This is certain because he 
admitted as much himself when trying to explain his sudden decision to cease cooperating. 
That he was not subject to violence is further proven by his increasingly brazen behavior 
toward the investigators that showed anything but fear. Thirdly, while much Communist 
rhetoric appeared in the documents prepared by the prosecutors for the Court, ideology did 
not play much of a role in the actual investigation itself or distort its conclusions beyond the 
semantic level – with the consistent exception of the partial or total elision of the identity of 
the victims as Jews. 
Ultimately, the investigators were not very skillful, and after he reversed his strategy, 
Šteins seems to have been much cleverer than they were. If anything, the GDR interrogators 
and prosecutors here appear far more incompetent than sinister. 
The Last Case Study 
 All of this was taking place outside of the public eye.  
 Elsewhere, trials related to former members of the Latvian Auxiliary Security Police 
would soon be taking place in the light of day. Many in the Latvian exile communities in the 
West took a hard line towards any Soviet involvement, deeming all Communist procedure 
corrupt, all Communist evidence bogus, and all Communist testimony coerced and falsified. 
This chapter has shown that while “due process” by Western standards was not met in East 
Germany, the evidence was not faked and the testimony, while flawed and otherwise 
problematic, was not coerced. Indeed if fakery and coercion had been employed, the outcome 
of the investigation would not have been so obviously muddled, inconclusive, and 
unsatisfying.  
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This study now turns to the efforts of the United States to deliver justice to the former 
members of the Arajs Kommando living in its jurisdiction.
  
CHAPTER 6 
THE UNITED STATES: 
PERJURY, THE PUBLIC, AND THE PASSPORT 
OVERVIEW 
 Internationally, the United States was the latecomer to the process of judicially 
settling accounts with the criminal actions of the Arajs Kommando. Neither the Nuremburg 
Trials nor any commission under American aegis in the immediate postwar period undertook 
to specifically investigate the Kommando and its crimes. Unlike the governments of the 
Soviet Union and what became East- and West Germany, after the initial legal reckoning 
with the Nazis in the middle and late 1940s, the government of the United States by and large 
considered the whole matter of Nazi crimes closed. While unfortunate, there are fairly simple 
explanations for this lapse. 
In the first instance was the Cold War against the Soviet Union. The Nazis and sundry 
collaborators who were confidently known by the authorities to be on American soil – most 
famously, men like the rocket engineer Werner von Braun, but also a host of other men 
working for the clandestine services in the struggle against Communism – were safely 
working for the government.424 In this connection, two intertwined issues rendered Latvian 
Holocaust perpetrators virtually invisible in the Unites States into the 1960s. First, there was 
the conscious use of known Nazis and collaborators as Cold War tools against the Soviets. 
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eventually filed, did work for the CIA, as did likely quite a few more – both in the CIA and other capacities. US 
Prosecutors could prove their case against neither man. 
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And second, there was the tendency to see all refugees from Eastern Europe and especially 
the Baltic states, as understandably fleeing from Communist tyranny – rather than, as some 
of them were, fleeing from postwar justice. Thus, the Cold War was a key factor. 
Another reason that a systematic attempt was not organized until the trial of Viktors 
Arājs himself was already nearly concluded in West Germany was that the events in question 
were fairly remote from American public consciousness and seemed disconnected from the 
United States and its government in a way that they were not in either Germany or the Soviet 
Union. The crimes of the Nazis’ Eastern European collaborators like those of the Latvians in 
the Arajs Kommando seemed especially distant from the realm of American legal 
competency, jurisdiction, or concern. The relevant offenses were, after all, committed on 
foreign soil by other nations’ citizens against people who were not Americans. If such men 
were still living free somewhere, it seemed to be someone else’s problem. Nuremberg was 
supposed to have done the job of dealing with the main Nazi criminals. European and Soviet 
courts, it was presumed, could be relied upon to deal with any smaller fry as the need arose. 
The 1950s and the 1960s mostly passed quietly for the American Latvian community in exile 
in the United States. Neither the Holocaust nor the Eastern Front was yet at the center of 
American memory and consciousness about the Second World War, so Eastern European 
collaboration in the Holocaust was doubly distant. 
In the 1970s, however, two sweeping trends in public opinion dramatically recast the 
relationship between the American Latvians on the one hand and both the mainstream 
American public and the US government on the other. First, the American public’s 
consciousness of the Holocaust dramatically increased. An expanding volume of scholarship 
was emerging, survivors generally were more willing to speak, and popular culture was being 
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affected by events like the release of the Holocaust television miniseries. A commission 
under the Carter administration recommended the foundation of what was to become the 
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. At the same time, attitudes toward the Soviet 
Union were softening considerably for a variety of reasons to do with diminishing appetites 
for military adventures abroad after Vietnam and the terrors involved with Mutually Assured 
Destruction. The Latvian American community found its former special victim status in 
American society much diminished and its aggressive anti-Communism reduced to an 
increasingly fringe position. 
Even then, tiny Latvia was not on anyone’s mind. It was only with the gradual 
realization that some, and perhaps many, of the lower level perpetrators of the Holocaust had 
successfully eluded justice in Europe and, instead of dwelling in some benighted South 
American autocracy, had in fact settled in the United States of America – and were enjoying 
their rights as naturalized American citizens, no less – that a whole new method of yet again 
legally dealing with the backwash of Nazism had to be, and was, devised. 
Thus three-and-a-half decades passed after the end of the Second World War before 
determined and coordinated efforts were resumed, this time designed to mete out a measure 
of justice to those criminals who had slithered through the net the first time. To identify and 
punish such persons, Congress, largely due to the initiative of Congresswoman Elizabeth 
Holtzman, established the Office of Special Investigations (OSI) in 1979, just months before 
the Arājs verdict was read. Those who belonged to this all-volunteer agency of the respected 
Criminal Division of the United States Department of Justice, became America’s dedicated 
“Nazi Hunters.” The OSI officials in charge of this effort put forward wild initial estimates of 
the number of “Nazi persecutors,” as they were officially termed, residing in the US. This 
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figure was placed at the staggering level of approximately 10,000. By 2006, cases had been 
brought against exactly 134 individuals, out of a total of about 1,500 persons who were 
investigated.425 All told, 83 people would be denaturalized and 62 would permanently depart 
the United States as the result of US efforts.426 
Among the charged were thirteen men of Latvian origin living in America, a figure 
representing almost exactly ten percent of the total prosecutions of the OSI and its 
predecessor, the less effective Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) Special 
Litigations unit that it replaced. Most of the remainder consisted of Ukrainians and Germans 
or Austrians, together with a moderate proportion of Lithuanians and a smattering of Poles, 
Romanians, Hungarians, and “Yugoslavians” – in the day’s parlance – who were mainly of 
Croatian background. Of the Latvians, two men were convicted in court; one fled the country 
and was essentially presumed to be guilty; four died before their respective cases could be 
resolved; two reached settlements with the government, forfeiting their citizenship in return 
for being left alone until their health improved or they died; and four won their days in court. 
Seven cases of this baker’s dozen were brought against suspected former members of the 
Arajs Kommando, but only one of them was convicted outright.427 That case, against 
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Konrāds Kalējs, will be one focus of this chapter.428 
Suspects in the Soviet Union had been accused of high treason against the Soviet 
people or the Motherland, war crimes, and – as also in East Germany – crimes against 
humanity; in West Germany, they had been tried simply for murder as defined by the prewar 
penal code. An outstanding peculiarity of the American experience in the context of this 
study was that in the United States, suspected “Nazi persecutors” were merely accused of 
perjuring themselves on their immigration and citizenship application documents with regard 
to their wartime activities. As a consequence, if convicted, they did not face imprisonment 
for the felony of murder or even worse.  Rather, their citizenship was to be revoked and then 
they could be deported to their country of choice, should it be found willing to take them. 
The legal stakes – and concomitant repercussions that existed outside of the formal law, it 
must be remembered – in the Communist trials were high. There, the accused faced decades 
of dangerously hard labor or sometimes even outright execution while their families could 
rely on becoming personae non grata. In West Germany, a conviction could result at 
maximum in the imposition of a life sentence and individual public mortification and 
disgrace, though for most such convictions the prison sentences were much shorter. In the 
United States, the maximum penalty by law was loss of citizenship and possible eventual 
deportation – quite distinct from extradition – and, obviously, a perfectly blackened 
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reputation and associated unofficial social and familial fallout.429 Incredibly, even a 
deportation order from a court did not legally brand a respondent as “criminal” because, as 
immigration cases, the suits against these men were civil in nature, rather than criminal.430 
Still, much can be made of the moral significance of the state casting such individuals out of 
the circle of citizenship and banishing them in opprobrium.  
But however relatively trifling these penalties were in view of the gravity of the 
mortal offenses involved and the small number of people to whom they were eventually 
applied, the trials themselves had a dramatically outsized effect on the Latvian exile 
community living in the United States. Excerpts from this author’s interview with the solitary 
figure of the American Latvian defense attorney who virtually single-handedly represented 
the American Latvian respondents will be interspersed throughout the chapter to discover 
something of the motivations behind this often overlooked category of participants in the 
process. The only interview this gentleman, Mr. Ivars BērziĦš, has ever granted to any 
representative of the press or the academy contains several highly interesting and important 
insights from by far the least understood perspective of the multifaceted subject of these 
trials: that of the legal defenders of those who technically were charged with fraudulent entry 
into the country but in the wider sphere of the press and public opinion seemed to stand 
accused of the most terrible crimes. The objective here is to use the legal aftermath of the 
Arajs Kommando’s crimes as a prism through which to view not only the American justice 
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system as it was constituted to combat Nazi fugitives, but also to understand the American 
Latvian community with which it was necessarily in dialogue. The self-concept and self-
justifications of this segment of the population, of which BērziĦš was a prominent part, in the 
midst of the latter stages of the Cold War, are as poorly understood as he is and merit an 
investigation in order to fully comprehend how America reckoned with the Holocaust in 
Latvia. The attitudes of this increasingly lonely and fearful group towards the Second World 
War, the Holocaust, the Soviet Union, and the United States government will be another 
major area of exploration in this chapter. It will show that if the American Latvian 
community behaved badly in terms of its response to the trials and with hearts hardened to 
the past suffering of others, then there were at least fathomable reasons for it. 
An important underlying theme of this chapter, therefore, is the complicated 
relationship between law and public opinion in a free society. Political volatility can spring 
from the least expected quarters, even the seemingly uncontroversial proposition of 
prosecuting suspected Nazi war criminals. The investigations and trials at hand uniquely 
crystalized Cold War America’s ethnic and political cleavages. As the belligerent Cold War 
paradigm gave way to an era that recognized the Holocaust and sought briefly at least some 
level of accommodation with the Soviet Union and then revived during the American right’s 
reinvigoration in the 1980s, these trials revealed hidden political alliances, ethnic prejudices, 
and previously unnoticed passions. They all tested the impartiality and independence of 
American justice and some actually ignited violence. 
Also deserving of some description is the role of the indigenous American allies of 
the American Latvian immigrant community regarding the OSI’s investigations, the Soviets, 
and the Holocaust. The trials themselves, and the attendant hullaballoo, mainly took place in 
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the 1980s in the era of the Reagan Administration. Various rightwing pundits, politicians, 
and organizations threw in with the Latvian exiles for their own political reasons, 
maintaining their familiar hardline anti-Soviet stances. 
Lastly, this chapter will assess the success of the OSI with regard to those cases 
involving Latvians and, especially, the Arajs Kommando. It will do so firstly on the OSI’s 
own terms, and then according to two major metrics of this study, namely the justice 
system’s contribution to future historical understanding as well as the education of the public. 
Taking place at such a great temporal remove from the events and involving so few suspects, 
the investigations uncovered comparatively little new information to enhance our overall 
picture of the crimes of the Arajs Kommando. With all of the background already solidly 
established, however, the OSI was still, in some cases, able to discover new information 
about individuals which in turn helped flesh out the overall picture. Perhaps most 
significantly, the investigations and trials drew the attention of the American public and the 
American Latvian community to the hideous wartime past and served a broader educational 
purpose. 
This chapter will show the limitations of the organs of American justice as well as 
their saving graces, using the examples taken from the INS and OSI prosecutions against 
Latvian immigrants. In summary, compared to the other national cases of this study, the 
prosecutions in the United States were temporally retarded, their number was relatively tiny, 
and the punishments were fairly light. Equally as important for this study, however, is that 
unlike the Soviet investigations and their results that were segregated from the regime’s 
official history or the documents ultimately destined for East Berlin’s paper shredders, the 
records of the OSI and its cases have always been and will remain public. The volunteer 
 265 
 
agents of the Office of Special Investigations still stand behind their work.431 After closing its 
doors, the agency turned over all information to the United States Holocaust Memorial 
Museum in Washington, DC, and to Yad Vashem in Jerusalem. With exceptions made to 
protect the innocent, the record of the OSI is an open book for anyone who wishes to read 
and learn.  
 
THE AMERICAN LATVIAN MINORITY AND THE MAINSTREAM PUBLIC 
The American Latvians and the Court (of Public Opinion) 
 The relationship between the majority of the US population and the tiny ethnic 
Latvian minority had several historic ups and downs which must be laid out to contextualize 
the general American Latvian response to the trials. Before the 1970s, American Latvians 
had been basically subsumed within the general category of “victims of Communism,” 
together with their compatriots from other “captive nations” such as Lithuania and Estonia – 
and they embraced this identification.432 This was a privileged position in America at the 
zenith of the Cold War. Over the 1970s, however, this automatic Cold War-inspired 
sympathy and deference lessened appreciably. The official government policy became one of 
détente with the USSR. This reflected a growing willingness among the population to accept 
the reality of the Soviet Union, avoid costly efforts to combat Communism abroad, and halt 
the kind of reckless brinksmanship that could lead to nuclear Armageddon. Simultaneously, 
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consciousness of the Holocaust and sympathy for its Jewish victims steadily heightened. 
Thus, after the 1960s, the balance, in the arena of popular consciousness, tipped firmly 
against American Latvians. They lost their status as a favored category of victims of 
Communism; had that special victim status actually supplanted by Jews; and were seen as 
out-of-step and behind-the-times in their obsessive anti-Soviet attitudes. As part of an easily 
stigmatized out-group and identifiable ‘other’ of whom the public at large was almost totally 
ignorant, American Latvians felt themselves to be in a uniquely vulnerable position as a 
community. These developments opened the door to legitimate US prosecutions of Latvian 
immigrants but at the same time triggered the community’s reflexive, but understandable, 
defense mechanisms. 
 A brief word about this community is necessary. In terms of self-identification, 
members of this community rather insisted upon describing themselves as “exiles” and not as 
“émigrés,” the former moniker underscoring the involuntary nature of their estrangement 
from their homeland. Furthermore, the choice of the term “American Latvian,” rather than 
“Latvian American,” was supposed to emphasize its bearer’s heightened identification with 
Latvian heritage while remaining a loyal American.433 They seem to have been one of the 
few ethnic groups, like some self-identified “American Jews” as opposed to “Jewish 
Americans,” that reversed the usual word order when it came to self-description. 
Critics have understandably charged that the group withdrew into a shell of ethnic 
solidarity and proclaimed the innocence of each suspect without review. Indeed, the 
community came together to uncritically fund the legal defense of every accused Latvian, 
including those eventually proven guilty. This fact lends considerable credence to the charge 
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of automatic ethnic solidarity in total disregard of the possible guilt of a single, individual 
Latvian. 
Nevertheless, despite this surface impression of uniformity, the American Latvian 
community’s attitudes to the proceedings against Konrāds Kalējs and other indicted Latvians 
were complex and need to be placed in context. For convenience, this chapter has, and will 
continue, to refer generally to “American Latvians” as a relatively monolithic group, at least 
insofar as their historical origins and ideational backgrounds were similar. However, some of 
the relevant splits must be outlined here and should be borne in mind.  
Said Ivars BerziĦš, the Latvian defense counsel: 
 
Well, I think you always had the completely rational element. People like Ezergailis 
who studied the subject and made pertinent observations and published reasonable 
studies of it. You had people who roundly condemned any involvement by Latvians 
in assisting the Germans in carrying out the Holocaust. And, of course, you had the 
other extreme. You know: people who said ‘this is all totally Soviet propaganda and 
we shouldn’t stand for it; we should oppose it.’... And of course, there were people 
who were just simply – [it was] their friends or relatives who were accused. So it was 
a mixed bag. It was not – I have no recollection of there being a monolithic, you 
know, one-sided opposition to it… I would judge that the reaction of the community 
was quite normal under the circumstances.434 
 
When the indictments started being filed in the late 1970s and 1980s, perhaps the 
majority of the members of the community – which by the time of the trials was composed 
substantially of natural-born American citizens rather than first-generation immigrants – 
could be called “low-information” American Latvians. These people were largely or 
completely ignorant of the Arajs Kommando and its crimes, specifically, and even about the 
Holocaust in Latvia in general. Since these were topics not only not widely discussed but 
virtually taboo within the community, this ignorance can be explained if not excused. The 
Holocaust, much less what Latvians had to do with it, not only was not talked about but was 
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not even thought about.  Repression had been the pervasive response to an uncomfortable 
and disturbing historical issue.  
There was surely a minority who did know something about the Arajs Kommando, or 
at least that the slaughter of the Jews of Latvia at the hands of some Latvians had occurred 
during the war – because they were there. Regardless of how they had felt about Latvian 
participation in these actions at the time, dealing with them lo these decades later seemed not 
only an embarrassment to Latvian honor and a threat to their relationship with the rest of 
American society but also a distraction from an atrocity that one was not powerless to 
reverse or remedy: the ongoing occupation of Latvia by the Soviet Union. It was more 
comfortable and too tempting to see these belatedly-instituted investigations as simply being 
within a framework of the United States cooperating with the Soviet Union against them, 
rather than an attempt to achieve justice and punish the guilty. This created something like a 
defensive whiplash effect in the attitudes of American Latvians who should have known 
better. The leveling of charges against any of their number was often automatically seen as 
an extension of omni-malevolent Soviet efforts to disgrace the “émigrés” by every means 
they could think of. It was regarded merely as the latest manifestation of the uninterrupted 
Soviet hostility since the initial occupation, annexation, and Sovietization of their country in 
1940. 
Finally, for those American Latvians of the second and third generation for whom 
Latvian identity was increasingly reserved for holiday visits to grandmother’s house and who 
may not have even spoken Latvian, these trials were of less central concern. Even so, this 
younger generation in general still shared a far higher degree of the routine anti-Soviet 
sentiment than prevailed in American society at large. 
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On a more general level, the Latvian immigrant community in the United States was 
numerically larger and certainly far more visible in its concentrated enclaves and on the 
political stage than its counterpart in West Germany (there simply was no analogous 
community in East Germany, much less – obviously – in the USSR). At the same time, the 
mainstream American society knew much less than its German counterpart about World War 
Two and the Holocaust – not to mention about Latvians and Latvian history. Once the 
prosecutions gained media attention, the public was thus more easily tempted to resort to 
filling their gaps in knowledge with stereotypes. The Germans generally were also in a worse 
position from which to engage in public moralizing on the subject of the Holocaust and war 
crimes than were Americans. Compounding this vulnerability, the exiles also had, in the 
world’s rival superpower, the Soviet Union, a powerful and irascible political enemy invested 
from the start in their undoing.435 Unsurprisingly, the community was intensely cognizant of 
both of these states of affairs. 
 
The Vagaries of Public Opinion 
The 1960s saw the usual baseline of ambient nativism of the US population towards 
the immigrants start to change into something new, with much Soviet encouragement. 
Interest in the Holocaust grew and, correspondingly, information about Latvian participation 
in it spread. This process was bolstered heavily by reportage of the bombastic Soviet trials in 
Rīga in the 1960s, described in an earlier chapter, which included among others a Latvian 
defendant who was living in the United States. The Soviet megaphone amplified these trials 
and pumped peripheral materials such as, among a basket of others that gained somewhat 
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less traction, Daugavas Vanagi – Who Are They? and Political Refugees – Unmasked into the 
public discourse to demonize their exiled political adversaries. 
 One public person who, for example, seems to have been influenced by these 
booklets is Len Deighton, the famous pioneer of the spy novel genre writing at the height of 
the Cold War in the early- and mid-1960s. True, he was an Englishman, but his books were 
ravenously consumed by American audiences and sometimes were even adapted to film. In 
1966, he published a book that provoked outrage in the American Latvian community and 
presaged their dramatically waning fortunes to come. The premise of this book, The Billion 
Dollar Brain, is that a megalomaniacal American billionaire, in collusion with racist ex-Nazi 
Latvian hyper-nationalists, steals a biological weapon from an arsenal in Great Britain and is 
attempting to use it to trigger World War Three with the Soviet Union, the whole operation 
being perfectly and coldly directed by his massive supercomputer – the titular “Billion Dollar 
Brain.” And it is up to a cynical, hard-bitten, chain-smoking, misogynistic British operative 
to put an end to the conspiracy and save the world, all while maintaining the classic 
annoyingly studied aloofness of the spy-genre’s prototypical flawed hero.436 
At one point during his investigation, the unlikeable protagonist encounters the highly 
agreeable figure of KGB “Comrade Colonel” Stok in a café in Rīga. Referring to the 
Latvians, the invented Soviet security man asks if there is a word in the English language for 
“unlucky people.” Comes the reply from our hero: 
“Losers.” 
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“Ah, that’s a good word. Well, this is a land of losers. It’s a land where doom hangs 
upon the air like poison gas. You have no idea of what awful things have happened 
here. The Latvians had Fascists who were more vicious than even the Germans. In 
Bikernieki Forest they killed 46,500 civilians. In Dreilini Forest five kilometers east 
of here, they killed 13,000. In the Zolotaya Gorka, 38,000 were murdered [perhaps 
Rumbula is meant, since the figure conforms to that given by the Soviets for that 
massacre]... The Germans were so pleased to find such enthusiastic murderers that 
they used Riga as a clearinghouse for people they wanted killed. They sent them here 
in trainloads from Germany, Holland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, France, from all over 
Europe, because the Latvian-recruited SS units were the most efficient killers... We 
have dossiers on hundreds of Latvians. War criminals now living in Canada, 
America, New Zealand and all over the world. You would imagine that people guilty 
of such terror would remain quiet and be thankful that they have escaped justice, but 
no. These scum are the foremost trouble-makers [emphasis added].”437 
 
The historical errors contained in the paragraph are manifold but conform to the 
Soviet official version of reality and, hence, betray their certain provenance. After all, the 
numbers are identical to those given by the Soviet Extraordinary State Commission’s reports, 
and the claim that Jews were deported from “all over Europe” similarly appears in the 
official Soviet account.438 The sly metaphorical allusion to poison gas was likewise probably 
no accident. Furthermore, in what one wants to say is a gratuitous insult, Deighton situated 
the café in which this conversation was taking place on “Soviet Boulevard.” The building 
faced “the old Liberation monument [sic.] that had been built there several regimes back and 
– so it was said – was something of a milestone in municipal graft.” Doubtless, the structure 
being sneeringly described is the Brīvības Piemineklis, or “Freedom Monument,” the most 
hallowed symbolic site in all the domain of Latvian politics and the physical representation 
of the idea of Latvian national sovereignty, here a target of mockery. 
Near the end of the fictitious Billion Dollar Brain, it is revealed that the wicked, war-
mongering Latvians were members of the “Free Latvia Movement” and were in the employ 
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of some presumably rogue section of the United States government.439 They are thwarted and 
unmasked by the hero, with plenty of help from the polished and deeply philosophical KGB 
officer. For the cathartic delight of the readers, the main Latvian villain is bloodied-up by 
military police of the British Ministry of Defence and made to write his confession. 
This work, described on the dust jacket of the 1966 edition as being “as topical as 
tomorrow’s headlines” was not disseminated by a Soviet publishing house but had to have 
been inspired by the contemporaneous Soviet trials and the release of tracts such as 
Daugavas Vanagi – Who Are They? and Political Refugees – Unmasked, perhaps along with 
other less-known Soviet public relations publications imported in translation into the United 
States that were aimed at alienating the Latvian immigrants. The Extraordinary 
Commission’s reports were obviously consulted. In view of popular publications such as this, 
the American Latvian community feared that anti-Latvian sentiment was taking root in the 
West and was probably right. 
Beyond the sphere of popular entertainment, the exiles’ basically ineffective struggle 
to preserve Latvia’s national reputation and some hope for its restoration as an independent 
state was also being fought in the arena of international politics. Serious political 
commentators and analysts were occasionally proposing real-world policies that would do 
devastating damage to the American Latvian cause. More-or-less overt hostility, or at least 
callous indifference, toward Latvians was not limited to popular culture. 
Writing already in 1961, several years before Deighton, none other than Cyrus Leo 
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Sulzberger II, for decades the chief international affairs correspondent for The New York 
Times and a scion of the Ochs-Sulzberger family that owns America’s “newspaper of 
record,” argued in favor of abandoning hope for the future independence of the Baltic states 
in the name of hard-headed foreign policy realism. 
And it is worth considering among offers we could make to reinsure our tenure in 
Berlin, whether as a quid pro quo, we might legally recognize Russian absorption of 
the Baltic states and also agree on the Oder-Neisse border between Germany and 
Poland, a concession already made by France. This idea will not be popular among 
Americans who are, thank heaven, idealistic. Yet there are certain grim realities in 
political life. If, in exchange for this gesture of goodwill we could obtain reaffirmed 
guarantees of West Berlin’s freedom until Germany is reunified, wouldn’t the 
sacrifice be worthwhile?440 
 
From the perspective of Latvians living in the United States, Sulzberger’s proposal 
seemed a frightening portent. The official sacrifice of their nation’s future for “reaffirmed 
guarantees” from the Soviets seemed no “gesture of goodwill,” much less a “worthwhile” 
one to them. That this ‘realist’ recommendation advocated selling out the hope for a restored 
independent Latvia in perpetuity in order to temporarily enhance the protection of a few extra 
Germans in Berlin was just the icing on the cake. No matter the specifics, however, the idea 
of officially abandoning the Baltic states and recognizing their de facto incorporation into the 
USSR in exchange for geopolitical favors elsewhere on the global chessboard of the Cold 
War was always current in serious ‘realist’ political discourse. Even if this was only 
proposed by a member of the ‘chattering class’ of foreign policy commentators who were not 
held to account for their statements by the mechanism of elections, such statements 
frightened the American Latvian community. The would-be grand strategists of the new 
American empire were willing to consider bartering away the future of Latvia for their own 
strategic purposes, never mind the actual people whose home was being wagered. 
                                                           
440
 C. L. Sulzberger. “Foreign Affairs: Berlin Bird and Baltic Bush,” in The New York Times. 12 July 1961, p. 
30.  
 274 
 
Of course, whole books could be written on the cultural and political relations of this 
particular minority community with mainstream American society. The brief preceding 
examples are intended to serve here only as a descriptive shorthand sketch. The point is that 
America’s wartime public and governmental empathy for the Latvians was gradually 
transmuted from the 1960s forward into increasing indifference and even impatient 
annoyance.  
After the upheavals in both blocs that culminated in 1968, Moscow and Washington 
increasingly saw eye to eye: they were more willing than at any time since the Second World 
War to put aside their ideological differences in favor of maintaining the stability of the 
status quo. Hopes for détente were replacing the fervid anti-Communism of the McCarthy era 
and the “roll-back” rhetoric of Dulles, with both Kennedy and Nixon ready to deal. Many 
Americans, across partisan lines, saw détente as a positive development, which as a 
consequence marginalized the previously lionized anti-Communist exiles. Thus, amid the 
natural clash of differing perspectives and priorities, the American Latvian minority within 
wider American society saw their previously disproportionate influence drastically 
dwindling. Latvians living in the United States, for whom even the international status quo 
was anathema, were well aware of this shift towards accommodation and felt 
correspondingly ever more isolated, besieged, and hopeless regarding the future prospects of 
regaining their homeland. 
A tiny and increasingly friendless community in exile, most American Latvians saw 
their homeland, torn from them in war, as being subjected to the totalitarian world 
Communist idea of the eventual extirpation of all national differences. Physical elimination 
of opponents was terrifying enough, yet it was only one instrument in the Soviet toolbox as 
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they saw it. The imposition of the Russian language, the political indoctrination of children, 
the eradication of religious observance, the permanent settlement of large numbers of 
Russians in Latvian cities, the sealing of the borders, and other measures were viewed as 
arguably even more insidious than outright killings and mass deportations (although these 
also took place). The majority of American Latvians believed themselves to be facing a type 
of extinction: cultural genocide. Therefore the leaders of the community considered as their 
charge nothing less than the existential defense of Latvian culture and identity. They 
conceived of their mission as a sort of holding action: to preserve what they had saved while 
promoting captive Latvia’s eventual liberation from Red tyranny and the restoration of its 
political independence.441 Although only two small examples among many, books like Mr. 
Deighton’s and articles like Mr. Sulzberger’s are emblematic in the way that they threatened 
these goals: they implied, in the first instance, growing Soviet influence over Western minds 
and, in the second instance, a willingness to make concessions toward or even peace with the 
Soviet order. 
Arguably as bad, from the American Latvian perspective, was the even more broad-
based sentiment against the Cold War amid the American public at large. Not only apparent 
dupes of Soviet propaganda like Deighton and self-styled hard-headed ‘realists’ like 
Sulzberger were making the calculation that the USSR needed more circumspect treatment. 
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In the wake of the Doomsday Clock coming close to striking twelve midnight in the near-
apocalypse of the Cuban Missile Crisis, ordinary Americans were losing their taste for Cold 
War brinksmanship. Given the deepening quagmire of the Vietnam War, they were losing 
their taste for hot proxy wars to combat the Communist order as well. There were very 
legitimate reasons for desiring a normalization of relations or at least a quelling of tensions 
with the USSR. This did not, however, accord with the goals of the Latvian exiles. 
 It was precisely within this context of an intensifying American Latvian siege 
mentality that the organized American prosecution of suspected Nazi criminals, Latvians 
among them, began. American Latvians interpreted the opening of these investigations as a 
warning signal: their status as welcomed supplicants sheltering under the indomitable shield 
of a compassionate champion was officially rescinded and they now felt themselves more 
friendless than ever. 
 
THE OPENING OF THE INVESTIGATIONS 
The “Holtzman Amendment” 
Elizabeth Holtzman was a four-term Democratic United States Congresswoman who 
represented the 16th District of New York. It was in her capacity as a member of the House 
Judiciary Committee that she arguably made the two biggest marks of her career. First, in 
1974, she participated in the impeachment hearings of President Richard Nixon, helping 
prompt his humiliating and merciful resignation. Then, on 10 October 1978, House 
Resolution 12509, which Congresswoman Holtzman sponsored with six other 
Representatives, became Public Law 95-549 – colloquially known as “the Holtzman 
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Amendment.” 442 
This legislation modified the Immigration and Nationality Act “to exclude from 
admission into, and to deport from, the United States all aliens who persecuted any person on 
the basis of race, religion, national origin, or political opinion, under the direction of the Nazi 
government of Germany, and for other purposes.”443 In effect, the new language of the law 
meant that the attitude of the government towards the enforcement of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, as applied to this category of immigrant, would be one of zero tolerance. 
Even before the founding of the Office of Special Investigations, the Special 
Litigation Unit of Immigration and Naturalization Services had already brought cases against 
three American Latvians: BoĜeslavs Maikovskis, Vilis Hāzners, and Kārlis Detlavs.444 The 
first was convicted; the other two were acquitted. Immigrants from other Eastern European 
countries, of course, were also similarly charged. However, before the passage of the 
“Holtzman Amendment” and the strengthening of the law, many such early prosecutions 
faltered. Frequently, “discretionary relief” was offered to respondents owing to extenuating 
circumstances.445 Pleas for grace were heard and often respected by judges that a respondent 
should not be deported because he was married to a native spouse, or because he had a 
history of model behavior, or even that he claimed asylum from the Soviet Union. The 
Immigration and Naturalization Service actually possessed lists of potentially deportable 
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suspects with dubious wartime backgrounds and Nazi connections. However, since the cases 
were so difficult to prove in court, INS prosecutors preferred to devote their time to lower-
hanging fruit elsewhere on their considerable list of underfunded priorities. They may also 
have had an aversion to pursuing potentially politically volatile cases. Whatever the reason, 
the INS brought relatively few such cases.  
On 4 September 1979, the Office of Special Investigations was brought into 
existence. Its mandate was to enforce Congresswoman Holtzman’s amendment to the law. 
The INS lists were part of the hand-off when the OSI was established and contained the 
names of 73 individuals, some Latvians among them.446 
 
The Representatives of the State 
Part of the United States Justice Department’s aggressive Criminal Division, the 
Office of Special Investigations was a dedicated taskforce for identifying, denaturalizing,  
and deporting former Nazis and their collaborators living in the United States who had 
falsified their wartime record in order to immigrate and, in most cases, also gain citizenship. 
The agency was composed of volunteers; it would be superfluous to explain here their 
honorable motivations. As the OSI was constituted only in the waning days of the Arājs trial 
in 1979, official US government participation or even assistance in that trial or others abroad 
was negligible. On the other hand, owing to its late inception, OSI lawyers had access to a 
ready-made trove of solid information collected by their colleagues abroad over the course of 
their many previous investigations. 
However menacing the organization soon became to many members of American 
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Latvian society, it by no means started out inauspiciously from their perspective. In fact, its 
first Director was a figure already long known to and well-liked by the Baltic community: 
Walter Rockler. His wife was an Estonian DP whom he met while working as an investigator 
in one of the Nuremberg trials involving financial crimes.447 It is not unthinkable that his 
connections and warm relationship with the community could have been advantageously 
employed by the OSI.  
In the late 1970s – at virtually the moment the first cases were opened by the INS – 
the American Latvian community rallied and established the Latvian Truth Fund.448 
Donations were collected and placed in the fund, which was then used to underwrite the legal 
defense of eligible applicants – in practice, all those who stood accused.  
While easily interpreted as the reflexive product of ethnic solidarity or, at worst, an 
active attempt to thwart justice for Nazi criminals, in fact some legitimate legal and 
Constitutional concerns were put forward by the group about the INS prosecutions.  
Procedurally in the case of civil suits, for instance, respondents were not accorded the same 
rights as those being criminally charged, which often disadvantaged them. Hearsay evidence 
against them could be permissible. They did not receive jury trials but rather their fates were 
decided in an immigration court by the presiding judge alone. Eventually it would be 
established that they were not even completely protected against self-incrimination under the 
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, and the prosecution was always free to ask for 
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“adverse inferences” against anyone who chose to invoke it.449 Lastly, the respondents were 
not guaranteed legal representation because they were technically not being charged with a 
crime – the original raison d’être for the Latvian Truth Fund.  
As unlikely as it seems, the people who ran the Latvian Truth Fund, established at 
first to resist efforts on the part of the INS considered unconstitutional, might conceivably 
have been brought around by the brand new agency headed by someone with Walter 
Rockler’s credentials. The OSI could have offered the potential for a fresh start. A known 
quantity with personal ties to the Baltic immigrant community, he might have gained the 
trust and hence the cooperation of substantial sections of the Estonian, and perhaps, even 
Latvian and Lithuanian immigrant communities. Unfortunately, Rockler’s tenure as the 
Director of the OSI was very brief – only about a year.  
His replacement, Allan Ryan, Jr., shared Rockler’s zeal for a righteous cause, but 
lacked his knowledge, delicacy, and first-hand contact with the exiles. Perhaps partly out of 
frustration with the uncompromising attitude he encountered on the parts of the various 
Eastern European immigrant communities, in 1984 Ryan published a book. It came out 
shortly after his own tenure as Director of the agency was over. It can be regarded as the 
point-of-no-return for the ever more poisonous relationship between the agency and the 
exiles. 
 
The Gauntlet Seemingly Thrown Down 
Allan Ryan, Jr., from 1980 to 1983 the second Director of the Office of Special 
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Investigations, gave American Latvians much cause for concern when he published his book, 
Quiet Neighbors: Prosecuting Nazi War Criminals in America, in 1984.450 The book and its 
author quickly gained considerable notoriety.451 The launch of this book was likely intended 
to be a public relations offensive, by means of which the praiseworthy purpose of the OSI 
was to be presented to the American public and its noble and necessary mission promoted. If 
so, it seriously misfired in at least one sense: to the exiles’ wary eyes, in those parts of the 
book touching directly on Latvian issues, Ryan came across as a vehement and singularly 
undiscerning opponent. His attitude seemed to be one of cavalier hostility to the ethnic group 
at large – an attitude anathema to the core precepts of American individual justice and 
understandably regarded as highly threatening by the exile community.  
For instance, Ryan alarmingly chose to use scare quotes to suggest as problematic the 
idea that the Baltic states were “‘forcibly incorporated’” into the Soviet Union, even though 
this had been the official diplomatic stance of the United States government virtually since 
the moment Stalin, with Hitler’s odious blessing, first annexed them in 1940.452 Raising this 
point was also completely extraneous to the prosecution of war criminals and was seen as a 
heedless attack on the community at large and a strangely ingratiating gesture for a former 
American government employee to be making towards the USSR. As far as his professional 
relationship with his counterparts in the Soviet justice system – the real bone of contention 
from the Latvian perspective, the reasons for which are readily apprehended – he wrote of 
them fairly warmly and sometimes almost admiringly, meanwhile referring uncritically to 
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Rīga as one of the Soviet Union’s “provincial cities.”453 Even according to the Soviet idiom, 
Rīga at least qualified as the capital of a Republic, not to mention a very cosmopolitan one by 
the standards of the USSR. Notions such as these – even if they were, by the Latvians’ lights, 
only being espoused by an obnoxious American tourist who was just visiting Twentieth 
Century European history for the first time – were read with much foreboding. Most 
charitably, Ryan may have been attempting to unofficially court the Soviets for the benefit of 
his former office’s mission, although he would have perhaps done better to court the 
American Latvians. 
In fact, Ryan unapologetically defended the OSI’s good relationship with Soviet legal 
authorities. As the exiles could never forget and Jerome Legge reminds us, OSI cooperation 
with the Soviets was “a test of the US policy of ‘non-recognition’ of the Soviet annexation of 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.”454 Once depositions began to be taken in Rīga, since the 
Soviet Union never once let a person travel to the United States to testify, government 
officials from the OSI were forced to defend the slightly embarrassing circumstance that 
witnesses for the United States government were testifying under a portrait of Lenin. Even 
though American procedure was otherwise followed in the Soviet courtrooms, the fact that 
witnesses in the Soviet Union were not sworn in also tended to project a poor image of the 
process. 
Some more mundane byproducts of working with the Soviets also rankled American 
Latvians and were generally interpreted by them as signs of ignorance and insensitivity on 
the part of American officials. For instance, the inclusion of the patronymics of Latvian 
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witnesses and others was completely foreign to Latvian custom but de rigueur in official 
Russian and appeared regularly. Also, Russian names were used for places in Latvia in 
general throughout the proceedings. For example, the eastern Latvian city of Daugavpils 
virtually always appeared with its Russian name transliterated into English as Dvinsk – or 
worse, was somehow borrowed from a German transliteration of the Russian and was 
rendered as Dwinsk – as though the place was not even Latvian.455 Small signs such as these 
did not build confidence among the Latvians that ‘their’ respondents would be given a fair 
shake. Whether out of American ignorance or acquiescence, Latvians perceived ineffaceable 
Soviet fingerprints on much of the OSI’s work.456 They felt that the Soviets were subverting 
American justice and also poisoning their relationship with the nation that had hitherto been 
the most steadfast in giving them succor. 
For Ryan’s part, that he was personally unsympathetic to the cause of the Latvian 
exiles was somewhat more than subtly suggested by the title of his book’s very first chapter: 
“DISPLACED PERSONS: ‘You’ve Got Everything in this Camp Except Hitler.’” Ryan 
claimed that it was simply common knowledge in the aftermath of the war that the “Balt 
[DP] camps were thick with collaborators.”457 He may have been referring to Latvian Legion 
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POWs who crowded the DP camps, but if so, it only further highlights his illiteracy of the 
subject. The Legion as such was exonerated by the US government – his former employer – 
very shortly after the war. 
Even casual readers of Quiet Neighbors will not fail to note that for all of the 
innuendo against the refugees of Baltic origin that the text contains, neither Ryan’s 
organization nor its less effectual INS predecessor had successfully concluded its first case 
against any Latvian at the time this book went to press. By 1984, when Ryan published his 
book, the OSI had filed charges against one Estonian, eight Latvians, and thirteen 
Lithuanians among the tens of thousands of immigrants from the Baltic states.  In fact, 
among all of the accused whose cases were underway or pending that year, only one Latvian, 
BoĜeslavs Maikovskis, was eventually found to be deportable, and rightly so. Several years 
later, after Ryan had left the stage, a second Latvian would most deservingly be found 
deportable as well: Konrāds Kalējs, a former Arajs Kommando officer who is discussed in 
more detail below.  
As to overall numbers, Ryan’s estimate of about 10,000 individuals liable to 
prosecution among the immigrants, including those from the Baltic, proved to be wildly 
inflated. The government’s retrospective assessment itself acknowledged that the 134 cases 
eventually opened by the OSI as of 2006 would, indeed, have been scandalously “de 
minimus” if the original semi-formal appraisal had been accurate.458 This modest record does 
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not justify the indiscriminately accusatory tone taken by Ryan against the refugees.  
 These considerations begin to make comprehensible the mentality of the American 
Latvian community, which in turn reflexively leapt to the defense of any of its members who 
stood accused – a fact which the final government assessment of the OSI’s successes and 
failures reports but does not attempt to explain.459 This response did not happen because the 
Latvians – the majority of whom by the 1980s were probably natural-born US citizens 
anyway – were just innately fascistic and primitive Eastern Europeans. Rather, there was a 
fairly predictable dialectic between their community and their government as represented by 
the OSI. Quiet Neighbors was perceived by the American Latvians as an attack on their 
entire community and was taken especially seriously because it emanated from a high-level 
former agency director and thus seemed to represent a quasi-official position statement of 
the government with which American Latvians had been losing ground for over a decade. 
From their perspective, a gauntlet had been irrevocably thrown down, their worst suspicions 
about the OSI and the anti-exile and pro-Soviet bias of its personnel confirmed. For its part, 
the OSI itself seems to have been caught completely back-footed by Allan Ryan, Jr.’s book. 
Chances for cooperation, if any had existed, had been destroyed as of 1984. 
The publication of this book, Quiet Neighbors, was thus an act of some recklessness 
considering its consequences. Trial in the court of public opinion is an unfortunate part of 
living in an open, democratic society. But the public is not a jury, which fact Ryan should 
have more carefully minded. For a government agent charged with the administration of real 
justice to debase it by using his credibility as a former officeholder to enflame negative 
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sentiment against a whole category of fellow citizens was inappropriate and 
counterproductive. Justice would have been better served without suggesting the collective 
guilt of the exile community at large – an innuendo possibly motivated at least in part to hype 
his former agency’s mission and inflate its stature. An OSI director who possessed greater 
sensitivity and discernment might have contrived instead to enlist the help of members of the 
exile community in the search for criminals rather than do them rhetorical violence. This 
could have boosted the success-rate of the OSI, kept open the door to cooperation with the 
American Latvians, and better promoted the cause of justice. Rather than seriously 
attempting to open a dialogue, however, the agency’s former chief wrote a book that fairly 
foreclosed the possibility for future assistance from the American Latvian community, quasi-
formally recast its relationship to the United States government as oppositional, and thus also 
did a tremendous disservice to the OSI by finally depriving it of any possible future 
American Latvian cooperation. Feeling nakedly attacked, the Latvian exiles naturally closed 
ranks.  
Perceived attacks such as Ryan’s only spurred more generous donations to the 
Latvian Truth Fund. The difficulty was finding a lawyer willing to accept the unpopular 
assignment of defending accused Nazi persecutors. In the end, only one was found.  
 
The Little Birch, Attorney at Law 
Beginning in the 1970s and lasting through the 1980s, Ivars BērziĦš became the go-to  
defense attorney for immigrants from the Baltic states who stood accused by the INS or, 
later, the OSI. His success record may be better than any other lawyer who undertook such a 
duty in any country. He was paid largely by the Latvian Truth Fund. 
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Ivars BērziĦš, whose last name means “Little Birch,” spent five years growing up in 
Displaced Persons camps in Germany. In 1950, his parents received permission to move to 
the United States with their son. After first earning a college degree in civil engineering, Mr. 
BērziĦš went to study law – something he had dreamt about since high school. While the 
unforeseen course of his career quickly turned him into a minor celebrity in American 
Latvian society, rarely did BērziĦš go on the public record except in the courtroom. 
Ivars BērziĦš: Well, I don’t think that my career is that newsworthy. During all of the 
time that I was doing defense work, I never, never, spoke to any reporters. I always 
recognized that no matter what I said, it would not help my clients. I could stand on 
my head and it would not help. I recall one little newspaper in New Jersey, I was in 
US District Court in New Jersey. We won a case. And the next day, the headline read: 
‘Nazi Wins.’ Well [laughs]! He was not a Nazi! He was a poor Lithuanian schmuck 
accused of shooting Jews! You know [laughs], well: what Nazi? The fact that the 
government couldn’t prove its case against him sort of escaped the headline [laughs]. 
In other words: he was not a Nazi [laughs]! So the press uniformly was picking on my 
clients... So talking to the press, a long time ago I decided, was counter-productive 
and I never, never gave – matter of fact, I think you are the first interview in my 
life.460 
 
Despite the acclaim he earned in the relatively insular world of the American 
Latvians, his decision to defend this set of clients was hardly a boon to his legal career.  
Richards Plavnieks: So, before we talk about some of these cases: I was wondering if 
you could sort of fit them in to your overall career. How important, or how salient, 
were these cases over the entire arc of your practicing your profession? 
Ivars BērziĦš: Well, in a sense, they were devastating. Because once you touch a 
subject as ugly as this, people tend to shy away from you. Because they don't want to 
be tainted. I had quite a few experiences where I was trying to get local counsel in 
other areas and no attorney would come in to act as local counsel for me because they 
didn’t want to get tainted with this. In one instance, I had to go to the local bar 
association just to see if someone would undertake to act as local counsel. And there 
were no takers, so the court permitted me to proceed without local counsel. So, in a 
sense, it was a sacrifice to do this, because I got some – ostracized maybe is the word. 
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So it’s: it did not – did not – benefit me.461 
 
After hesitating and finally declining to answer whether or not he would undertake the task 
of defense counsel again, should, hypothetically, another such case against an accused 
Latvian arise, the interview with Mr. BērziĦš proceeded thusly: 
Richards Plavnieks: Okay, well. Maybe I could put it a different way, then. If you 
could go back in time, would you accept the cases? Especially in view of – as you’ve 
mentioned before – that it was damaging, ultimately, to your career, by and large. 
Ivars BērziĦš: Well, that again is a sort of philosophical – calls for a philosophical 
answer. You know, when you undertake to become an attorney, you sort of undertake 
to give people a defense, regardless of what they have done or not done. Everyone is 
entitled to counsel and the constitutional protections are meaningless if, as a practical 
matter, you are denied counsel. And in a lot of instances, these people would have 
been denied counsel if someone didn’t step forward and undertake the defense. I have 
in mind that attorney in Israel who undertook to defend Demjanjuk. I really have a lot 
of respect for him. Admiration, even. And I feel sorry for what happened to him. So 
in that sense, yes, I don’t really regret it because if I had rejected all of these – well, at 
least, you only reject the first couple. Afterwards, no one asks you. If I had rejected 
and looked back today, I would have said, ‘Boy, you know. I was a coward.’ [laughs] 
So, today at least I can look back and say ‘No, I was not a coward. I did what my 
profession calls for, and so I should not have regrets.’ And I, in that sense, I don’t 
have regrets. Because I can look back and say ‘Well, yes I could have disengaged 
myself and not have been a part of this and lived happily ever after,’ but then I would 
always have to look back and say ‘Well, I was a coward. I didn’t have the courage of 
my convictions.’462 
 
While perhaps his Latvian background suggests to some that BērziĦš took the cases 
out of a misplaced sense of national solidary, he refutes this. The background he shared with 
these clients was, however, more than simply incidental: it actually made him a logical 
choice for completely rational reasons:  
                                                           
461
 Ivars BērziĦš, Author’s interview with Ivars BērziĦš. Babylon, New York, 11 June 2011. 
 
462
 Ibid. Here, BērziĦš refers to the Israeli lawyer Yoram Sheftel. Acid was thrown into Sheftel’s eyes while he 
was attending the funeral of a colleague who worked with him on the Demjanjuk defense and who had 
committed suicide. Sheftel subsequently published a book expressing his belief in Demjanjuk’s innocence and 
alleging malfeasance on the part of the OSI and Israeli and German prosecutors, all of whom, using evidence of 
Soviet provenance, took their respective turns prosecuting him between 1977 and his death in 2012. See: Yoram 
Sheftel. Defending ‘Ivan the Terrible’: The Conspiracy to Convict John Demjanjuk. Haim Watzman, trans. 
Washington, DC: Regnery Publishers, 1996.   
 
 289 
 
Richards Plavnieks: Do you think that your ethnic background may have militated 
against your clients in the courtroom? Might they have been in, you know, in a 
hypothetical, better served by someone who wouldn’t be seen as having a dog in the 
race? 
Ivars BērziĦš: Yeah, that is difficult to say. Because at the beginning and actually 
throughout these cases, I think my background was very, very helpful. Because I had 
a much better grasp of where to look for information and to sift the irrelevant from 
the relevant than someone who had absolutely no background in that time period in 
history. So I think in that sense, my background was helpful. Also my command of 
the Latvian language was in some instances quite useful. Because I could question the 
witnesses in Latvian. Whether some results would have been better if it had been 
another attorney, who did not have this background, you know, that’s difficult to 
say.463 
 
Certainly, the relationship between BērziĦš and his West German defense attorney 
counterparts was not without some professional friction. For cooperating with BērziĦš, they 
wanted something in return. Throughout the months of March, April, May, and June 1979, 
Steinacker and other attorneys on Arājs’s team engaged in a prolonged process to obtain 
testimony from one of BērziĦš’s clients, Kārlis Detlavs.464 They wanted him to testify that 
“executions were carried out exclusively by German personnel” and that “if ever he [Arājs] 
was present at such executions in individual cases, he had no command authority whatever, 
which was exclusively in the hands of the Germans, and did not develop any activities on his 
own.”465 
Now, each of the attorneys was doing his duty to the respective clients, 
“safeguard[ing] his interests zealously within the bounds of the law” as Ivars BērziĦš phrased 
it. 466 Arājs’s lawyers were obligated to make the request, and Detlavs’s lawyer had an 
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obligation to refuse it. As the demand persisted, BērziĦš eventually wrote a sharp and 
defensive letter to Judge Wagner in Hamburg, explaining that “There is no way he could go 
to Hamburg, because he would never be permitted to return to the United States. When his 
great-granddaughter was being baptized in Canada, I could not even arrange with our 
Government to permit him to come back to the United States if he should visit Canada for a 
day. They would have barred his entry at the border.”467 The resolution of this disagreement 
will be treated below. 
The court records show that Mr. BērziĦš, like many other American Latvians, 
sometimes wore his politics on his sleeve. Even in the midst of defending his clients he 
referred, for example, to the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic as “Soviet-occupied Latvia,” 
to the mild annoyance of the Court.468 Likewise, Mr. BērziĦš often corrected mistranslations 
in the transcripts of video-taped depositions from Latvian into English and complained that 
the translators were furnished by the KGB. This attribution usually prompted chiding from 
the Court, which corrected him by averring that the witnesses had been furnished by “the 
Soviets.”469 
Mr. BērziĦš was also a wit in Court. Complaining once about what he viewed as the 
uncritical entrance into the record of documents of Soviet provenance that he mistrusted and 
which had not been forensically tested to his satisfaction, he remarked: “In other words, a 
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ham sandwich could be certified.”470 During one INS prosecutor’s direct-examination of his 
client, the following exchange took place that shows Mr. BērziĦš’s exasperation at the deficit 
of nuance in the government’s historical understanding: 
QUESTION: Let’s go to July of 1941. The disbanded Latvian Army was called up to 
assist the Germans to consolidate their hold of Latvia.  
MR BERZINS: Objection, Your Honor.  
THE COURT: On what grounds?  
MR. BERZINS: That question has umpteen assumptions in it.  
THE COURT: Break it down into components.471 
 
Objecting to a critical translation, Mr. BērziĦš once exclaimed to the Court: “This is 
cockeyed. I saw it. It's cockeyed.”472 And Mr. BērziĦš frequently got his way in the 
courtroom. In the same hearing, shortly before adjourning, the judge concluded: “Well, do 
you have any more documents? Why don't we have it translated? I think we better, instead of 
proceeding this way. It's embarrassing to the Government.”473 
BērziĦš followed the trial of Viktors Arājs on a virtually day-to-day basis throughout, 
both by means of the reports he paid Štāmers to generate, and via direct contact with the 
lawyers of Arājs’s defense team.474 This close attention undoubtedly paid dividends to 
BērziĦš and the clients he would defend in the course of the following decade. It gave him as 
good a picture of the Arajs Kommando and its crimes as had anybody in the world save the 
former Kommando members themselves. 
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The Case of Konrāds Kalējs Begins 
Konrāds Kalējs, whose family name simply means “smith,” was born in Latvia on 26 
June 1913. He attended the Latvian military academy during the years 1934 to 1937 and 
thereafter served in the peacetime Latvian army as a junior officer [“Virsleitnants”]. He was 
automatically inducted into the Red Army like everyone else in that position when the Soviet 
Union first absorbed Latvia in 1940.475 In June 1941, his unit was stationed in Gulbene, a 
small provincial market town, but he, along with most of his unit, melted into the forest upon 
news of the German invasion. 
While the government would prove that he became one of the top officers of the 
Arajs Kommando and a direct subordinate of Viktors Arājs himself, Kalējs naturally told a 
different story. He presented his activities during the war as those of a demobilized vet cum 
university student making ends meet by the sweat of his brow as a part-time farm hand – and 
no friend of the Germans.476 He had only met Arājs, he claimed, late in the war during their 
mutual duty in the Latvian Legion. In fact, during the trial, testimony made by Viktors Arājs 
from prison was entered in which he attempted to protect his former lieutenant by agreeing 
that the two only first crossed paths during their Legion days.477 
 The postwar path of Kalējs took him to the Displaced Persons camps where he 
became the police chief of the DP camp near Rotenburg which housed Latvians.478 After 
some years, he managed to relocate to Australia. He lived there until 1959, when he 
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immigrated to the United States. He did not, however, petition for citizenship. He led a quiet 
life, finally retiring from A.G. Nielsen Company, the famous polling and marketing research 
firm, on 1 July 1983, age 70.479 
 How exactly he was discovered is under some dispute. According to the government 
report, the “OSI serendipitously learned of his presence when searching for another member 
of the AK (Arajs Kommando). They learned that he was dead but that his widow was in the 
country. She was living with Kalejs, a name OSI recognized from the AK roster.” Professor 
Andrew Ezergailis, however, contends that the name, which does not appear in any Soviet 
publication, was given to them by a Latvian named Herman Redins.480 
Either way, what is remarkable is that all the way until October 1984, when the OSI 
first filed the deportation suit against him, Kalējs lived openly under his own name and 
apparently did so without drawing the slightest bit of legal or police attention to himself. In 
the United States and Australia at least, nobody was looking for him and he was not even 
trying to hide. There was no Soviet pressure either. At the time of his arrest in 1985, the 
recently-retired 71-year-old Kalējs was living in St. Petersburg, Florida. He was vacationing 
in Miami Beach in knowing defiance of a court order to report to his immigration hearing.481 
Indeed, his brazen attitude at his trial and multiple acts of tempting the law outside of his trial 
afterwards suggests contempt for his prosecutors and a complete lack of remorse or fear. 
 
The Threat of Deportation 
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The United States had no extradition treaty with the Soviet Union.482 However, OSI 
prosecutors did attempt to deport one denaturalized Latvian, BoĜeslavs Maikovskis, to the 
Soviet Union where, in all parties’ full knowledge, he had already been sentenced to death in 
absentia – a de facto extradition from his perspective at least. It is unclear what the 
provisions of the US offer contained but in another such case the Americans required that the 
prior absentia verdict be set aside and that the deported defendant only be tried on additional 
charges and with guarantees of due process. Probably, the application of such provisions was 
the OSI policy. Maikovskis’s own designated choice, Switzerland, barred him from entry. 
Instead, he managed to make it to West Germany, where a fresh trial against him was opened 
and quickly suspended because of his poor health.483 The official US government report 
would later imply that the prosecution was originally undertaken by the West Germans in 
part because of political considerations: the decision was announced a few days before 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s 1988 visit to Moscow, although this seems quite thin evidence for 
such a weighty accusation.484 
As it happened, while the threat always loomed, only one Balt, the Estonian Karl 
Linnas, in 1987, was ever actually removed from the United States to the Soviet Union. 
Although he died in prison in the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic of natural causes within 
three months of his arrival, he was deported having already been tried there in absentia in 
1962 and had also been sentenced to be executed.485 A Ukrainian, Feodor Federenko, was a 
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former guard at Treblinka. A denaturalization case was brought by the United States 
Attorney's Office against him in 1977. The litigation had made it to the Supreme Court by 
1981, not long after the OSI had gotten off the ground.486 Ultimately, Fedorenko was 
deported to the USSR in 1984, where he also faced charges. His story ended with his 
execution in 1987 – the year before Kalējs was given his deportation order.487 This could 
never be forgotten in American Latvian society; there was precedent for the American 
Latvians’ fear that the OSI’s practices could lead to what amounted to de facto extraditions to 
the USSR. 
 That deportation to the Soviet Union, rather than a simple prison sentence of 
whatever duration, was the possible penalty faced by the respondents also struck a uniquely 
sour chord with American Latvians because of their particular history. The natural associated 
historical reference that leapt into the minds of Latvians living in the United States was the 
doom of the three hundred Legionnaires, regarded as martyrs, who were executed almost 
immediately by the Soviets after being “repatriated” to the USSR in 1945. This transfer was 
made against their will by, in the view of the Latvian exiles, the craven and faithless 
government of Sweden, whence they had fled for their lives near war’s end. The thought that 
the mighty United States, like the Swedes before, would deliver them into the hands of their 
enemies was, for American Latvians, revolting and terrible to contemplate. Mr. BērziĦš said 
of the OSI’s attempt to deport anyone to the Soviet Union that: 
I thought that was gross. That was just gross. [pause] I still think that is gross. I mean 
the Soviet Union, they tried to prosecute the Germans for the Katyn Forest, you 
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know, at Nuremberg. To a regime like that, you treat them as if they were normal? 
They’re not normal. And to treat them as such, I thought was a black mark on the 
United States. I still think that.488 
 
The Burden of Proof and the Two Prongs of Chaunt 
 The burden of proof for most civil cases is the well-known formula of “the 
preponderance of evidence” or “the fair preponderance of the credible evidence.” However, 
for the revocation of citizenship, there is a higher burden in that “the evidence must be ‘clear, 
unequivocal, and convincing’ so not to leave ‘the issue in doubt,’” because “To require less 
‘would be inconsistent with the importance of the right that is at stake.’”489 That the burden 
of proof resembled that of a criminal case, even though the charge was civil, proved a large 
advantage for the respondents and their counsel, and made things much more difficult for the 
INS and OSI prosecutors to prevail in court. 
Various conditions were set forth in the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 that those 
hoping to immigrate to the United States were required to meet. Two relevant exclusions 
apply here, to wit, Sections 10 and 13. Section 13 stipulated that “No visas shall be issued 
under the provisions of this Act to any person who is or has been a member of, or 
participated in, any movement which is or has been hostile to the United States or the form of 
government of the United States,” while Section 10 stated that “Any person who shall 
willfully make a misrepresentation for the purpose of gaining admission into the United 
States as an eligible displaced person shall thereafter not be admissible to the United States.” 
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490
 The prosecutors needed to prove that the respondent had disqualified himself for entry and 
subsequent application for citizenship on either of these clearly related provisions of the law. 
 Among the arcana in American jurisprudence is a legal formula known as the 
“Chaunt Test,” so named after a landmark immigration case in the Supreme Court in 1960 
involving an immigrant who had failed to disclose his arrest record and membership in the 
Communist Party in his petition for US citizenship.”491 The legal reasoning behind the 
Chaunt ruling – the “test” – consisted of two “prongs,” or criteria that had to be met by the 
government before denaturalizing a respondent. In essence, the test is simple: the prosecution 
must prove that the respondent, first, made a willful misrepresentation or concealment in his 
or her petition for citizenship, and secondly, that this misrepresentation or concealment was 
material to the petitioner’s eligibility.492 Various elaborations were also devised as the 
precedent congealed over the course of later cases. 
 Mr. Jack Liebhof, a veteran of the United States Army, did work for the Department 
of State after his discharge and became the US Consul in Melbourne, Australia, in the late 
1950s. He had been in charge of visa operations. Over the course of his career, which also 
took him to South America, he estimated that he had issued about 1,000 visas. On 3 
December 1958, he issued one to Konrāds Kalējs.493 Mr. Liebhof testified at the immigration 
hearing in 1988 that “applicants with involvement, serious involvement in Nazi activities, we 
would consider them also [in addition to Communists ‘under the provisions of the 
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Immigration Nationality Act’] ineligible, basically.”494 Questionable cases would be sent to 
the Visa Office in Washington, DC, for an “advisory opinion.” Yet the visa application of 
Kalējs raised no red flags and was approved without a hitch. Kalējs just lied. 
Ivars BērziĦš: The identities were very difficult to establish. If the target itself did not 
incriminate himself, in some instances it was almost impossible to establish the case, 
I thought. And that brings us to a very interesting aspect of it all, namely: the Fifth 
Amendment.495 
 
The Fifth Amendment 
Within a week of the opening of the proceedings in 1988, Konrāds Kalējs was called 
to the witness stand. On the advice of his counsel, Mr. BērziĦš, he repeatedly pleaded the 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless 
on presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or 
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; 
nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice in jeopardy of life or 
limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private 
property to taken for public use, without just compensation.496 
 
After stating only his name, to each of the questions during his direct examination by 
the OSI team, Kalējs repeated the sentence: “I decline to answer on the grounds that my 
answer might tend to incriminate me.”497 After this persisted for a conspicuously long time, 
Judge Petrone intervened, but BērziĦš replied: 
Yes, Your Honor, the Respondent, upon my advice, will decline to answer each and 
every one of the questions put to him by the OSI attorneys on the grounds that the 
answer might tend to incriminate him, and he is invoking his privilege against self-
incrimination under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of 
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America.498 
 
In response, the prosecution asked that the Court make “adverse inferences” each time the 
respondent declined to answer on the basis of the Fifth Amendment. The prosecution could 
then frame questions in such a way as to more-or-less compel the respondent’s answer – the 
“adverse inferences” would have been too detrimental not to answer. Respondents could still 
lie, however. 
Not peculiar to the Kalējs case, this was in fact a major strategy of BērziĦš across 
many of his cases. Mr. BērziĦš, almost ten years earlier, had vigorously opposed allowing his 
client, Kārlis Detlavs, to testify in the trial of Arājs. However, a compromise in that instance 
was eventually reached. Finally ordered by the United States District Court for the District of 
Maryland to place Detlavs on the stand, he did so. But the Hamburg Court would have to 
come to him; he would not leave the country out of fear of never being let back in. 
Judges Wagner and Görtz, along with the prosecution in the form of Lothar Klemm 
and the defense in the form of Fritz Steinacker and Hannelore Cermak-Schwanen, all flew to 
Washington, DC, where they stayed in the Watergate Hotel, no less. The proceedings did not 
take long: Mr. Detlavs merely informed the Court that “I decline to answer on the ground this 
might tend to incriminate me,” after which the transcript records that the judge asked “Does 
anybody of the members of the German Court being present wish to have any further 
questions asked of the witness? (Members of the German Court shake their heads.)”499 For 
some reason – perhaps because adducing “adverse inferences” would be problematic in a 
German court, in this case, the matter was allowed to drop. 
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The Bombing 
The frustrations of some members of the public with the US system’s treatment of 
suspected Nazi persecutors, seen alternately as inept or, more often, too indulgent towards 
the defense, eventually boiled over. In 1982, quite some time before the legal battle of 
Kalējs, charges were filed by the OSI in the Federal District Court in Long Island against 
Elmars Sproăis, who came to the United States in 1950. He was charged with having 
perjured himself when he signed the requisite form attesting that he had never participated in 
any persecution on the basis of race, religion, or nationality. It had emerged that he had been 
an assistant to the chief of police in the small provincial Latvian town of Madona, home to 
approximately 100 to 150 Jews who were murdered in short order, almost certainly by a 
detachment of the Arajs Kommando in a ‘Blue Bus’ action, after the German takeover in 
1941.500 The two witnesses produced by the Soviets upon request – one perpetrator and one 
victim, as it happened – were, in the Court’s judgment, not to be considered reliable as they 
seemed coerced and their testimony was contradictory. No additional proof could be found 
that Sproăis had actually participated in any specific criminal acts besides being a jailor of 
Jews and apportioning their property to their killers. He would confess to nothing more, 
although other alleged actions of his had been luridly described in various Soviet 
publications. The Court judged that his participation in the incarceration of Jewish people as 
Jewish people and handling the allotment of Jewish-owned property to the murderers was 
merely “magisterial” in capacity and did not amount to “active participation.” Furthermore, 
since he had honestly identified himself on his immigration application as having been a 
policeman in wartime Latvia, he was deemed not guilty of misrepresentation according to the 
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law. Although this was an early case for the OSI and the judges in future cases would not 
much rely on the dubious finding with its extremely narrow definition of what constituted 
“persecution” as precedent, in 1984 the judge in this case did rule in favor of Mr. Sproăis.501  
A bombing at the Sproăis residence followed this ruling in September 1985. The 
bomb “severely burned” an innocent passerby who saw the fire caused by the explosion and 
attempted to warn the occupants of the house.502 Although both Elmars Sproăis and his wife 
were at home, unlike the Good Samaritan, neither was injured. According to news reports: 
“the Long Island newspaper Newsday received two apparently recorded telephone calls 
shortly after the explosion in which the voice said: ‘Listen carefully. Jewish Defense League. 
Nazi War Criminal. Bomb. Never Again.’”503 Coincidentally, the victim of a similar early-
morning bomb attack died of his injuries – including the loss of one leg – within hours of the 
attack at Sproăis’s home.504 Before and after this incident, it may be noted, Ivars BērziĦš 
lived in Long Island. 
Later, when Konrāds Kalējs was in court in 1988, the prosecution had occasion to call 
a Los Angeles attorney, Jeffrey Mausner, who until January of 1986 had worked for the OSI. 
Exhibits in the form of the transcripts of two interviews that he had conducted in 1984 in the 
course of his duties with Elmars Sproăis were entered into the record. Here, Mr. BērziĦš 
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objected, saying “I have not been taught how to cross-examine a piece of paper. I don’t know 
how.”505 The Honorable Judge Patrone responded by asking him if Mr. Sproăis could be 
produced in person, in that case. To this the unflappable Mr. BērziĦš replied that “His house 
was bombed a little while ago, but he survived. Unless it was bombed again over the 
weekend, he should be alive.”506  
While Mr. BērziĦš was indulging in a bit of black humor as he often did, this was 
obviously not a trifling matter. That such acts of vigilantism – or even a form of terrorism – 
occurred is disturbing. The violence indicates a certain perceived deficiency in the American 
judicial process, at least among those radicalized enough to see their own version of justice 
done by means of extra-legal violence. These acts were clearly the result of the frustration of 
some in the failure of the constituted authorities to punish these people who were seen as 
gravely guilty of capital crimes. In both cases, the attacks came not long after the acquittals 
of the intended targets. Needless to say, such acts also may have bolstered Latvian feelings of 
victimhood. Certainly, they generated greater sympathy for the perceived plight of the 
American Latvian community among its native rightwing political allies. 
 
The Right Fights Back 
In general, as the more leftwing of the two parties in the American political system, 
the Democrats were mistrusted by many, if not most, American Latvians virtually by default. 
Instead, from Eisenhower through the McCarthy years, to those of Nixon, Ford, and 
especially the exalted Ronald Reagan, all the way to the presidency of George Herbert 
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Walker Bush and the surprisingly pathetic collapse of their Soviet foe, the Latvian exiles in 
America were a compact and reliable Republican constituency.507 As the community gained 
its footing in the new country, establishing its own churches and hobby and sports societies, 
sending its youth into the university and the armed forces, and gradually making appreciable 
economic headway, it also became something of a single-issue political lobby, often 
embodied in the form of the American Latvian Association (ALA). Their rigid anti-
Communist stance brought a ready-made set of rightwing political confederates over to the 
Latvian immigrants’ side.508 The Reaganite campaign posturing against the “Evil Empire” 
and the cult of the Cold Warrior that saw its apotheosis in the 1980s solicited enthusiastic 
American Latvian activism and contributions to Republican candidates up and down the 
ballot. 
In the 1980s, the trials became the subject of popular political debate and put the 
American Latvian community under the glare of the national spotlight. While the OSI itself 
responsibly refrained from wading into the political dispute, it was defended by an array of 
supporters who varied in their ardor. Allan Ryan, Jr., probably went the furthest beyond an 
appropriate defense of the OSI and instead endangered it by attacking innocent people.509 
Much more difficult to understand are the OSI’s detractors. In return for its decades-
long brand loyalty, the American Latvian community did not stand alone in its pushback 
against the Office of Special Investigations and the advocates of its prosecutorial mandate. 
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Political pressure groups like Americans for Due Process and the Coalition for Constitutional 
Justice and Security sprung up overnight. Leading rightwing commentators like Pat 
Buchanan, to choose perhaps the most prominent example, took to the microphone not only 
to protest against the OSI, but actually to defend the accused. “I see these people as 
undefended. Someone is called a Nazi war criminal, and there is an automatic presumption of 
guilt, not of innocence,” decried Buchanan.510 Former CIA Director William Colby praised 
one accused Latvian in a nationally televised interview for his service with the agency. The 
man had specialized with notable success in the recruitment of Soviet Latvian defectors.511 
 Overlapping the many Republican politicians and pundits among the active 
supporters of the American Latvian cause in public resistance to the OSI were also a great 
many military personnel. Numerous young American Latvians had fought in Korea and in 
Vietnam not only as draftees but as volunteers because they believed their sacrifice to thwart 
Communism and blunt its expansion in Asia would hasten the liberation of their own country 
in Europe, even if they had never yet set foot there. Their impassioned anti-Communist 
commitment – gained by many of them though searing firsthand experience on Asian battle 
fields, or through osmosis from their parents’ experiences during the Second World War – 
was from the dawn of the postwar period until the final ruin of the USSR highly valued by 
the United States government. The military especially, and retired service members as well, 
naturally, tended to view American Latvians as completely faithful and reliable defenders of 
the American way and a rock-solid block of resolved enemies of Communism. This fond 
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relationship extended past the realm of rhetorical platitude. When cases against Latvians and 
exiles of other Eastern European nationalities began opening, the Veterans of Foreign Wars 
(VFW) moved to publically defend them. Indeed, as Jerome Legge found, in 1984 the VFW 
termed the Office of Special Investigations “the willing and subservient official American 
Government tool of the Russian empire.”512 The military itself had no legal ability to express 
views on political matters, but non-governmental organizations such as the VFW could do so 
by proxy without controversy or risking very bad publicity. 
More because of a specific confluence of interests rather than a formal and 
‘principled’ alliance, the American Latvians also sometimes found themselves in the same 
room with more extreme and even less palatable allies: the writers and editors of the 
execrable Institute for Historical Review – the notorious pseudo-academic faction of 
America’s anti-Semitic Holocaust denier community. One “revisionist” of their number, Ted 
O’Keefe, criticizing the OSI and Mr. Ryan’s book, asked  
What to make of a procedure so clumsy, and so shabby, that it would be laughed out 
of a police court if it ever so much as came to a hearing? Clearly it has little to do 
with the norms of justice in America. Then again, the OSI is scarcely an American 
body. It serves no American purpose, its investigations are dependent almost entirely 
on evidence supplied by the U.S.S.R. and witnesses produced from abroad, mainly 
from Israel, and nine-tenths of its activity is focused on events which occurred in 
countries far from America and which didn’t involve Americans. Only two aspects of 
the OSI’s activities are American: Americans foot the bill, and several hundred 
Americans are being stripped of their rights and driven from their country.”513 
 
Thus, some rightwing opponents of the OSI were only partially motivated by what 
they perceived as Communist-inspired attacks on fiercely anti-Communist exiles in the US, 
and their critiques bled easily into Holocaust denial. Here, they showed themselves to be 
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dubious friends indeed. For schizophrenically, while condemning the OSI’s prosecution of 
suspect immigrants, the same people deployed the accused as alibis for the German 
perpetrators and for German policy, using them to whitewash German responsibility for the 
Holocaust at the expense of the “spontaneous” actions of putatively less civilized Eastern 
Europeans. A common claim of the promoters of the “Germanless” Holocaust thesis was that 
“The pogroms were evidently initiated by the Latvians themselves, as reprisals for what the 
outraged Latvians saw as Jewish oppression and murder during the Soviet occupation.”514 
While deploring the OSI, radical “revisionist” Holocaust historians like these were thus still 
happy to sacrifice the Latvians among others to their higher cause, claiming that whatever 
few killings had actually taken place, had occurred at the hands of primitive non-Germans. In 
the end of course, these dishonest, partial allies were not worth having. Their association 
with the American Latvian community not only besmirched Latvian honor but brought 
everlasting disrepute to their cause, as well. 
 
The End of Konrāds Kalējs 
The legal defense of Konrāds Kalējs was hindered chiefly by two factors: first, his 
prominence in the Arajs Kommando meant that more documentary evidence and, especially, 
witnesses could be found in the Soviet Union. Second, since Kalējs was an Australian, not 
and American, citizen, his prosecutors only needed to obtain a deportation – not a more 
difficult denaturalization – ruling.  
Hearings began as early as 1985, but the main immigration proceedings themselves 
publically opened on 14 April 1988 and were completed on 3 August 1988. They left a 
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transcript of around 1,400 pages. Kalējs was there in person every day.515 
Although a number of survivors of the Holocaust in Latvia testified from around the 
world, the most damaging testimony came from a dozen male witnesses from the Soviet 
Union. These men, testifying on camera in Rīga courtrooms, were former Arajs Kommando 
members who had been convicted by the Soviets. All of them had served at least ten years in 
labor camps, some of them twenty-five. In the event, some no longer felt much loyalty to 
former Lieutenant Kalējs.516 
A handful of expert witnesses were also called, mainly to forensically verify the 
authenticity of a variety of wartime documents produced by the Soviets. These were top 
Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and 
Firearms (ATF) analysts who were able to confirm that the documents were physically 
authentic in terms of paper, ink, typewriter, glue, and so forth. Moreover, the renowned 
Professor Raul Hilberg testified in order to establish the historical context, although he had 
nothing to say specifically about Kalējs himself. 
 Besides first opting for the Fifth Amendment and later testifying as evasively as 
possible, there was little for Kalējs could do once the forensic and translation-based 
challenges to the evidence provided by the Soviets were dismissed. He managed to produce 
certificates of good conduct from US and British Armies from the late 1940s and early 
1950s. Other attempts to introduce positive evidence to prove his good character ended in 
farce. For example, Erna Namgauds of Ontario, Canada, was on the stand when one of the 
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prosecutors intervened: “Excuse me, your Honor. Can I ask the Respondent to try and refrain 
from shaking his head after the questions are asked and before the witness answers?”517 
The story of Konrāds Kalējs did not end when he lost his case in 1988. Only in April 
1994 was Kalējs finally deported to Australia, having exhausted the last of his appeals. Both 
later the same year and again in 1995, he attempted to enter Canada, presumably to be nearer 
to his surprisingly steadfast female “long-time acquaintance” who lived in Winnetka, 
Illinois.518 The first time, he returned to Australia before any new legal proceedings could 
take place; the second time he was tried again and deported again, this time by the 
Canadians, although the process lasted well into 1997.519 Late that same year, he was 
intercepted by American authorities on his way from Australia to Mexico via Los Angeles.  
After he was refused entry, Kalējs briefly managed to drop off the map. With 
prodding from the American news program “20/20,” however, his fond female friend’s 
phone records were examined, which indicated frequent calls to Rugby, England. There, in 
1999, Kalējs was discovered living in a Latvian nursing home under a false name.520 With 
the OSI’s continued goading – “OSI worked to keep the spotlight on Kalejs” – deportation 
proceedings were brought against him by the British and an inquiry was launched to 
determine how he had entered the United Kingdom in the first place. Kalējs returned again to 
Australia before being required to appear in a Crown court. Instead of a reprieve, he was 
greeted with legal pressure from yet another direction. The OSI energetically helped to stir 
up an international outcry, and the government of the independent Republic of Latvia issued 
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an indictment of Kalējs in 2000 and requested his extradition. He was arrested by Australian 
police. Less than a year later, while the complicated extradition process was still in progress, 
he died.521 All of that time, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, in contrast to the 
US, could try, convict, and imprison Nazi criminals for the real crimes at issue, rather than 
just for fraudulent entry. Thus, ultimately it was potentially more dangerous for Kalējs to be 
in those countries than in the United States. He was simply audacious and showed no fear. 
 
SUMMARY 
 Professor Ezergailis argues in Nazi/Soviet Disinformation About the Holocaust in 
Nazi-Occupied Latvia.‘Daugavas Vanagi – Who Are They?’ Revisited, that the reliance of the 
OSI on the Soviet press and propaganda arm led to the rather embarrassingly low rate of 
convictions in cases against Latvian immigrants. In other words, he says that Soviet 
interference sent US justice authorities on wild goose chases and, in effect, obstructed justice 
for political reasons. The American government, in his story, struggled with flawed cases 
against innocent people while, he rightly points out, truly guilty parties not mentioned in the 
Soviet books, such as Konrāds Kalējs no less, roamed free. Ivars BērziĦš tends to dispute 
this, however. He believes that such literature was never taken seriously by the government, 
although its effect upon the public may have been corrosive to the American Latvians’ 
reputation.522 For his part, Dr. Steven Rogers, one of the OSI’s most experienced in-house 
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investigative historians who worked for the agency literally from start to finish, relates that 
the OSI was aware of the publications and did scrutinize their claims, subjecting them to a 
rigorous fact-checking process and discarding everything that would not pass muster in an 
American court. The publications evidently did provide one starting point for the infant 
agency, but it was more-or-less quickly outgrown. 
Obviously, the prosecutors working for the OSI did not waste resources or risk their 
reputations or that of their organization by bringing charges against people they did not 
believe were guilty and who could not be convicted in open court. Systemic reasons, in fact, 
account for the greater part of the explanation for the very large proportion of the cases 
brought against American Latvians that resulted in the government’s failure to convict. 
Firstly, the late date that efforts were undertaken meant necessarily that some worthwhile 
investigations were prematurely halted or were perhaps never even begun in the first place 
because the subject of that investigation was already dead or dying. Secondly, it should not 
be considered a mere coincidence that the most convincing conviction was that of an Arajs 
Kommando officer. Cases against less prominent members of less conspicuous formations 
were understandably more difficult for the prosecutors to prove. The evidence required to tie 
a specific respondent to a specific unit – much less a specific illegal act or acts – was much 
more difficult to produce when both the person and the unit were more obscure. Lastly, 
several cases were horribly and unambiguously botched by the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service before the Office of Special Investigations arrived on the scene, as 
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Allan Ryan, Jr., rightly says. The OSI then faced obstacles in re-trying them because of laws 
against “double jeopardy” – the practice, prohibited by the Fifth Amendment, of the 
government simply charging a person over and over for the same alleged offense until it 
obtains the desired verdict.523 
Although for the purposes of this chapter – that is, to the American Latvian 
community more generally and the cases related specifically to the Arajs Kommando in 
particular – the  record of the Office of Special Investigations may not seem very good, the 
set of cases brought against Latvian defendants was something of an exception. In fact, the 
OSI was overall a very successful agency in terms of fulfilling its mission, and a credit to the 
dignity of the United States and its sometime commitment to justice. Even their adversaries 
in the courtroom praised the lawyers, researchers, and historians of the OSI as “formidable 
opponents” who were “probably the most professional war crimes prosecutors on this 
planet.”524  
The claim might therefore be leveled that the United States behaved too assiduously, 
was too scrupulous in observing the rights of those who stood accused. Yet, the fruits of the 
United States legal process by the INS and, especially, by the OSI, are also to be found far 
beyond the walls of the courtroom. Beside their prosecutorial performance, the volunteers of 
the OSI were always aware of its secondary didactic function, which was explicitly aimed at 
providing a public information service.525 This aspect of its responsibilities was formalized in 
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its charter. Later, the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, passed on 8 October 1988, created a 
Nazi War Crimes Records Interagency Working Group.526 The Justice Department was 
represented in the group by the OSI, which thereby also helped to make the relevant 
documents in the possession of the United States available to researchers and to the public.527 
According to the 2006 government assessment of the OSI, “As a repository of World War II 
knowledge, the office has been called upon by various parts of the government to prepare 
reports to assist in non-litigative matters concerning the Holocaust.”528 
 Besides these positive outcomes, the US justice system improved itself in its legal 
theory and institutions as all of this developed. Today, the OSI no longer exists but it does, in 
a sense, live on. In 2010, it was merged with the Domestic Security Section, also a part of the 
Justice Department. This new creation is called the Human Rights and Special Prosecutions 
Section (HRSP), and enjoys a broader mandate than OSI ever had. Its mission is to pursue 
and prosecute international criminals and human rights violators abroad as well as keep them 
out of the United States and expel any that enter. It also acts in an advisory role in shaping 
related policies.529 
With regard to American Latvians, it might be said that before the investigations of 
the INS and the OSI, they were largely ignorant of Latvian complicity in the Holocaust. 
Compounding this fateful ignorance was the fact that the allegations and evidence were seen 
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as originating in the detested Soviet Union. Even worse, the charges came precisely at a time 
when American Latvians saw their privileged status as pitied and honored victims of 
Communism slipping in a country that was simultaneously learning about the Holocaust and 
beginning to recoil from the superpower game of nuclear brinkmanship. The cooperation of 
the OSI with the Soviets carried the odor of American accommodation and seemed to entail a 
permanent US acquiescence to what they regarded as the criminal and forceful annexation of 
Latvia. Many even considered a public legal reckoning with the crimes that were committed 
during the war as an impediment to the overriding goal of defeating the USSR and restoring 
Latvian independence. These were almost certainly the main factors shaping American 
Latvians’ generally hostile and disgusted reaction to the trials, fairly or unfairly. The 
community’s resistance to the government’s honorable efforts, and its enlistment of dubious 
allies, is not to be excused, but it can be understood without resorting to denigrating 
stereotypes about Eastern Europeans with innate fascist propensities and without denigrating 
innocent people as Nazis. They behaved as one might expect any other group would have 
under this unique set of circumstances. 
 It is to be hoped that the OSI’s educational mission will have had its influence upon 
American Latvians as well, in the final analysis. This author is proof that, to some extent at 
least, it has. As time goes on, the importance of the research and educational functions of the 
OSI will only become more apparent. In the 1990s, not only had the Soviet Union vanished, 
but the men of the generation who were of military age during the Second World War who 
might have been legally culpable for their actions at that time were also disappearing. Thanks 
to the OSI, that much more of the record has been preserved.
  
CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION:  
JUSTICE FOR SOME, THE TRUTH FOR ALL OF US 
Concerning a crime of the magnitude of the Holocaust – and the manifold tributary 
crimes such as those committed by the men of the Latvian Auxiliary Security Police – 
something like real justice for the perpetrators and their victims can at the very best only be 
approximated. Combining the 356 men of the Arajs Kommando tried by the Soviets with the 
unknown but appreciable number of wartime combat deaths and the smattering of trials in the 
West, likely one-third to one-half of Arājs’s men found some form of justice sooner or later. 
While a high proportion by the standards of justice visited upon the perpetrators of the 
Holocaust in general, this figure is nevertheless deeply unsatisfying. What is more, even 
those who did stand trial in whatever venue – a snap SMERSH or NKVD troika, a Red Army 
Tribunal being broadcast live, an exacting West German process, a secret Stasi inquisition, or 
a US immigration court – most faced penalties wholly incommensurate to the crimes of 
which they were accused. Not only could some of the punishments faced have been more 
severe, but given the special nature of the crime of genocide, appropriate sentencing was in 
principle impossible. 
The principal function of each individual trial was the weighing of evidence and the 
determination of individual guilt or innocence, followed by the sentencing of the guilty. One 
should not lose sight of this narrow but fundamental function of each trial. But the case of 
each individual defendant must be placed alongside the wider issues – revenge, closure of the 
 315 
 
victims, rehabilitation, deterrence, and establishing the wider historical truth and educating 
the public about it. Of these other possible objectives, the latter two were clearly the most 
successfully met. Revenge on behalf of, much less closure for, the few surviving Jewish 
victims was clearly nowhere a goal of the competent authorities. Neither was any sort of 
human rehabilitation of the convicted seriously contemplated or, indeed, even possible. Not 
even after a quarter century of hard labor served in Siberia could a convict fully regain his 
rights as a Soviet citizen, for example, and if convicted in the United States, the convict was 
reviled as an outcast and banished. In view of the war crimes around the globe that took place 
subsequent to and, in some cases, even contemporaneously with these trials, they plainly 
failed as prophylactic deterrents to aspiring génocidaire. Regardless of one’s philosophy, 
then, by process of elimination, aside from determining individual guilt the subsidiary 
functions of the legal proceedings against the men of the Arajs Kommando have always been 
first, the establishment of a historical record of their crimes, and second, the promotion of the 
public’s awareness of them. It is mainly on this basis, then, that the present study has 
attempted to compare and judge the various systems of justice involved.  
In early 1979, Viktors Arājs penned a letter to Der Spiegel, a major West German 
weekly news and opinion magazine. Although the magazine did not publish this self-
proclaimed “correction” of its coverage, the Hamburg Court was startled that Arājs had 
contrived to open a direct dialogue with the media. The presiding judge himself, Dr. Wagner, 
wrote to Der Spiegel and upon request was provided a photocopy of the Arājs letter.530 It 
read as follows: 
Re: Correction to your report “War Crimes – War Graves” in Der Spiegel Issue 52, 
Page 55. 
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As a Spiegel reader of many years, I was very pleased with your coverage of the so-
called war criminals. Allow me to quote briefly from my correction. Thirty years ago 
I was acquitted by an English War Crimes Tribunal because the so-called witnesses 
could no longer truly remember. [Yet] [t]oday – after 30 years – they can. Doesn’t the 
unavoidable question pose itself, that this is happening only because of the pressure 
of certain press and media? Just to correct the record: you identify me as SS-Man and 
Obersturmbannführer [SS Lieutenant Colonel]. Neither of these corresponds to the 
facts. As a Latvian citizen, I could never become a member of the SS or Waffen-SS. 
My membership was in the Volunteer Latvian Legion, where, shortly before the end 
of the war, I was promoted to Sturmbannführer [SS Major]. Through the general 
negative press reportage about me, I get an ever stronger feeling that I am the object 
of a public spectacle, not the subject of jurisprudence, as it truly should be.531 
 
The assertions that he had been acquitted by an Allied Commission and that he only 
attained his rank near the end of the war, as well as the insinuation that he had exclusively 
served as member of the Latvian Legion, were totally bogus. Also untrue was his last 
statement to the effect that his trial was some kind of media-directed witch-hunt being staged 
for the cruel amusement of the masses. The lies in this letter represent an extremely clumsy 
and squalid, self-serving maneuver desperately or perhaps naïvely conceived as an appeal to 
the press, and thereby to the public at large, for sympathy. 
This strange message can still, however, serve as a reminder that an equitable society 
must balance justice between secrecy and sensation the better to discover the truth. The 
cliché that “daylight is the best disinfectant” holds; transparency in the legal process is 
important to staving off corruption. But even this must be balanced in such a way as to keep 
said daylight from becoming a scorching blaze. Courts must keep themselves impartial, 
independent of and above ‘the mob,’ and justice must be kept, to use another cliché, blind.  
The Soviet Union succeeded in alternately exceeding both extremes of this spectrum. 
First, it withheld the solid information gleaned from its captives and instead supplied a 
                                                           
531
 Ibid., pp. 6970-6971. “Betr.: Richtigstellung Ihres Berichtes ‘Kriegsverbrechen – Kriegsgräben.’ im Spiegel 
Ausgabe 52, Seite 55.” Hamburg, 8 January 1979. Emphasis added. 
 
 317 
 
warped version of events for public consumption quite at odds with what its own 
investigations were establishing. Later it indulged in making trials into public spectacles 
turned to political purposes. Its East German satellite trespassed, for purposes that refer only 
to the legal aftermath of the Arajs Kommando’s crimes, on the side of excess secrecy alone. 
Its inception was almost certainly purely political in motivation and it was handled extremely 
unskillfully, resulting in neither due process and a just verdict nor any enhancement to 
historical knowledge 
Despite Arājs’s complaints, he received due process and a fair trial in West Germany. 
One essential aspect of this was transparency: the right of public and free press to observe 
and report as a check against injustice, without the interference of ulterior political purposes 
of the state. West Germany and the United States probably struck the proper balance: non-
sensitive information was made available by the state, but it was left to a free press to set the 
level of coverage according to the interest (and in the interests) of the public. The media and 
public were free to observe from the gallery, pundits were free to say what they would, but 
the government did not officially promote or advertise the case. The records show that no 
party to the Hamburg trial – save Arājs himself, as was just shown – attempted to go beyond 
the walls of the courtroom and make its case before anyone but the judges. 
It has been argued that a key defining feature for assessing the trials – beyond the 
justice faced by the individual men accused of committing crimes as members of the Latvian 
Auxiliary Security Police – is what those judicial efforts have contributed to our historical 
knowledge of that unit’s crimes. The final fate of one additional member of the Arajs 
Kommando may serve to bring this thesis into relief. Despite all of the deficiencies of the 
Soviet and East German trials, very important evidence was gathered by the former and the 
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latter at least respected some limits in terms of not torturing their suddenly uncooperative and 
even defiant suspect. In punishing the perpetrators, the alternative to trials, even highly 
flawed ones, was to focus solely on achieving the maximum revenge. The state-organized 
assassination of Herberts Cukurs represents the quintessential case-in-point. 
On 23 February 1965, an international act of state vigilantism, if such is not a 
contradiction in terms, was committed. Herberts Cukurs, a former officer in the Arajs 
Kommando and a figure far more salient in postwar victim testimony than Arājs himself – 
especially when it came to wonton acts of hands-on brutality – was assassinated in 
Montevideo, Uruguay, by an Israeli Mossad team.532 After a lengthy process of earning his 
trust and propositioning him with lucrative deals for his air tourism business, the Mossad 
agents lured him from his haven in Brazil to a small house in the Uruguayan countryside. 
There, the members of the squad waiting for him bludgeoned Cukurs to death with a hammer 
after their only firearm, a pistol, malfunctioned. The battered corpse was stuffed into a trunk 
with a note from “Those Who Shall Never Forget.” An anonymous letter was sent to the 
Associated Press office in Bonn, West Germany, including an address where his body could 
be found.533 
As satisfying as the act probably was to the men who killed him, they could have 
done no greater disservice to their own cause and all of ours, more generally.534 A trial for 
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Cukurs, especially as a former Arajs Kommando officer, could likely have yielded untold 
information about the unit and its operations.535 A lost opportunity, the case of Cukurs is the 
exception that proves the rule. Ironically, the last words of Herberts Cukurs, according to his 
executioners themselves, were “Let me speak! Let me speak!”   
                                                                                                                                                                                    
of an extreme chauvinistic nationalist bent can perversely but accurately claim that no court ever convicted 
Cukurs of any crime and attempt to blur the stark divide between mass-murderer on the one hand and victim 
and even martyr on the other. For the current state of Cukurs-ology, see: Baiba Saberte. Herberts Cukurs: 
Laujiet man runat! Rīga: Jumava, 2010. The title means “Let me speak!” 
 
535
 Perhaps the political turmoil that resulted from the trial of Adolf Eichmann only a few years before had 
soured the Israeli leadership on that option. 
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